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A little over a
decade ago all eyes were set on Gaza City which in September 1994
jubilantly celebrated the arrival of Yassir Arafat, PLO Chairman, and
his comrades in the top PLO leadership after so many years of exile.
In accordance
with the Oslo agreement, signed a year earlier between the PLO and
Israel in a pompous U.S. hosted ceremony on the White House lawn,
Arafat had come to lead the recently created Palestinian National
Authority (PNA) whose role in accordance with the peace agreement was
to attend to the domestic municipal needs of the Palestinian
population under Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank but more
importantly secure Israel and Jewish settlements throughout the
1967-Israeli occupied territories from attacks by Palestinian
resistance groups or individuals. Although an overwhelming majority of
the Palestinian refugees in camps scattered across the region (ten
camps in Jordan, twelve in Lebanon, ten in Syria, 19 in the West Bank
and eight in the Gaza Strip) and in various other countries around the
world where they have become known as the Palestinian Diaspora, a
sizable proportion of the Palestinian population under occupation
sincerely thought and hoped that the creation of an Authority in their
name as part of a deal with Israel was the beginning of the end of
their suffering and the beginning of the materialization of their
dream in freedom and independence.
The Oslo deal had come as part of the search for an exit out of the
predicament in which Israel found itself having failed to extinguish
the flames of the Palestinian popular uprising, referred to now as the
first Intifada, that were ignited on 8 December 1987 after two decades
of humiliation under oppressive Israeli occupation. The peace making
process had also been in fulfillment of a promise pledged by the U.S.
George Bush (senior) Administration to the Arab countries that had
joined the U.S.-led alliance to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in
1991. Both the U.S. and its Arab allies saw a real danger in the
Intifada which could, potentially, have inflamed the entire region and
led to spillovers if not brought under control. As for the PLO, it had
already been significantly weakened by failure to deliver on its
promise to lead the Palestinian people toward emancipation and to
deliver them from their misery and had been suffering serious
financial difficulties on the one hand due to corruption and on the
other due to punitive measures taken against it by Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia as a result of Yassir Arafat’s open support for Saddam’s
invasion of Kuwait. Hence, the peace process, which started in Madrid
and ended in Oslo, amounted to a ‘kiss of life’ for the PLO; it
resuscitated it and restored its self-claimed position as ‘sole
legitimate representative’ of the Palestinian people endowing an
international recognition of such a status since both Israel and the
United States have accepted it.
However, as the late Edward Said always contended, Oslo amounted to no
more than a security arrangement in which the U.S. and Israel had
employed the PLO leadership to do on behalf of Israel what its troops
had failed to accomplish, namely maintain control over the Palestinian
population so that Israeli troops can be spared the hellish task of
suppressing the Intifada. The PNA was allowed to have a lightly armed
police force of about forty thousand men so as to provide the Jewish
colonizers with the safety and security that may enable them to have a
long-term worry-free occupation of Palestine.
The public euphoria soon subsided as more and more Palestinians
discovered that the new reality had turned to be anything but what
they dreamed of or where promised. The peace Israel agreed to make
stipulated security measures that necessitated the confiscation of
large areas of Palestinian lands to allow for the construction of
express highways for the exclusive use of Jewish settlers between
their settlements (colonies) and Israeli coastal towns as well as for
the expansion of existing Israeli settlements for what was alleged to
be essential security needs. An extremely inefficient and corrupt PNA
only augmented the suffering of the Palestinians; some of the most
senior PNA officials had cashed on Israeli settlement expansion
programmes by acting as contractors and middlemen importing cement and
providing other more menial services to the Israelis. For seven years
Palestinians saw their economic conditions worsen by the day and
whatever freedom they had erode by the hour.
As their suffering continued, Palestinians watched as Israel withdrew
its troops in disgrace and humiliation from South Lebanon, both
unilaterally and unconditionally, under the hammer of Hizbollah-led
Lebanese resistance. For more than seventeen years successive Israeli
and U.S. administrations flouted international law and all UN
resolutions insisting on Israel’s need to maintain a military presence
in the Israeli-occupied and self-proclaimed ‘security zone’ along
Lebanon’s southern borders with Palestine. Pressure building within
Israel – thanks primarily to the campaigns staged by mothers of young
soldiers serving in the Israeli army – was the key factor that ended
the Israeli intransigence over Lebanon; it brought about what had
previously been unthinkable: a unilateral withdrawal in the darkness
of the night. This was an important lesson for the Palestinians who
too were longing for freedom. But it took another factor to trigger
the second Intifada in late September 2000. That was the insolent
political-scoring intrusion into Islam’s third holiest mosque – the
Al-Qasa in Jerusalem – by the then leader of the opposition Ariel
Sharon. His desecration of one of Islam’s most venerated shrines was
interpreted at the time as a message to the Palestinians that nothing
in Palestine belonged to them and a gesture to the Israeli right that
were he to be voted into power he would accomplish for them the dream
of seizing the Islamic mosque, which they claim to be the site of
their mythical ‘temple’.
The second Intifada brought all peace-making to a grinding halt. Not a
single Palestinian faction, including Fatah – the backbone of the PNA
and the PLO, believed anymore in the viability of peace making with
the Israelis. The brutality of the Israeli troops prompted the
Palestinians to resort to force more than ever before. The cost to the
Palestinians has been enormous but so has it also been to the
Israelis. For the first time since the creation of the state of Israel
in 1948 the gap in the ‘ratio of death’ has been narrowed down to one
Israeli to slightly less than three Palestinians. Just before the
Intifada erupted the ratio was one Israeli to nearly a hundred
Palestinians. Sharon, who promised to deliver security to those who
elected him, had become Israel’s most costly prime minister.
The more brutal
he became the more he drove the Palestinians into the innovation and
adoption of new unprecedented means of resistance so much so that even
his eight meter high segregation wall has, technically speaking,
proven to be futile. Furthermore, the movement he sought to destroy,
Hamas, has had the opportunity to reap the fruits of the sacrifices it
has been forced to make in terms of a sharp rise in popularity and an
influx of recruits. As an exit out of this predicament Sharon, who was
known for many years to champion the cause of Jewish settlers, finds
no alternative to withdrawing from the Gaza Strip. His real problem is
that he cannot afford to do it unilaterally as former Prime Minister
Barak did in South Lebanon. He needs both Egypt and a loyal
Palestinian authority. To pave the ground for such a project Sharon
has wreaked havoc in the Gaza Strip creating several buffer zones and
hunting down field commanders and political leaders of the active
Palestinian military organizations, especially Hamas, Islamic Jihad,
Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the PFLP.
By killing so
many Palestinians and destroying so many houses, Sharon hopes to
convince his critics in Israel that his withdrawal plan is foolproof,
that it is the best that Israel can have under the prevalent
circumstances, and that all the necessary measures to guarantee its
success have been taken including, most importantly, the destruction
of Palestinian resistance groups. Placing himself in the wider global
picture Sharon boasted of waging the war against the Palestinians as
part of the overall ‘war on terrorism’ that is being conducted by the
U.S. Administration of his loyal friend George W. Bush.
*
The author is the Director of the Institute of
Islamic Political Thought, London