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Here we go again, confusing image with reality. Ariel Sharon’s formation of a new political party in Israel has been hastily welcomed as a seismic event that offers hope for the region. One misleading headline screamed ‘the hawk turns dove’. The author was apparently unaware that political transformations of this kind are extremely rare in Zionist Israel. Current realities suggest that it would not happen under the aegis of retired General Ariel Sharon. 

There was, understandably, deep scepticism in Palestinian circles with Sharon’s so-called shift to the centre of the political spectrum. Sceptics insist that in the twilight of hours of his political career the Israeli leader is too set in his ways to make the fundamental changes needed for peace.

In their search for clues some recall Mr. Sharon’s disclosures to the Israeli daily, Maariv, in an interview conducted on 25 January 1974 shortly after the disastrous 1973 October war. When asked whether he ever disobeyed a superior’s order he answered;

‘Yes, even in the last war. I tried not to carry out instructions. First of all I will tell you my own belief in this connection. When I receive an order I treat it according to three values: the first, and most important, is the good of the state. The state is the supreme thing. The second value is my obligation to my subordinates, and the third value is my obligation to my superiors. I wouldn’t change the priority of these three values in any way.’ [Peri, 1983]

This unbridled adulation of the state Abdelwahab Elmessiri reminds us in his critique of political Zionism, brought great tragedy upon humanity not too long ago in Europe. In their approaches to the state there is, he argues, a striking similarly between Zionism and Pan-Germanism. For whereas Zionism requires a Jew to prove his Jewishness by being an unconditional supporter of Israel, Pan-Germanism as advocated by the Nazis similarly declared that all peoples of the Aryan race owed their absolute loyalty to the German state, the Heimat. [Elmessiri, 1977]

When Ariel Sharon made those remarks in 1974 there was a massive public outcry throughout Israeli society. As the current political climate in the country is overshadowed by the military setbacks in the Gaza Strip, so too it was then clouded by the reverses suffered during the October War. The Cabinet appointed Agranat Commission which was set up to investigate the war ‘blunder’ summoned General Sharon to appear before it and explain his views. Not surprisingly, he claimed he was misquoted.

Although the Commission exonerated the General there were many in the media who were deeply sceptical and warned of his intentions. Mark Gefen, the Editor of Al Hamishmar in an article titled, ‘After the politization of the IDF – damage of militarization of political life’, called on Sharon to declare whether he had been inspired by divine providence to decide what was good for the state. Gefen pointed out worriedly that this was the first time in Israel’s history a public figure wanted to emulate the example of Latin American states by allowing the military to become involved in the struggle for state power.

There were, yet, other incidents from that period that raised eyebrows and which shed immense light on Sharon’s current political conduct. In 1975 he submitted a paper to Prime Minister Rabin urging the formation of a non-party government of experts. He suggested that Rabin should resign and run for elections at the head of a ‘personal list’. Before doing this, however, Sharon negotiated with his friends in the army for key positions in the proposed new government. He further proposed that the Commander in Chief of the army would become prime minister. Yoram Peri in his study of the Israeli military in politics observed, ‘the ideological heterogeneity and profound political differences between the proposed ministers only highlighted the main common trait – their military background.’

What’s in the Name?

Thirty years after suggesting to Rabin to resign and contest the elections as head of a ‘personal list’, Sharon has decided to do just that. After initially naming his party “National Responsibility” he quickly changed it to “Kadima,” or “Forward. The title “Kadima” has a certain significance and resonance in Israel’s military and political establishment. Zionist army officers used it to inspire their soldiers in their many military operations. By choosing this name Sharon has revealed something about his leanings, his methods and the constituency to which he now appeals.

If nothing is certain about this latest gamble it is evident his decision was largely influenced by Israel’s internal politics. Here, the struggle has less to do with ideology or world-view and much more to do with who wields actual power. In this regard Israel’s incumbent prime minister sees himself as Mr Security and in so far as the state is concerned, its security is paramount to everything else.

Given the manner in which the state of Israel was established, security and defence were always primary factors in its politics. Invariably, those who gained political power have been persons closest to the military establishment. Unlike the surrounding Arab states where officers tend to age in their positions, in Israel the turn over of senior officers from the army is rather frequent. As a result, relatively young people find themselves in the civilian labour market competing for limited jobs. Those who do not manage to move from the military into politics often become enticed by military adventures abroad.

Traditionally, officers are recruited into politics not because of their managerial skills but their heroism on the battlefield. This is precisely what Sharon is appealing to today. It is not surprising therefore that Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz was among the first recruits to the new party. The next few months are expected to witness a swelling of the Kadima’s ranks with other army veterans.

In the long run, their role would be crucial in shaping policy both internally and toward the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Although military strength is not the only means of guaranteeing national security, it is certainly the first in Israel’s case. For this reason former Haganah Field Commander Yigal Allon noted the relationship between security and foreign policy must be much stronger than in normal circumstances of international relations [Allon, 1959].

His Reading of the Road Map

Despite the rhetoric of religious hardliners Israeli leaders have for many years viewed the West Bank and Gaza as a political card that would be restored to the Palestinians in return for peace. They claimed their strategy was always based on the view that parts of the WB would be given up if there were an acceptance of border modifications to satisfy Israel’s security needs. When Sharon finally accepted the American-led road map it was because it fulfilled the following conditions; it does not require a return to the 1967 borders, it allows Israel to keep its large settlements built in the West Bank and it absolutely precludes a return of the Palestinian refuges to their homes in Israel.

Subsequently, in late November 2005, Sharon announced that the ‘false’ approach of land for peace was no longer on his government’s agenda. He claims that the road map had changed this approach to a more realistic formula of ‘security for independence’.

In the absence of any Arab opposition the Israelis have been encouraged to maintain their intransigence. The Middle East has changed Shimon Peres told Newsweek [12/12/2005]. ‘And look, Arab unity doesn’t exist any longer, because the Gulf countries are on their own, Egypt is on its own, Iraq is on its own, North Africa is on its own.’ 

In effect, Sharon’s rejection of the land for peace approach is yet another step in his overall plan to impose a unilateral settlement on the Palestinians. The timing is not without significance as it is intended to outshine his rival, Benyamin Netanyaho, by implementing the ‘clean break’ strategy, which Richard Pearle and company recommended way back in 1996.

That document called for a “break” from the failed policies of the past such as the “land for peace” formula. It urged Tel Aviv instead to concentrate on the new realities of “balance of power” in the region.  Since taking office in 2001 Prime Minister Sharon has managed to implement several critical elements of the ‘clean break’ strategy. These include enforcing the right of hot pursuit into all Palestinian areas. The policy document further advices, “only the unconditional acceptance by the Arabs of our rights, especially in their territorial dimension, “peace for peace”, is a solid basis for the future.” In practice, this implies no significant withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967.

The current realignment of political forces in Israel is the result of an intense power struggle. From his corner General Sharon remains committed to the same goals for which he has been fighting for more than 50 years. As far as the Palestinians are concerned, he is determined to remain an enforcer and unwilling partner, both at the same time. Having realized that the expulsions of 1948 can’t be repeated he has finally decided that the best way to dominate their lives is to divide their land and surround it with settlements and an Apartheid Wall. Call it what you will, this is no seismic shift toward a just peace.