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Despite
increased talk about the need to make economic development and
democratization in the Arab world the major priority of intellectual
discourse and government policy, the Palestinian cause remains the
single most influential factor in the Arabs’ political psyche and
life. It is not that most Arabs don’t view progress and the
alleviation of poverty as relevant issues, but that the impact of
the Arab-Israeli conflict (particularly the Palestinian issue) on
the political, economic and even routine existence of Arabs
underscores, to varying degrees, the extent to which the conflict is
an obstacle to development and political progress.
It is true that many Arab leaders have used “commitment to the
Palestinian cause” to justify measures ranging from martial law to
stifling dissent and press freedoms. However, these leaders’
acquiescence toward Washington or fear of popular anger against
Israel have been used more often to justify repression. In other
words, while public opinion in most Arab countries has always
favored increased support for the Palestinians and stronger Arab
governmental positions vis-a-vis Israel, Arab leaders their
bombastic rhetoric not withstanding have sought to undermine
political parties and all forms of popular opposition to their weak
policies in addressing the Palestinian plight.
One should
remember that Israel’s establishment in 1948, which involved the
dispossession of Palestinians and the cutting off of an important
part of the Arab world from its environment, instilled a deep
awareness of a residual colonial legacy, despite the nominal or
practical independence of most Arab governments from French and
British rule after World War II. Therefore, the presence of Israel,
with its policies of displacement of the Palestinians, confiscation
of Arab land and alliance with the United States, has become a daily
reminder of foreign influence and a challenge to Arab identity.
The peace
treaties between Israel and both Egypt and Jordan have not succeeded
in changing the perception of Israel as an occupier and an
instrument for American control over the region. On the contrary,
the treaties, while weakening the strategic Arab posture against
Israel, confirmed to many Egyptians and Jordanians that Israel was
demanding and receiving unconditional acceptance for its ideology of
expansion and its racist policies toward the Palestinians.
Moreover, the treaties are still seen as resulting from an unequal
balance of power that gave Israel the upper hand through the
imposition of agreements that did not address the primary cause of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. This popular sentiment is reflected in
the failure of all political, economic and cultural normalization
efforts between Egypt and Jordan on the one hand, and Israel on the
other. Economic incentives, such as tying the relationship with
Israel to the apportioning of US aid and setting up a special free
zone that exempts joint Jordanian and Israeli-made products from
American tariffs, have done little to change Jordanian popular
attitudes toward Israel. The economic dividend promised by the late
King Hussein and former Prime Minister Shimon Peres did not bear
fruit for most Jordanians, even as Israel’s continued occupation and
collective punishment of Palestinians has reinforced Israel’s image
as an enemy and aggressor.
There is no
doubt that the Oslo Accords of 1993 dampened popular support for the
Palestinians in Arab countries. It was difficult to demand a better
arrangement from Israel than one the Palestine Liberation
Organization would settle for. But as it became clear that the
accords and subsequent agreements were not leading to the end of
Israeli occupation, movements expressing their solidarity with the
Palestinians started regaining their influence and were able to
mobilize new generations when the Palestinians themselves launched
their second intifada in September 2000.
It is
interesting that American decision-makers and some conservative and
even liberal pundits argue, often with condescension, that if only
the Arabs were to abandon their confrontational mentality toward
Israel and focus on developing democracy, they might reassert their
political weight. This is a very twisted argument since a democratic
Arab world with more advanced economies would also be more capable
of supporting the Palestinians and demanding legitimate Arab rights
though not necessarily through war. Many in Israel and the United
States know, even if they remain in complete denial on this, that
democratic Arab governments will mean governments that are more
responsive to public opinion. And Arab public opinion unequivocally
opposes collaboration with Israel, submission to US policies and
conditions placed on them by international financial institutions
that have so far only increased the gap between the haves and
have-nots.
Democracy and the search for justice are intertwined. US efforts to
divorce “plans to democratize the Arab world” from a genuine
solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that recognizes
Palestinian national rights and freedom (and now an end to the US
occupation in Iraq) is either an act of deception or at best a
futile exercise.
*Lamis Andoni
is an independent Palestinian journalist who has covered the region
for 20 years and who lectures at the University of California,
Berkeley. This is an edited version of an article that first
appeared on bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter that publishes
Arab and Israeli opinions