A reading of Sharon’s amended plan

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The Zionist government approved on 12th June this year Sharon’s modified unilateral disengagement plan in an atmosphere of extreme political wrangling both within the Likud Party and the Zionist government, which led to the dismissal of the National Union party’s ministers and the resignation of two other ministers affiliated with the religious Zionist Mifdal Party.

Sharon’s modified plan stipulated that the potential withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will be undertaken in three phases providing that the Zionist cabinet should vote to approve each phase respectively. The pullout’s first stage is scheduled to start in March 2005, while the two other stages are set to be implemented by the end of the same year. In addition, the endorsed plan states the following:

1- Annexing parts of the West Bank, including settlement blocs, civilian barriers, security areas and other places of special interest to the Zionist entity.

2- Retaining the Philadelphia axis, located on the Palestinian-Egyptian borders, which is likely to be evacuated under specified terms, including Egyptian cooperation following joint security arrangements.

3- Retaining air and sea control over the Gaza Strip.

4- The Zionist occupation army will pursue its military operations in the Strip under security pretexts whether as a preventive measure or to strike Palestinian resistance elements.

5- Expanding the Philadelphia border axis, which would entail demolishing hundreds of Palestinian homes in the vicinity.

The plan as a means out of the dilemma

Sharon put forward his plan in the light of the utter failure of his military option to abort and rein in the Palestinian Intifada, which he promised to do 100 days of his rule. His all-out military campaigns ended in failure resulting in his conviction that he should follow another approach to achieve his aims, whereby he combines political steps with military measures to double the pressure on the Intifada.

The plan came into being in an atmosphere where the concept of a Palestinian entity has been crystallized and has become a political reality awaiting realization on the ground. Furthermore, the fact that overcoming the Zionist dilemma necessitates relinquishing parts of the Palestinian lands on which Palestinians would establish their state has become a tangible reality in Zionist politics both right and left.

However, since the Likud Party’s ideology was based on rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state to the west of Jordan River and the Likud central council had endorsed a decision dated 13th May 2002 rejecting the two state solution on the land of Palestine. Sharon is trying to reconcile the ideological prerequisites and the necessities of overcoming the existing Zionist plight.

Therefore, Sharon spared no pains to specify the form, features, mandates and borders of the Palestinian entity. This, of course, should be in conformity with his view that the Gaza Strip and some of the West Bank’s cantons are the lands, where the Palestinian state is to be set up as a state over the people with no sovereignty over the land. In other words, a state by name with no real substance; a non-viable entity which is stripped of sovereignty, agrarian lands and water resources and which is isolated from the outside world by means of the racist separation wall which can be considered to be the most prominent element of the Sharon plan, other elements are ink on paper awaiting implementation.

The plan and the continuing deception:

The plan was completely designed to serve Sharon’s view of the final solution. Thus, the possible pullout from the Gaza Strip represented the bribe to help it (the plan) pass at various platforms. However, the amended plan made the possible withdrawal contingent upon the internal interactions within the Zionist government. Hence, each phase of the pullout was linked to a new voting in the cabinet. Practically speaking, Sharon has never pledged withdrawal; rather his government had approved a declaration of intention and a plan for possible pullout from the Gaza Strip.

Sharon postponed voting on the first phase of withdrawal until March 2005. i.e. nine months after the amended plan was endorsed, a matter that would open the door wide open for different options. Subsequently, Sharon would find a room for maneuvering to achieve his goals, including completing the construction of the separation wall. If he doesn’t manage to do so, he will cunningly and craftily dodge the promises he politically took upon himself.

The plan and the US guarantees:

Sharon’s plan could be only understood in the light of the US guarantees, Bush announced on April 14 this year in which he considered withdrawal to the 1967 borders as unrealistic and that the right of return should be restricted to the Palestinian state. Bush also stressed that the Jewish nature of the Zionist entity is indisputable, and that any solution should take this point into account along with other demographic changes emerging due to the Zionist settlement blocs in the West Bank.

Thus, Sharon obtained US pledges, which later became a valid law, that would bind the forthcoming US administrations to determine the broad lines of the final solution according to Sharon’s perspective. This means that Sharon had received the reward for the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip without withdrawing from one inch. Bush’s guarantees became a valid law in the Congress with a sweeping majority of 407 votes against 9, it will not take long before it gets approved in the Senate.

Sharon had secured the US pledges before he submitted the plan with his party and government, believing that the US administration held the keys to the final settlement. He, meanwhile, exploited the US plight in Iraq and the presidential election campaign to impose his view towards such a final solution. In doing so, Sharon put a halt to the US role in mediating a solution and turned it into political pressure tool on the Arabs and Palestinians to implement his plans.

The plan in the Regional Context:

 
Sharon’s view is based on excluding the Palestinian partner in the sense that no Palestinian party would accept his view. Therefore, he sought to create such a partner through what he termed as “PA reforms” and through excluding Arafat. As he didn’t succeed in doing so, he excluded the Palestinian partner and sought an Arab partner instead.

Sharon resorted to some Arab countries to rehabilitate the Palestinian partner or to replace it. Consequently, the US efforts, which coincided with Sharon’s plan, started to exercise pressure on some Arab countries to uphold responsibility towards shouldering that role. Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, along with Condoleeza Rice, US national security advisor, maintained that Sharon’s plan is the only one put forward on the negotiations table, and that the Palestinian and Arab parties are bound to bring it into being.

Some Arab countries exerted efforts to develop their role from a limited security role involving the training of PA security and the Palestinian partner into revitalizing the peace process. However, Sharon reaffirmed such efforts would be restricted to the limits he specified in his plan, and that he wouldn’t take any new political step in the upcoming 50 years.

Sharon, who submitted his plan to avert returning to the negotiations table, would not do so following the withdrawal, if it ever takes place, as he wanted the Gaza Strip to be the first and last lap of such a pullout. He also seeks to utilize the expected pullout to consolidate the construction of the racist wall and settlements in the West Bank.

Sharon sought to enlist regional efforts in favor of his plan so as to achieve what he could not achieve through four years of repressive measures against the intifada. In the light of mounting US pressure some Arab countries consented to play a security role in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, according to Sharon’s views and his conditions, a matter that would shuffle the cards in the political arena, and would leave the door wide open for non-coveted developments especially with the presence of Arab guarantees to make the plan succeed through pledging security commitments to Zionist occupation.

The Plan and the Palestinian Situation:

Sharon’s plan is unilateral and assumes the non-existence of the Palestinian partner. There is also a Palestinian consensus (unanimity) to keep it as such without any commitments or security and political costs to be granted to him in return for the potential pullout from the Gaza Strip. However, some Palestinian parties consider such a situation an opportunity to restore their lost power and influence. They are trying to utilize the plan and the international and regional situation to their own interests, a matter that would spark confusion in the Palestinian arena and threaten Palestinian national unity. This could occur if the Gaza Strip was neutralized, as what happened with certain segments of the Palestinian people due to varied circumstances.

Conclusion:
Sharon is attempting, under his disengagement plan, with its various procedures, to rein in the Palestinian resistance and to end the conflict according to his perspective of a solution. He is also trying to disentangle himself and to impose a long-term and temporary settlement for the coming twenty years. By then, he would have succeeded in imposing political realities and facts on the ground in accordance with the Zionist entity’s interests.

This was the disengagement plan, which of course, is not a fate. The steadfastness and awareness of the Palestinian people coupled with similar awareness on the part of the Arab World could turn it into an achievement for the Palestinian people through supporting and continuing the resistance without which Sharon would not have considered withdrawing from even one inch of Palestinian land. Action should be taken to build on such an accomplishment along the road to liberating the remaining lands of Palestine.

It is dangerous if some Arab countries agree with Sharon's views, as this would contradict the regional and national interests of those countries in addition to the Palestinian national interests. Sharon should not be allowed to export his predicament to either the Palestinians or the Arab countries. He declared his intention of unilateral disengagement; it should remain as such, unilateral. It is unacceptable that he should be rewarded for his aggression and occupation.