Erasing the ‘optics’ of Gaza

Sara Roy*

The Daily Star

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"If Sharon successfully removes a majority of settlers from Gaza (relocating them to the West Bank or the Negev), which he himself states will take one or two years, he will, no doubt, be praised by the US and Europeans for having made “painful concessions” for peace ­ for which Palestinians will have to reciprocate. Israel will be financially rewarded and Sharon, having “relinquished” volatile Gaza, will have strengthened his argument for maintaining control over those West Bank areas deemed essential for security or settlement purposes."

"Most importantly, Israeli mothers and fathers do not want their children sent to Khan Younis or Netzarim to perform military service, where they face considerable danger."

From the time I started researching the Gaza Strip almost two decades ago, I have encountered two recurring themes in Palestinian-Israeli relations: Israel’s desire to rid itself of any responsibility for Gaza, while maintaining control over it; and its desire to “exchange” Gaza for full and internationally (read “American”) sanctioned Israeli control of the West Bank.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s recent proposal to evacuate 17 of the 20 settlements in Gaza ­ but leaving Israel with direct control over all of Gaza’s borders, its air space and waters, and the settlement of Gush Katif ­ is simply the latest expression of longstanding Israeli policy that will keep Gaza an imprisoned canton. Sharon’s proposal, which is one part of his unilateral separation plan, would effectively complete implementation of Oslo’s 1994 “Gaza and Jericho-First” plan, which similarly aimed to create a provisional Palestinian state in Gaza, allowing Israel to pursue, in one form or another, the de facto annexation of the West Bank, which it very successfully did during the seven years of the “peace” process.

In fact it was the physical changes to the West Bank imposed by Oslo, notably its division into areas A, B and C, that are now facilitating Sharon’s usurpation of Palestinian lands and their incorporation into Israel.

 

The Gaza disengagement plan, while a reversal of Sharon’s policies, should be understood as part of the same political continuum created by the Oslo process (and indeed by Israeli policies since 1967, beginning with the Allon Plan). It should also be understood as serving the same goals: to maintain full Israeli control ­ direct and indirect ­ over all Palestinian lands and resources; consolidate and institutionalize direct and permanent military and political control over a majority of the West Bank (primarily through continued settlement expansion, the concentration of settlers in main settlement blocs, control over the Jordan Valley and the building of the separation barrier); secure, to the extent possible, demographic separation with the Palestinians, and thereby guarantee a Jewish majority within Israel (which may now include transferring some Arab-Israeli citizens to a future Palestinian state); and ensure that if a Palestinian state is declared, it will be weak, diminished and highly dependent on Israel ­ a condition Sharon believes the Palestinians will have no choice but to accept. In this way, Sharon is seeking to manage rather than end the conflict, in a manner acceptable internationally and domestically.

If Sharon successfully removes a majority of settlers from Gaza (relocating them to the West Bank or the Negev), which he himself states will take one or two years, he will, no doubt, be praised by the US and Europeans for having made “painful concessions” for peace ­ for which Palestinians will have to reciprocate. Israel will be financially rewarded and Sharon, having “relinquished” volatile Gaza, will have strengthened his argument for maintaining control over those West Bank areas deemed essential for security or settlement purposes. Some observers argue that under such a scenario, Israeli control could extend to almost 60 percent of the West Bank, leaving Palestinians under permanent and worsening occupation.

Domestically, Sharon’s call to disengage from Gaza holds great appeal to many if not most Israelis, including the military, which does not support its occupation or the expense associated with it. Most importantly, Israeli mothers and fathers do not want their children sent to Khan Younis or Netzarim to perform military service, where they face considerable danger. Furthermore, as a US official recently told me: “The optics of Rafah are appalling to many here and abroad,” and erasing them from popular consciousness has its own advantages.
For Palestinians these “optics” include: the division of the West Bank into 300 isolated clusters, and Gaza into four; the building of more than 500 military checkpoints throughout the West Bank and Gaza since the start of the uprising, solidifying the fragmentation and isolation of Palestinian lands and severely restricting the movement of people; the demolition of at least 3,000 homes since September 2000, leaving between 10,000 and 40,000 people homeless in Gaza alone ­ while the number of settlers in Gaza’s Kfar Darom and Netzarim settlements grew by 51 percent and 24 percent, respectively, since March 2001 when Sharon came to power.

In parallel, there has been a contraction of the Palestinian economy by half; an average unemployment rate of between 30-40 percent over the last three years, with rates in Gaza exceeding 50 percent at times; a poverty rate that increased from 21 percent in September 2000 to 60 percent as early as December 2002, with certain regions of Gaza reaching 80 percent; a decline in overall food consumption of more than 25 percent per capita, with more than half the Palestinian population totally dependent on food aid, and over 22 percent of Palestinian children suffering from acute and severe malnutrition ­ levels equivalent to those in parts of sub-Saharan Africa; the destruction of, and damage to, Palestine’s physical resources, amounting to a loss of $1.7 billion through 2002; and the building of the separation barrier in the West Bank, now projected to run over 600 kilometers, cutting the territory into 16 isolated communities, effectively annexing at least 15 percent and as much as 58 percent of the West Bank to Israel, and entrapping or otherwise severely affecting over 670,000 Palestinians through loss of land and destruction of assets.
In light of these realities, any attempt by Israel to unilaterally separate from Palestinians will bring further misery and certain disaster. Yet, such attempts have already been implemented long before Sharon’s disengagement proposal. In May 2003, for example, foreign visitors wishing to enter Gaza, including human rights and NGO workers and international monitors, were required to sign a waiver absolving Israel of responsibility for their injury or death by the Israeli Army. Many refused and consequently fewer are present in Gaza.

On Jan. 4, 2004 Israel issued a new set of restrictions designed to obstruct the entry of foreign nationals into Gaza and the West Bank, further isolating Palestinians. Now, individuals wishing to enter the Occupied Territories must apply for permission and obtain written authorization from the Israeli civil administration. Permission to enter Gaza requires a minimum of five days to obtain. Individuals found in the West Bank or Gaza without official authorization can be deported and refused future entry into Israel and the Occupied Territories.
Perhaps most worrisome, NGOs wishing to enter Gaza must now disclose the following information to the Israelis ­ which many are loathe to do ­ before permission will be given: information about the organization, its annual report, website and scope of work; a 24-hour contact number and the CV of the head of mission; information about the main funders of the organization; a letter from the home consulate or embassy of the organization stating it is recognized as an aid or development organization; and a list of expatriate staff wishing to enter Gaza, including names, passport numbers, nationality and position. This information must be supplied five working days in advance of entry.
The requirements will increase the difficulties already encountered by NGOs operating in the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, the provision of humanitarian relief has become so encumbered that the heads of several international and UN agencies have threatened to cease their operations altogether.

Unilateral separation, which in the end is physically and functionally impossible, has yet to succeed as a long-term policy. Sharon’s strategy ­ “giving up” some land to gain control over other land ­ is an old one among Israeli politicians. What is different now is the rapidly deteriorating conditions of life among Palestinians, and the slow but steady dissipation of their society. There is no separation from that.

*Sara Roy is a senior research scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. She wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR