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Since 2001, the reality created “on the ground” in the 1967 occupied
Palestinian territory (OPT) by the Oslo Accords has been erased de
facto as a result of Israel’s re-invasion of the semi-autonomous
Palestinian areas (“areas A and B”), destruction of Palestinian
Authority infrastructure and the subsequent imposition of an ever
tightening military regime employed for more colonization and annexation
of Palestinian land. Now, six years later, this “post-Oslo reality”
appears to devour also the political system that has shaped the
Palestinian struggle for decades. Shattered by the breakdown of the
Hamas-Fatah led National Unity Government in June, the Fatah-dominated
Palestinian Authority (PA) and PLO are discredited, dis-functional and
dis-empowered, and the political system of the Palestinian leadership
elite appears beyond repair.
From the perspective of the Palestinian people in Palestine and in exile
the recent turn of events in the Gaza Strip is tragic, not because it
exposed the full scope of corruption and incapacity among the
traditional leadership structures, but because no alternative political
force is currently available to carry the people’s national project of
liberation and peace based on justice, freedom and self-determination
for all.
Why did the National Unity Government fail?
Although strongly welcomed by the Palestinian and Arab people as a means
to end the deeply disturbing inter-factional violence in the OPT, there
was consensus already in February: the Mecca Agreement was a fragile
pact designed to protect mainly the diverse interests and needs of the
political elites in the region.
Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood,(1) a religious political movement
active world-wide based on Sunni-Islam, had a strong interest in the
Agreement’s success. This, because their project of gradually building
political power, although victorious in the 2006 elections in the OPT,
had run into a dead-end as a result of persistent isolation by the
United States and Europe. A Palestinian national unity government with
Fatah therefore appeared to be the only means for moving ahead. The
above were joined by so-called moderate Arab states, among them Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (“Arab Quartet),
whose quest political influence derives from their elites’ need for
economic and political stability which has been threatened by the
persistently divisive US policies, US-Israeli warmongering, and the
subsequent rise in popularity and
influenceofIran’sandHizbullah’sShi’a-basedideology(3) in the region.
The secular Palestinian political elite, however, was divided in its
support of national unity with Hamas. The majority of small political
groups supported (PFLP) or joined (DFLP, Palestinian National
Initiative/Mubadara, The Third Way, former Communist Party/Hizb
al-Sha’b) Haniyeh’s new unity government in order to protect
stability and continuity of the Palestinian political system and avoid
armed conflict. However, a significant and influential section of Fatah
maintained that military defeat of Hamas with the help of the United
States was a preferable and feasible option for reinstating Fatah’s
dominance over the Palestinian Authority and evading substantial PLO
reform, i.e. integration of Hamas into PLO institutions.
The dices, however, were cast by others. The decision by the Quartet
(US, EU, Russia and UN) to uphold its “conditions” for ending economic
and diplomatic sanctions also vis-à-vis the new PA National Unity
Government triggered not only disappointment among wide sectors of the
international community and the resignation of UNSCO chief Alvaro De
Soto (see box below), but removed Palestinian hopes and the glue,
which had held together the fragile unity agreement. Parallel and
relentless US intervention by President Bush and his military advisers,
Generals Dayton and Welsh, triggered a situation where the previously
reluctant P.A. President and PLO Chair Mahmoud Abbas gave the green line
to those forces in Fatah which promoted military confrontation with
Hamas.
The Events in Gaza: What was the Plan?
In hindsight numerous analysts, among them Egyptian observers and Hani
al-Hassan, senior Fatah leader and former chief adviser to the P.A.
President, indicate that Hamas might not have planned the June takeover
of Gaza as it evolved. Hamas may have gone too far: it had an interest
in raising its stakes in the coinciding Egypt-led negotiations over
reform of the P.A. security system, and it had the ability to cause a
local defeat to the Fatah forces affiliated with Muhammad Dahlan, which
in alliance with US General Dayton’s team, obstructed Hamas’
achievements in these negotiations.(2) The shameful flight with Israel’s
help of Dayton’s Fatah allies from the Gaza Strip, and the rapid demise
of the well armed and US-trained but unmotivated PA/Fatah fighting units
in the Gaza Strip, may have resulted in an unplanned and complete
military victory whose fruits are sour. The collapse of the National
Unity Government now threatens to deprive Hamas of a role in shaping the
Palestinian Authority, which was to be the tool for a gradual
enhancement of the Movement’s major achievement, i.e. the legitimacy and
power it had gained in democratic elections.
The Result: Breakdown of the Palestinian Leadership System
Hamas considers its June armed overthrow of PA/Fatah security
installations and the presidential compound in the Gaza Strip as a “war
against the circle of betrayers in Fatah”, while the latter hold it was
“mutiny” or a “coup d’État.” Each party blames the other for the
shipwreck of the “national project”, and none of the two is willing to
return to the status-quo-ante. On the one hand, Hamas continues
to call for a solution of the crisis through renewed national dialogue
and unity on the basis of the Mecca Agreement and aims to hold out,
until the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip will force Israel
Western and Arab states to cooperate and thereby grant recognition of
its role as a political player. On the other hand, most Fatah elites,
including P.A.
President and PLO Chair Mahmoud Abbas, are actively engaged in lobbying
foreign governments and donors to abstain from cooperation with Hamas,
have set all cards on their alliance with the United States and Israel,
and propose early elections in the OPT as the solution.
Both parties continue to claim legitimacy under the PA’s Basic Law.
Hamas’ claim is based on the results of the 2006 elections, while Fatah
argues that this Law empowers President Abbas to appoint emergency and
caretaker governments even if the parliament (PLC) is not convened for
approval. This although independent observers and legal experts,
including lead-lawyers in drafting the PA’s Basic Law, agree that the
former Fatah-led emergency government – and now caretaker government –
under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, as well as new presidential decrees,
are illegal and violate the provisions of that Law (see box below).
More importantly, however, legal experts like Al-Qasem also explain,
that there is no constitutional solution to the current crisis of the
Palestinian Authority’s political system, because “the ‘democracies’ of
the world [responded] with an unprecedented crippling siege as a
punishment for the exercise of the Palestinian people of their
democratic right to change the government. ... No constitutional
draftsman would anticipate such a situation when his aim is to provide a
basic law anchored in democratic principles and the rule of law.” The
same applies to another unprecedented measure: the paralysis of the PA
parliament through detention by Israel of the majority of the elected
legislators affiliated with Hamas, thereby preventing its functioning.
In the absence of a constitutional solution based on popular democracy,
also early elections – currently pursued by the president and the Fatah-led
caretaker government and rubber-stamped the PLO - lack legitimacy and
are divisive and unlikely to restore national unity.
The Losers and the Winners
Israel emerges as the winner also in this round. Encouraged by the
unwavering support of the US administration, including President Bush’s
speech on 16 June, Israel remains unwilling to soften its military siege
in the West Bank and to provide a “political horizon” for peace
negotiations which could meet a minimum of rights and needs of the
Palestinian people. The main loser in this scenario is Fatah, with the
political system it has led for decades discredited and – together with
its major shaping factor, the Oslo Accords - seemingly beyond repair.
However, as the overwhelming “post-Oslo reality” of Israel’s colonial
apartheid-like regime, as well as likely future US-Israeli military
interventions in the region, sweep away the foundations of corrupt and
outdated Palestinian leadership structures, the Palestinian people are
again paying the major price. For long excluded from meaningful
participation in political decision making, the overwhelming majority of
the Palestinian people continue to call for national unity and dialogue
among their leaders, but lack a mechanism for effective intervention. As
Palestinians are losing their much criticized but familiar system of
leadership, no new leadership mechanism for political participation and
protection of Palestinian individual and collective rights is yet
available. A Palestinian people without leadership would certainly go
well with the current Israeli and U.S. strategy of divide and rule,
violence and military containment of the people in the region. A broad
movement of solidarity among global civil society, which highlights
Israel’s role at the core of the conflict, provides principled support
and builds the global campaign of boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS)
against Israel, however, will give Palestinians the courage and strength
to build new leadership and strategies for their principled struggle for
freedom and justice 60 years after the Nakba of 1948.
* Ingrid Jaradat is Director of Badil Resource Center. |
