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Ramzy Baroud is a journalist and Editor-in-Chief of the
Palestine Chronicle. His writing has been published in newspapers
worldwide from the Washington Post to the Japan Times. He teaches Mass
Communication at Australias Curtin University of Technology in Malaysia.
Ramzy Barouds latest book is The Second Palestinian Intifada: A
Chronicle of a Peoples Struggle (Pluto Press). His website is
ramzybaroud.net
I began the preface of my latest book: The Second Palestinian
Intifada: A Chronicle of a Peoples Struggle, by claiming that the
uprising would be etched in history as an era where a major shift in the
rules of the game occurred.[1][1]
But have they? If so, then to what extent and for what purpose?
Answering these seemingly straightforward questions is imperative if
one is to seriously address the advent of the September 2000 uprising,
which began to fade out following the death of Palestinian Authority
President Yasser Arafat in November 2004 and the rise of Mahmoud Abbas
in January 2005. Its momentum slowed down significantly following that
date; a fact that was cemented by Hamas perennial decision to halt its
suicide bombings inside Israel. However, various activities, mostly
collective non-violent action against the Israeli Imprisonment Wall in
the northern West Bank and sporadic militant activities elsewhere helped
sustain the Intifada, even if timidly, for a while longer.
Then there was that interlude of uncertainty, similar to that which
followed the December 1987 Intifada, which continues to irk historians -
when did the Intifada conclude? And my question is: does it really
matter? What is the purpose of historic preciseness here aside from the
fact that it helps historians neatly package their accounts of the world
and its ever- tumultuous conflicts?
Nonetheless, one must contend that it is of great import because the
direction, nature, and intensity of the Intifada was highly effected by
its adjacent milieus - the intensity of Israeli violence, the internal
and external politics of the Palestinian leadership, the level and
nature of regional and international support; all of which to a large
degree helped to determine the Palestinian peoples ability to withstand
such a taxing commitment. Equally significant is the need to study the
uprising as it actually was, not as many imagined it to suit their own
political, ideological, or religious frame of reference; or any
other.
Only a well-defined and careful comprehension of the Intifada can
explain the many dichotomies it presented and its seeming contradictions
at times. How could a popular rebellion of an historically oppressed
group of people foster so much corruption, disunity and infighting? How
could the same uprising that aspired to grasp the most basic
manifestations of peace, justice and life, inspire death, martyrdom and
suicide?
Expectedly, the many folds of political, societal and ideological makeup
the backbone of the Intifada has opened the stage before wordsmiths the
world over to decode this momentous event. Doubtless, it also opened up
the stage before those who saw every Palestinian collective action as
essentially manipulative, directed from behind the scenes by Palestinian
politicians vying for concessions from a vulnerable, beleaguered state,
that is Israel.
In late November 2006, Hamas exiled political leader Khaled Mishal made
a speech to the media wherein he gave Israel six months to negotiate an
end to the conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Failing this, a third Intifada would be unleashed. It was not Mishal, of
course, who introduced the terminology of the third Intifada to the
struggles swelling lexicon, but considering his position as the leader
of a movement that has reshaped Palestinian politics in the Occupied
Territories, one must wonder if a popular uprising can be decreed by a
political decision, delineated by a confining time frame, i.e. within
the foreseeable future. Mishal claimed Hamas will become stronger all
resistance forces will become stronger ... and willat Israel was also expecting a popular
uprising but wished to suppress it much more brutally and decisively
than the first Intifada.[1][5]
Americans and Israelis were all pointing to Arafat as the one to
scapegoat for the failure of Camp David. However, these accusations were
proven false by President Clintons own advisor to the talks, Robert
Mally in an article published in the New York Review of Books, well
after the falsified Israeli narrative prevailed of a fabricated generous
offer made by Barak and snubbed by Arafat.[1][6]
Israeli generals, led by Shaul Mofaz, as I documented in my book,
cautioned that Palestinians might interpret Israels hasty withdrawal
(read defeat) from Lebanon as weakness. That too compelled a decisive
response to any Palestinian violence.
Of course, the widening chasm between Israels Prime Minister at the
time Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon was evolving into a major political
dispute. Barak was accused of being politically indecisive and feeble,
and unlike Sharon, didnt know how to handle greedy Palestinians who were
in fact merely negotiating the remaining 22 percent of historic
Palestine. Barak too agreed that Palestinians were overly greedy: The
Palestinians are like crocodiles, the more you give them meat, they want
more, as it was reported in the Jerusalem Post (August 30, 2000).[1][7]
But Sharon had his own way of dealing with ungrateful Palestinians.
Addressing a meeting of militants from the extreme right-wing Tsomet
Party less than two years earlier, Sharon highlighted his peace
strategy: Everybody has to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they
can to enlarge the settlements because everything we can grab now will
stay ours .. everything we dont grab will go to them. (Nov. 15, 1998)[1][8]
Fed up with Baraks policies, which actually aspired to Sharons exact
objectives, only by using a less affront strategy, Sharon, the head of
Israels Likud Party opposition at the time, accompanied by a Likud Party
delegation and over one thousand soldiers and police officers marched
into Haram al-Sharif (Holy al-Aqsa Sanctuary) compound in Jerusalem.
Sharons religious far right constituency advocated the destruction of
the Muslim shrine, alleging that it was built atop the Second Temple,
and its destruction was prerequisite for the final temple to be erected
upon the return of the Messiah, according to prophecy. Expectedly,
Palestinians, already geared up for a popular action, rose in Jerusalem
in protest of Sharons raid. The anticipated response was met with
decided Israeli violence and several Palestinians were killed and scores
were wounded in and around the mosque.
The picture of Palestinian blood spattered around the holy Muslim site
stirred an emotional response amongst Palestinians and served as the
rallying cry for the anticipated Intifada. The Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories joined by Palestinians living in todays Israel took
to the streets in mass demonstration, clashing with heavily armed
soldiers. Thus another bloody episode began where the Palestinian people
took on one of the strongest armies in the world. Expectedly, the
Israeli army responded much more brutality this time. There was a dual
message - one to Arafat that his refusal to sign off Palestinian rights
in accordance to Israeli and American dictates would not be tolerated.
It was clear that Israel would quickly snuff out any attempt to
politically coerce it even if it meant the active use of missiles, guns
hips and tanks to suppress rioting Palestinians. The second message was
to the Palestinians that the Lebanon scenario would not be repeated in
the territories.
Barak also understood the seriousness of the challenge facing him at
the Knesset. Sharon dashed into the political arena and mobilized the
Israelis using similar tactics as that of Benjamin Netanyahu which
brought him to office in 1996 - that the peace process has failed and
that Palestinians only understand the language of violence, etc. The
Israeli public thus brought Sharon to power in February 2006 on the
premise that he would break the will of the Palestinians as manifested
in the 100 days of Intifada. Although the 100 days logic might appear
haphazardly composed, Sharons point was that a focused campaign of
murder and collective punishment would break the Palestinians fast, and
if there was a living Israeli leader who was capable of delivering such
a strategy, it was Sharon (whose responsibility over the Sabra and
Shatillah massacre in Lebanon in the summer of 1982 was anything but
disputed.) This is how he articulated his logic:
It wont be possible to reach an agreement with them before the
Palestinians are hit hard. If they arent badly beaten, there wont be any
negotiations. Only after they are beaten will we be able to conduct
talks. I want an agreement, but first they have to be beaten so they get
the thought out of their minds that they can impose an agreement on
Israel that Israel does not want. (July 3, 2002 Haaretz)[1][9]
It is no secret that Israels own brutality, which claimed the lives of
4,166 Palestinians in the first five years of the Intifada, including
886 children, and which left tens of thousands wounded and maimed and
many more psychologically scarred and impaired[1][10],
has failed to bend Palestinian resolve. Sheer brute force in itself has
never resulted in Palestinian submission, but has in fact augmented
their determination to carry on fighting; a fact that most Israeli
leaders continue to ignore at their own peril.
This time, however, Israel had no obstacles in its way whatsoever.
There is nothing to make it rethink its policies, or reconsider the
severity of its actions. This was strongly demonstrated after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks which cemented the rapport between
Israel and the US government like never before. There was on one hand, a
born-again Christian president who claimed that God spoke to him
directly, while being surrounded by neoconservative ideologues with a
belief that Israel comes first, even before America itself. On the other
hand there were war generals concerned about the relevance of the
military in the post-cold war era, and also a fuming public who were
largely deceived by the media into believing that violence is capable of
addressing the problem of terrorism, which is itself a product of an
appalling foreign policy. As the twin towers of New York collapsed,
there were many out there willing to take advantage of the sorrow, rage
and confusion.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was asked on the day of
the attacks how they could affect Israeli-U.S. relations. His replied:
Its very good.Well, its not good, but it will generate immediate
sympathy (for Israel).[1][11]
And it certainly served Israels propaganda machine well, with Israel now
selling its decade-old war on the Palestinians as a subdivision of
Americas war on terror. Giddy Israeli intelligence couldnt even help
themselves and tried to engineer al-Qaeda cells in the Gaza Strip, a
plan that was fortunately thwarted. But the Shin Beit or Mossad did not
need to fabricate such links, since neither the Bush administration, nor
the Congress or the media needed any persuasion: their pro-Israeli line
has never been clearer, even former President Bill Clinton seemed like
an honest broker in comparison.
Similar to the way the Bush administration rendered the UN irrelevant
before it decided to lead its own coalition of the willing in a war
against Iraq, it was also an irrelevant international body as far as
Palestinian rights were concerned. Former US Ambassador to the UN, John
Negroponte advised Arab delegates not to even bother presenting drafts
of UN resolutions regarding Israeli actions to the Security Council, for
they would always be vetoed if they failed to condemn Palestinian
terrorism. Now US vetoes in defense at the Security Council stand at 85,
allowing the latter to pursue whatever destructive policy it wishes with
utter impunity.[1][12]
In this volume, I attempted to highlight all the issues that affected
the nature and direction of the Intifada, locally, regionally and
internationally. While doing so, I pushed the envelope like never before
in my writing, to confront head-on the failures of the Palestinian
leadership, its incompetence and inability to unify the ranks of the
Palestinians around one articulated strategy; audacious enough to learn
from the mistakes of the past; courageous enough to withstand the
challenges of the present; and clever enough to respond to the trials of
the future.
I also tackled the overt militancy of the Intifada: what exactly
determines the nature of the Palestinian response to the Israeli war?
Were there alternatives to firearms? Why did Palestinians blow
themselves up? Was such an action a strategy in itself? What was the
role of the international volunteers who flocked to Palestine in a
unique addition to the indigenous resistance there? Why did Israel treat
internationals with brutality despite the fact that they espoused
methods of non-violent resistance? Why did the democratic elections of
January 2006 that brought Hamas to power lead to internal strife,
international sanctions and fear of a civil war? What does the future
hold for Palestine and the Palestinians?
I doubt that I have answered all the important questions pertinent to
the Second Intifada. I certainly tried and to the best of my abilities.
But unlike a stock market analyst, I didnt wait until the end of the
crash to offer my analysis. I chronicled the Intifada as it happened,
before it happened, followed its every twist and turn, bomb and bullet,
and tried, again, to the best of my ability, to provide a segment of
history, untainted by political or ideological affiliation.
Finally, it must be stated that Palestinian resistance, which for the
most part has been a non-violent and popular movement, shall continue as
long as the circumstances that contributed to its commencement remain in
place. In fact, Israeli oppression has crossed the traditional
boundaries of daily murders and small-scale land confiscation. Under the
deceptive disengagement from Gaza smokescreen, West Bank lands are being
vigorously expropriated while Israels Imprisonment Wall, illegal
according to the International Court of Justices decision of July 2004,
is swallowing up whole towns and villages.
This reality, as history has taught us, is only a prelude to another
popular Palestinian response, which is already echoing in the angry
chants of destitute farmers whose lands are being affectively annexed by
the encroaching Israeli wall. Regardless of how historians choose to
chronicle the Second Palestinian Uprising, it will always be remembered
by most Palestinians, as well as by people of conscience everywhere, as
a fight for freedom, human rights and justice. It will remain a loud
reminder that popular resistance is still an option - and one to be
reckoned with at that.
[1][1]
Ramzy Baroud, The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a Peoples
Struggle (London: Pluto Press, 2006)
[1][2]
Conal Urquhart, Hopes for Peace as Hamas Agrees to Truce, The Guardian
(26 November 2006), http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1957540,00.html
[1][3]
Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2001), p. 311.
[1][4]
History of Middle East Conflict, BBC News Online (7 February, 2001),
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2000/mideast_peace_process/340237.stm
[1][5]
Daniel Pipes, Israel's Lebanon Lesson, Jerusalem Post (23 May 2001), p.
8.
[1][6]
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, New
York Review of Books, Vol. 48, No. 13 (August 2001), www.nybooks.com/articles/14380.
[1][7]
M. Junaid Alam, Anti-Semitism or Ultra-Semitism? The Politics of Smears
and Self-Absorption, Left Hook (3 May 2005), also found at: www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=7777
[1][8]
Poly Toynbee, Say it Loud: No More Support Until Israel Agrees to Pull
Out, The Guardian (24 October, 2001), also found at:
www.commondreams.org/views01/1024-05.htm
[1][9]
Aluf Benn, Powell Says Sharon Must Take Hard Look at Policies, Haaretz
(3 July 2002), www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=137662&contrassID=1&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=0
[1][10]
MIFTAH's Facts & Figures, Casualties and Material Losses during the
Intifada, http://miftah.org/report.cfm
[1][11]
The Five Dancing Israelis Arrested On 9-11, WhatReallyHappened.com,
www.whatreallyhappened.com/fiveisraelis.html
[1][12]
Use of the Veto on United Nations Resolutions by the USA,
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