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Amid rumors that the political furniture
is being moved around in Damascus, perhaps the strangest thing is how
Syria has organically lodged itself between
Iran and Israel,
states that are otherwise mortal foes. The Iranian connection is well
known, but less understood are the dynamics of the Syrian-Israeli
relationship, and where they might lead.
Rarely a day goes by without someone in
the Israeli press advocating a revival of Syrian-Israeli negotiations.
The arguments are familiar: Syria has a "secular regime," therefore is
worthy of Israel's attention; now is Israel's best chance to "break
Syria off from Iran"; Syria alone can control Hizbullah; and so on. That
each of these arguments has been explicitly contradicted by Syrian
actions or statements is generally ignored. The fetish of "talking" is
too strong for anyone to punch through the myths.
And yet the rationale for Syrian-Israeli
peace talks rests on a bed of myths. Syria's regime may be secular, but
it has built long-term
alliances mainly
with Islamist regimes and groups, such as Iran, Hizbullah, and
Hamas. When possible, as in the case of Fatah al-Islam, Syria has
created or overseen militant Islamist groups, while Al-Qaeda operatives
caught in Iraq will routinely describe their training and passage
through Syria, usually via networks linked to the country's intelligence
services. Given all this, the Assad regime's "secularism" seems
irrelevant.
What about Syria's purported willingness
to break off from Iran? Syrian officials have repeatedly affirmed that
Iran is more than an ally; it is a strategic partner. However, optimists
on Syrian-Israeli negotiations write this off as a Syrian bargaining
step, a case of upping the ante before an eventual divorce from Tehran.
In fact nothing suggests Syria is lying. Assad is wagering heavily that
Iran will emerge as the regional superpower, which is precisely why he
has been so willing to risk his Arab relationships lately in Tehran's
favor. Logic, too, indicates a Syrian-Iranian split is not in the cards.
Its close ties with Iran are what make Syria sought-after. If those ties
disappear, Syria's sway would markedly decline.
Which brings us to the third issue:
control over Hizbullah. A sudden downgrading of the Syrian-Iranian
relationship would indeed leave Damascus with little regional sway,
except if one thing happens: Syria returns its soldiers to Lebanon,
taking the clock back to where it was before 2005. Israel would have no
problems with this, and was never enthusiastic about the so-called Cedar
Revolution. The only thing is, the Israelis forget that Hizbullah built
up its vast weapons arsenal under Syria's approving eye. Far from
imposing its writ on Hizbullah in order to eventually disarm the group,
Syria has every incentive to keep the Hizbullah threat alive as leverage
so that it remains indispensible.
That leads us to an obvious but seldom
considered truth. Syria will not engage in serious negotiations with
Israel unless it first manages to reimpose its hegemony in Lebanon.
Without Lebanon in hand, Damascus has no real cards to play when
haggling with the Israeli government, which has already demanded as a
precondition for peace talks that Syria end its affiliation with Iran,
Hamas and Hizbullah. And without cards to play, how could Bashar Assad
conceivably get what he actually wants out of negotiations, which is
only what his father was on the verge of getting in 2000: a return to
Syria of the entire area of the
Golan Heights,
as well as international recognition of Syria's long-term domination of
Lebanon?
So what we are bound to see in the
coming months, and probably beyond, is the foreplay of Syrian-Israeli
contacts, without the real thing. Indirect exchanges are already taking
place through the Turkish authorities. Other channels have been
mentioned in the media. A recent report in Kuwait's daily Al-Jarida,
citing sources in Jerusalem, went so far as to announce that
Israeli Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni would visit Qatar on April 14 to "complete" secret
talks with Syria. If that odd story is somehow true, the fact that it
found its way into a newspaper could be an effort to torpedo the
initiative. But such acts seem unnecessary. Israel has no impetus to
give up the Golan without assurances that Syria will make major
concessions in return; and the Syrians will not make major concessions
before Israel assures them that it will hand back all of the Golan and
look the other way on, even assist, a Syrian restoration in Lebanon.
One item receiving publicity last year
was news of the unofficial channel the Syrian and Israeli governments
allowed between a former Israeli Foreign Ministry official, Alon Liel,
and a Syrian-American businessman, Ibrahim Suleiman. It lasted from
September 2004 to July 2006, and a main objective of the Syrian regime
was to use those contacts to start a dialogue with the United States.
That endeavor failed, but Liel has tirelessly sought to revive the
relationship, even visiting Washington a few months ago to lobby
American officials. He apparently came away empty-handed, because the
Bush administration refuses to approve of a Syrian-Israeli track that,
it knows, would make it considerably more difficult to contain Syria and
check its efforts to undermine Lebanese sovereignty.
During his Washington trip, Liel had
some captivating things to say about his discussions with the Syrians.
For example, those Lebanese who get so lathered about the settlement of
Palestinians in their country might consider what he said at the
Middle East
Institute on the issue: "Part of our talks with the Syrians included the
[400,000] Palestinian refugees in Syria and they indicated [a]
willingness to consider nationalizing them. This will then ... likely
make it easier to promote the same in Lebanon."
Israel
is unlikely to soon surrender anything serious to the Syrian regime, and
the contrary is equally true. But the Israelis do prefer Assad to the
unknown, which has bought the Syrian leader a good deal of breathing
space in the face of Arab and American animosity. You have to wonder how
long that can last. Once a new administration takes office in the United
States, it may soon find that the situation in Iraq, relations with
Iran, and Israel's negotiations with the Palestinians allow little room
for maneuver. Syria may materialize as the one place where the Americans
can effect a fundamental shift in the balance of power in the Middle
East. Could Assad's Israeli friends remain as complaisant in that
context?
Michael Young
is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.
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