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Palestinian Refugees in
Lebanon
Current Policies
Resolution No 1559 and Impacts There of
The Settlement Question
Why Palestinians of
Lebanon?
Because the situation is characterized by certain distinctives and
features.
1.
Compared to other Arab countries,
Lebanon is characterized by the deep rootedness of a confessional
regime these in. the impacts and effects of this confessional regime
are not limited to the political level, and consequently, the
settlemental level relevant to legally residing Palestinian
refugees. It rather touches and affects various dimensions of the
sociological level, with all the negative bearings since 1948.
2.
Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon had lived an experience, of a certain specialty, having
nestled the Palestinian Revolution for about fifteen years, the
thing which led to great developments in formulating the
Lebanese-Palestinian relations on the security, political and
psychological levels. It also led to continuation of these local
reactions, even after the famous militants' exodus in accordance
with Philip Habib's agreement in 1982, and also after the Sabra and
Shatella massacre.
3.
Over the last two months,
Lebanon has witnessed accelerating security and political
developments that augmented these reactions and dragged Palestinians
there into, particularly through the international Resolution No
1559, issued by the Security Council.
The three main axes on which we are to concentrate are:
1.
Who are the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, what is the
legal/political formation there of and what are the socioeconomic
reflections that governed the relation between those Palestinian
Refugees and the hosting Lebanese society, authority wise and civil
community wise.
2.
What is the political and legal content of Resolution No 1559, and
what are the political and legal consequences thereof on Palestinian
refugees.
3.
What is the purport and what are the reactions of the settlement
question, and what are the effects thereof on the status quo ante?
Palestinian Refugees in
Lebanon
a.
The first enigma starts with the numbers of Palestinian existence
taking refuge in
Lebanon:
The political/economical factor controls and influences the number
of refugees' estimate. Some Lebanese parties tend to exaggerate this
number, stretching it to above 600,000 to show that Lebanon is
enduring a lot, in an attempt to justify its projects for
distributing Palestinians among other countries./ the truth is that
the number of Palestinians is continually decreasing, specially when
we take into consideration the question of re-granting the Lebanese
nationality to about 35 thousands refugees (citizens of the seven
villages) in accordance with the naturalization decree No 5247
issued on 20/06/1994. Besides, recently passed rules and regulations
afflicted the Palestinian refugees' legal status in Lebanon, as did
decision No 478, issued by the Lebanese minister of the interior.
This decision interdicted the return of Palestinian refugees to
Lebanon –including those carrying travel documents, issued by the
Lebanese General Security- unless they obtain a "Return Visa". Since
procedures and regulations in force do not allow issuance of such
visas, more than one hundred thousand Palestinians found themselves
expelled from Lebanon, due to these regulations and to
implementation there of. In abroad, many of those refugees had to
seek "Permanent Residence" and later on "citizenship" in the hosting
countries.
The overall UNRWA estimate which excludes those who had been
naturalized and those prevented to return to Lebanon as well (as
their registration was crossed out) gives a much smaller figure for
Palestinians taking refuge in Lebanon. This figure is in the range
of 250 thousand people; where as the announced overall number of
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is 400 thousands.
b.
The second enigma lies in the Palestinians' legal status in
Lebanon:
1.
Individual Rights:
The Lebanese authority issued regulations and decisions which it
considered appropriate for dealing with the Palestinian existence in
Lebanon. It is the Lebanese authority as well that limited –right
from the beginning- their gathering places to be inside camps, and
later on refused –in the Al Taaef Agreement- naturalization thereof.
It is not also Lebanese authority that administratively refused in
mid 1994 to allow erection of a camp for Palestinian emigrants in
"Al Qureia' " area? It is not the same Lebanese authority that set
up "The General Department for the Affairs of Palestinian Refugees",
as part of the Ministry of the Interior, as per decree No 927, dated
1959, entrusting it with certain jurisdiction, pertinent to keeping
records of Palestinian Refugees, issuance of identification papers
and receipt of free travel document applications (Later on duties
were imposed thereon)? This "General Department" was later on
replaced by "The Refugees' Department" as per decree No 4082 dated
02/11/2000,
noting that this so called "Department" had no authority at all
towards social or economical situations and conditions of those
refugees.
The Lebanese Authority's continual treatment of Palestinians as
foreigners (relating to "Right of work" and "Social Security") is
one of the negative discriminatory bases ever since the arrival of
Palestinian Refugees to
Lebanon.
The Palestinian's right for education was as well subject to laws
which stipulate that the total number of foreign students –including
Palestinians- at any Lebanese public school should not exceed 10% of
the total number of students thereof. Lebanese private schools were
free to accept any number of foreign students. This only allowed
well-to-do students to join those private schools because of the
considerably high tuition fees. Such regulations deprived refugees
from suitable education chances, particularly after enforcement of
circular No 8, issued on 15/04/2002, by the chancellor of the
Lebanese
University, which doubled the tuition fees that used to be paid by
Palestinian students (six months later this circular was canceled).
Palestinian Refugees were and still are deprived from the right of
medical treatment and environmental health.
The Lebanese actions and practices toward Palestinians'
particularity found expression in several fields such as:
a- Right of Real Estate Ownership:
The resolution no. 296 , published in issue no 15 of the official
Gazette, on 5/4/2001 invalidated the right of real estate ownership
for Palestinians. This resulted in preventing Palestinians from
owning even their own houses. It also prevented Palestinians from
giving personal property by will, even if they were ( as per the
previous law) owners of whatever real estate they possess. This law
which is still effective constitutes a humanitarian problem and a
transgression to personal ownership.
b -Right of Residence and Complications thereof:
Three mainstreams are being practiced, in relation to Palestinian
Refugees' camps in Lebanon. Those mainstreams reflect an intrigued
policy that takes into consideration some demographic geopolitical
aspects that are expressed as follows:
·
The Southern camps in Saida and
Tyre areas (Al Rashidiyah, Al Bass, Al Burj Al Shamali, Ain Al
Hilweh, and Al Mieh wa Mieh): Those camps are subject to a check in
and check-out procedures, carried out by the Lebanese Army check
points, erected at each single entrance(access) to the aforesaid
camps.
The check-points at the
Tyre
camps prohibit entry of building and maintenance materials as from
the beginning of 2005.
·
Camps of
Beirut
(Burj Al Barajneh, Shatela and Dbayeh): The Lebanese authority
forbids construction and development works inside these camps. On
the other hand, vast areas of these camps are included in the
Lebanese development master plan, the thing which particularly leads
to abolishment of these camps. This happened when residents of Tal
Azza'atar, Jisr Al Basha and Nabatiyeh camps were prevented from
returning to these camps to have them rebuilt and repopulated.
·
The Northern Camps (Al Baddawi and Nahrel Bared): The Lebanese
authority allows projects for improvement of the camps'
infrastructure, but practically, the funds required for carrying out
such works are unavailable.
·
Furthermore, straitening continues on camps, on the housing range
thereof and on the infrastructure and services there in so as to
obliterate these camps' geographical and demographic particularities
and distinctions. This is what has been happening to camps that are
close to the Lebanese/Israeli borders. Thus, the Lebanese
government's tacit policy towards Palestinian Refugees aims at
intensifying pressures to force these refugees to migrate. The most
serious of these pressures are the restrictions imposed on "area"
and on "housing": The number of Palestinian refugees living inside
camps in
Lebanon is much greater than that in other Arab host countries (more
than 50% of the total number of refugees, and this is by itself an
indication of poverty). Besides, it was forbidden to reconstruct or
develop any of the many camps that had been partially or completely
destroyed during the past twenty years of war, nor was it allowed to
build outside the camps boundaries. Besides, the UNRWA was advised
not to carry out any reconstruction works inside any of the twelve
camps. Prohibition of building works had dissuaded the UNRWA and
other non government organizations from repairing sewage and
drinking water or electricity networks. In practice, the present
infrastructure within refugee camps in Lebanon is far worse than it
had ever been before.
2 Collective Rights
There are some decisions and procedures that touch the Palestinians'
collective rights, some of which had been enforced for some time,
while others are still in force, though in the official scope,
Lebanon does not adopt or take any measures that inflict collective
punishment on Palestinians as a separate gathering. In fact,
procedures are being adopted in commonness so that all Palestinians
become subject there to, because of being Palestinian refugees.
a)
Right of representation and attribution:
The Lebanese authority had distinguished Palestinian Refugees. It
has been treating them as a "special category of foreigners as far
as residence is concerned (i.e. they do not have to annually renew
their residence visa at the "General Security" as other foreigners
do). But on the other hand, the Lebanese authority did not
acknowledge their special identity, nor did it acknowledge their
local representatives.
b)
The right of "Exit and Re-entry":
Traveling in general is theoretically unrestricted, as long as the
required official documents and visas are obtained. The Lebanese
authority used to exempt Palestinian refugees of all taxes, duties
and charges relevant to issuance of travel documents, but later on
this was stopped and Palestinian refugees were –and still are-
treated on equal footing with Lebanese nationals. They pay the same
charges for obtaining a "travel-document", though these charges are
relatively high if compared with Palestinians' income level.
c)
The Right to establish representational societies, associations and
bodies:
Societies and associations –being a frame that organizes the
citizens' interests and concerns- are unallowable for Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon, the thing which goes in line with the tendency
adopted by the Lebanese authorities, to delimit freedom of
organizing the Palestinian society. So, there are no legally
recognized Palestinian societies or associations in Lebanon, though
laws and regulations allow establishment of associations and
societies for foreigners, under specified conditions. In fact, there
are only Lebanese bodies and establishments working in the
Palestinian milieu. Practical implementation of this mentioned
tendency deprived Palestinians from forming syndicates and unions,
adding to the fact that Palestinian refugees are not allowed to join
vocational syndicates and unions, simply because they are not
Lebanese subjects, and hence, establishment of Palestinian parties
is out of question amid these difficult situations.
d)
Economical conditions and Palestinians' right of work and social
insurance:
With the beginning of the third millennium, Palestinians in Lebanon
are still deprived of their civil and social rights. They are not
allowed to work officially at governmental institutions because the
Lebanese laws and regulations stipulate that any government employee
should be a Lebanese citizen for at least ten years. Thus, it is up
to Palestinians to seek employment at private institutions. Even
then they are required to obtain work permission from the ministry
of Labor, the thing which impelled employers to avoid hiring them.
The problem which is considered of serious bearings is unemployment.
Several factors play an important role in intensifying the acuity of
this crisis and add to the negativeness of the impacts thereof:
i.
The cut down in the UNRWA services, contributions and subventions.
ii.
PLO and factions thereof found themselves facing several financial
plights because of the reduction in their budgets. This reduction
affected the social and economical levels of the whole Palestinian
infrastructure, particularly when these militant factions started to
live the same plights which the Palestinian masses were witnessing,
the thing that forced these militant factions to make a diminution
in the number of full-timers and in militant cadres as well. Those
full-timers and former militant cadres found themselves unemployed
and started to seek migration.
iii.
Projects: Most of the projects that had been carried out for social
support, closed their doors, while legal impediments prevented
establishment of new projects this situation dropped all chances for
absorbing the wide spread unemployment.
iv.
Vocational societies (societies of lawyers, pharmacists and
engineers): Palestinians are not allowed to join the aforesaid
societies and hence can not officially practice any of these
professions.
v.
Excluding Palestinian laborers and workers from social security:
According to paragraph (4) of Article (9) of the Social Security
Law: "Any foreign laborer –working on the territories of the
Lebanese Republic- is not to benefit from the provisions of this
law, whether in full or in part, unless the country to which this
laborer belongs treats Lebanese subjects reciprocally, as far as
social security is concerned. So, it is noticeable of course that
Palestinians do not benefit from the Lebanese social security
benefits even if they pay the fixed contributions and duties.
The Lebanese economy is almost completely blocked in the face of
Palestinians. This persuation –adopted since long- conforms with
four other negative developments: (a) Contraction in the number of
jobs and in the free services and subsidies that used to be
furnished by PLO and the other militant factions. (b) A decline in
the services and aids which the UNRWA used to furnish. (c) A severe
drop in the donations and grants that used to be provided by non
government organizations, international organizations and foreign
governments. (d) A fall in the personal monetary transfers from
Palestinians who worked in the Gulf Countries. According to one of
the administratives working at a Social Care Program, about 60% of
the Palestinians in Lebanon are living under the line of poverty, as
had been stated by the United Nations.
vi.
Education: 40% of Palestinian children in
Lebanon
are outside schools. In the work market, we find martyr's sons who
have no resources and whose mothers have to send them to work for
earning their living, noting that in
Lebanon
there are more than ten thousand martyr families. So, we can imagine
the extent of the tragedy when we get to know that those families
received not aids or subsidies for many years. When PLO resumed
payment of allowances the average monthly allowance was less than 70
US dollars, which does not allay a family's hunger. No doubt, those
children from today in illiterate generation. Had the aim been to
pauperize Palestinians to make them accept political concessions for
their rights, then this would destroy the Palestinian society and
drive it –socially and economically- to a state of illiteracy.
Just for comparison, we know that the number of Palestinians in
Lebanon is close to that in
Syria,
i.e. 400 thousand people. Yet, when we look at schools in both
countries we find that in Syria the UNRWA schools receive about
800,000 students in the elementary and preparatory stages, in
addition to a further number received by governmental schools, due
to the fact that private and public schools treat Syrian and
Palestinian students alike. On the other hand, we find that UNRWA
schools in Lebanon receive only half the above mentioned number
(i.e. 400,000 students). Could any one imagine the severity of the
Palestinians' educational tragedy in Lebanon, which arises from
poverty and from dispossession of rights!!
vii.
Public Health situations:
Chances for medical treatment of Palestinians vary from one hosting
country to another: in
Jordan
and Syria for example, Palestinian refugees have the right to
benefit from the government health services, while in Lebanon they
are not. Hence, Palestinians resort to three medical sources: The
UNRWA, the Palestinian Red Crescent and non government
organizations.
a)
UNRWA Health Services:
After deduction of employees' salaries, the remaining annual budget
for medical care becomes relatively too tight to meet such services
(i.e. less than two millions us dollars). Palestinians have to pay
between 50 to 70 percent of the charges and expenses. Cases
suffering from heart, kidney and cancer are most critical of all,
where as most patients die without getting any treatment. It is
worth mentioning here that the average number of patients checked
per doctor –at UNRWA clinics- is 90 per day.
b)
The Lebanese Ministry of Health:
The Lebanese Ministry of Health provides neither treatment nor
medicine to Palestinian refugees. Even infants' vaccines are
basically supplied by the UNRWA or the UNICEF.
c)
Palestinian Red Crescent
Association:
This association suffers much from insufficiency since "the war on
camps", despite the many improvements it witnessed.
Current Policies
Lebanon, which is stepping out of a long civil war is looking for
fixation of a well founded future, which tends to solve all previous
dilemmas, among which is the future of Palestinian refugees on its
territories. Nevertheless, the responsibility of solving this
dilemma does not solely lie on Lebanon and on the Lebanese, because
several influential factors are involved. These factors are:
1)
The Israeli Policy:
The Israeli policy is a basic factor because of its perpetual
refusal to implement "The Right of Return" of refugees to their
homes and properties. They are left to suffering and endurance,
pursuant to the conditions prevalent in each host country.
Palestinians are deprived to live in their own homeland. They are
neither allowed to carry the nationality of the host country in
which they live, nor are they recognized as a nation. They are
looked upon as refugee groups, awaiting and calling for humanitarian
assistance. This is still one of the most important factors in the
Middle East
crisis and in the Palestinian/Israeli struggle.
2)
The
Lebanese State Policy:
Throughout the various successive governments, the Lebanese policy
has always been negative, most of the times stiff in its language
and at fewer times a little tapered off. The Lebanese official
stance draws upon the belief that there is no permanent solution
unless all the Lebanese territories –including Shaba'a Farms and
Kafar Shouba heights- are restored in full, and until the refugees'
question in Lebanon has been solved, starting with rejection of
settlement and ending up in either returning to Palestine or
dispersion over regions of the world.
Official
Lebanon
believes that the Palestinian existence on its territories is a time
bomb, and considers that solving this matter is one of the
requirements of a just and comprehensive peace. Within this scope,
Lebanon has launched a political and diplomatic campaign, centered
mainly on rejection of settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon.
Accordingly, seclusion and exclusion of Palestinians in Lebanon mark
the adopted policy, which is based on depriving them from the
state's security responsibility, in addition to deprivation of
Palestinians from their civil rights, had helped to place refugee
camps outside the sphere of normal patterns of life in the country,
with all the resulting complications that are negatively reflected
on the refugees conditions.
Throwing light upon the camps' military and security dimensions
falls under two contradictory connotations:
The first considers refugee camps insubordinate, insurgent and hot
bed of fugitives, outlaws and escapes. The second connotation
considers refugee camps a nationalistic reserve and a potential
source for an anti-Israeli resistant work at the Palestinian
borders. Any way, the two connotations reflect how exceptional these
refugee camps are in Lebanon, compared to their likes in
Jordan
and Syria, in an attempt to present and accentuate the dangers
embodied by the Palestinian existence in Lebanon, as far as the
country's security and stability are concerned.
Palestinians form a residential block, quite recalcitrant to merge
and combine with the "Lebanese block". The reason –in the first
place- is not denominational or sectarian. In fact, the reason is
nationalistic, economical and social, and is associated with the
negativism with which the Lebanese state has treated the Palestinian
social levels, ever after the 1948 catastrophe. The Lebanese state
–together with Palestinian blocks inside refugee camps- have
administered relations based on preventing Palestinians from
reacting with their Lebanese milieu which adheres to their cause and
to other Arab causes. All Palestinian attempts for organizing
–whether within the nationalistic or patriotic spheres- were met
with severe repression, in the late fifties and early sixties.
Developments of the Lebanese situation –with its internal and
regional sides- have strengthened the negative look at Palestinian
gatherings. It is a look, governed by fear and anxiety, and this
fear and anxiety permeate to the leaderships of sects and
denominations. The fountain head of the leaderships' real fear is
neither sectarian nor denominational, nor is it substantial. Yet, it
is based on the fact that Palestinians in Lebanon form a social
block living in privati9on and penury because of the unjust and
oppressive discriminatory measures implemented.
Simultaneously, this block has a basic national cause that is not
likely to be satisfactorily solved, as current settlements show.
During the last 50 years (since the mid fifties), this human block
and factional organization. It has also shown high predisposition to
react with local and regional issues, especially when these issues
are directly linked to the mother cause.
Resolution No 1559 and Impacts There of:
On 02/09/2004, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution
No. 1559, which focused –in its first four articles- on the matter
of stretching out the Lebanese full sovereignty and control over the
entire Lebanese territories. The fifth article of the mentioned
resolution called for carrying out just and free presidential
elections…. Hence, the provisions of Article (3) were meant to cover
Palestinians in
Lebanon,
and called for disarmament of all Lebanese and non Lebanese
militias, meaning Hizbullah and Palestinian organizations in
Lebanon.
a)
Key authors of Resolution No. 1559:
The Security Council is the most important executive part of this
international institution which had been established by the nations
of the world in the wake of the Second World War, to keep
international security and peace. Yet, practice had taught us that
there is a big difference between the resolutions it takes –which
should theoretically express effectuations of the international law
provisions- and the ability to enforce these provisions, specially
when the matter relies on how far these provisions agree or disagree
with the interests of those powerful and influential countries.
As everybody knows, there are tens and tens of resolutions –that
positively touched Arabs' interests- which have not been enforced up
to this date. "Withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from the
territories occupied in 1967" and "The unconditional and unreserved
return of refugees" are two examples of such resolutions that have
not been put into effect so far. Going back to Resolution No. 1559,
we have to state the following:
i.
Safe guarding international peace is the Security Council's function
and objective. Yet, peace was never threatened in or by
Lebanon
before issuance of the Resolution. In fact, reactions resulting from
this resolution created this worrisome situation which –security
wise- effects Lebanon and neighbours thereof.
In a study prepared by Dr. Dawood Khairallah, published on
17/05/2005 by "Al Safeer" Lebanese daily newspaper under the
heading "The United Nations: A Tool For Powerful Countries'
Domination" the teacher of law at George Town University said:
"voices, calling for international legitimacy became loud when some
powerful countries –such as the United States- wished or decided to
bring about or implement certain resolutions. Those same voices
faded or died when the interests of these powerful and influential
countries at the UN required so, as had happened with the
International Court of Justice Resolution, pertinent to the Israeli
Expansion Wall in
Palestine.
Consequently, Resolution No. 1559 is wrapped up in an international
cover, with the aim of achieving Western/Israeli interests, rather
than attainment of international security or peace in the
Middle East.
ii.
To refer to "Presidential Elections" is mere interference in
Lebanese internal affairs, which international security has nothing
to do.
iii.
The quest for disarmament of the Lebanese resistance emerges as one
of the factors that consecrate occupation of parts of the Lebanese
territories, and stands out as an attempt to annul the role of
combative pattern, struggling against the Israeli occupation. Yet,
this quest is not an unanimous Lebanese issue because the Lebanese
people (supporters and opposers) has repeatedly stated that
Hezbollah's weapon is an internal affair, subject to a Lebanese
internal negotiations and agreement to get to a suitable formula
within the frame of real independence and sovereignty, so as to
prevent any Israeli threats to Lebanon and to the Lebanese people.
The formula which satisfied the Lebanese authority, relating to
persistence of the resistance and weapon thereof, plus the formula
for defending the Lebanese borders and for ousting the Israeli
occupation, prevented the American/Israeli strive for isolating
Lebanon from the Palestinian cause. An essential reason for this
Lebanese stance is the necessity of bringing up the question of the
future of Palestinian refugees, who are still living on the Lebanese
territories since 1948, and whom Israel is still denying their
"Right of Return".
Lebanon
fears that "Settlement" may be enjoined there on and on Palestinians
as well. So, the Security Council's taking up of part of the
Resolution (i.e. disarmament of Hezbollah, and from the security
angle only) is a feigned blindness to major issues. The first of
these major issues is that many international resolutions had been
taken, in connection with the Palestinian cause, but none is
implemented so far. Therefore, these resolutions should be
implemented for the sake of the Security Council's credibility.
Further more, the obvious intrusive interference particularly that
of the French and the American ambassadors raises the doubts and
fears of the Palestinians and the Lebanese, especially when
implementation is linked to withdrawal of the Syrian troops from
Lebanon,
without determining anything in connection with the right of return
of Palestinian refugees to their homeland. Many Lebanese had stated
and stressed that the American pressure aim at imposing settlement
after disarmament of Palestinians.
In the "Al Safeer" newspaper, the Palestinian writer Hussein Qassem
mentions some of the fears raised by the Palestinian weapon file.
Some of the fears specified by the writer are…. "Lack of Lebanese
support to the Palestinian rights, believing that they (i.e.
Palestinians) endanger the future of
Lebanon
(the ghost of settlement)…. And the Security Council Resolution
tackles refugee camps from the weapon perspective only, noting that
this perspective does not differ much from that of some Lebanese
parties –whether inside or outside the authority- who consider camps
nothing but security isles".
The mechanism laid down by the Security Council proves that
execution of the resolution acquires great importance within the
frame of current international policy towards that
Middle East.
Launching a missile by unknown militants, from inside the Lebanese
territories, against a northern Israeli settlement –for example-
motivated Coffe Anan –The Secretary General- to make a statement in
which he condemned the incident and called for making haste in
executing Resolution No 1559, the thing that shows that the two
concerned and directly responsible parties are under the close
observation of the United Nations, which follows up details day by
day.
b) Stances of Relevant Parties
Lebanon is the basic party in implanting Resolution No 1559, and
here, the Lebanese political situation attains its great importance
due to the extent of ability for execution thereof, due to political
desire to do so, due to the mechanisms that could be adopted and
finally due to the parties on whom the execution thereof would fall
(i.e. Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias). The most outstanding
example is what was stated by the Lebanese ex-minister of
information –Elie Al Ferzli- who tried to wash the hands of the
Lebanese government from any responsibility by putting all the blame
on Palestinians. Mr. Ferzli said that disarmament of militias is
unfeasible by virtue of a Palestinian decision, though "the question
of handing over of the Palestinians weapon is currently a
questionable matter as per the Palestinian logic. Furthermore,
pushing matters in the direction of clash between the Lebanese
security forces and Palestinians who reject handing over of camps'
weapons is quite clear. This stance renders disarmament of Lebanese
and non-Lebanese militias –in accordance with Resolution No 1559- at
the time being is an unthinkable matter by virtue of a Palestinian
decision".
All this requires the following reading:
Reaction of the internal political stance has accelerated,
particularly after assassination of the Lebanese ex-prime minister,
Mr. Rafic Al-Hariri. This assassination gave rise to big changes:
The cabinet tumbled and was compelled to resign and parliamentary
elections context towards essential changes promoted opposition.
Political strife is still wide open and every body is awaiting the
end of June 2005, whence the elections would be winded up and a new
government would be formed, after the return of the Syrian army to
its country.
This awaited cabinet is to be entrusted with jurisdiction to deal
with the resistance weapon. Many believe that this matter relates to
the weapon of Hezbollah and to that of Palestinians. Any close study
might help to extract the true and intrinsic nature of the basic and
actual goal, which was alluded to –directly or indirectly- by some
Lebanese politicians.
What is aimed at is not accomplishment of encountering military
operations for collecting weapons from both parties (Hezbollah and
the Palestinians). The sought objective is to get to a kind of
agreement per which the official army could be spread along the
Lebanese southern borders, the thing which practically means
territorial expulsion of weapons altogether.
Though the Palestinian weapon does not play any regional role as
from implementation of "Al Tayef" agreement and withdrawal of
Israeli forces on 25.05.2000, yet it played and still plays an
important role in granting refugee camps a distinguishing feature,
whereas these camps represent Palestinian residential areas, managed
by an international agency (the UNRWA). These camps manage their own
security and attain their own societal structure, the thing that
continuously places them outside the customary Lebanese course. As
such, the excuse that had always been used by the Lebanese for
inflicting social and economical deprivation on Palestinian refugees
was formulated: The propounded objective is to prevent the Islamic
and Palestinian weapon from playing any limited more internal "Lebanization".
This means that dealing with the Palestinian weapon subtends several
possibilities, the most probable of which is to avoid serious and
practical broaching of withdrawal thereof. This is exactly what "
Hassan Nasrallah" –secretary General of the Lebanese Hezbollah
(statement published in Al Nahar daily newspaper) said: "We are
resistance movement and not a militia and the camps' weapon is a
Lebanese-Palestinian concern". Of course, the basic excuse is the
Lebanese parties' dispute over the formulary, i.e. the dispute
between those who support clashing with Palestinians and
consequently driving them away on the one hand, and those calling
for an agreement with Palestinians on the other hand, who are
consequently receiving uncustomary principle Palestinians leaders,
sent by the Palestinian authority to announce its support to the
Lebanese sovereignty doctrine but without reaching an agreement
formulary that starts with a Lebanese political acknowledgement of
the right of representation for this part of Palestinian people, via
dedicating –in Beirut- a bureau for PLO, the only and legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people. The Lebanese predominant
current is represented by those, not wanting to remove the excuse of
Lebanese/Palestinian lack of coordination, in an attempt to evince
the particularity of the camps' state of affairs, which seeks a
local and international intervention that aims at displacement and
ousting of Palestinians of Lebanon on the plea of "fear of
settlement".
Therefore, the Lebanese government has not yet suggested any formula
for implementing the Palestinian part of Resolution No 1559. Here,
the previous experience of 1991 is recalled, when execution of "Al
Taaef" agreement commenced. This agreement included an article that
calls for breaking up all militias, whereas the Lebanese authority
refused the Palestinians' excuse which considered Palestinians a
part of a liberation movement and not a militia, and hence the
Palestinian factions had to hand over all their heavy and medium
weapon as a present to the Lebanese army, while personal weapons
were kept inside Palestinian camps.
Furthermore, the stance of both parties (Lebanese and Palestinian)
was enervated by cancellation of "Cairo Agreement", concluded in
1987 to organize and regulate the Lebanese/Palestinian relations.
This cancellation came from the Lebanese side, with a unilateral
will and a Palestinian dissent.
As no alternative formula was suggested, the formula of
Lebanese/Palestinian relations enervated and no legal norms or
principles were left to regulate and control this relation other
than unilateral decisions taken and implemented by the Lebanese
authority.
Palestinians –on the other hand- cling to their weapon inside their
camps and many assuring stances have accompanied the call for an
interlocution between the Lebanese state and the Palestinian
community to discuss the question of rights and obligations of
Palestinian refugees instead of looking at matters from the security
angle, in an attempt to show that the relation between the two
peoples is subject to, and governed by foreign decisions.
Palestinians repeatedly confirm that the objective behind keeping
their weapon is not to battle against the Lebanese army or any other
regional party. Under this harmonious atmosphere, which resulted
from "Cairo Agreement" and restored an atmosphere of Palestinian
national unity, Palestinians confirm that the internal-fighting era
has ended. They attribute this to the deep impact of the second
Intifada, which proved that any weapon possessed by Palestinians
should be directed only against the Israeli enemy. When Israeli
constraint attempts to push inland Palestinians to internal combat
collapse in the face of the Intifada's solidity and national unity,
it becomes worthy for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to emulate in
reserving their unity and in coordinating their efforts.
Some believe that the Palestinian weapon had incurred some
restrictions that reduce the roles it has played, or the roles which
reactions had enabled it to play.
Some also believe that Palestinian youths had been trained to take
up arms, basically to break through the borders and carry out
commando operations against Israeli occupation inside the 1948
territories, and this used to evoke violent Israeli responses that
detrimented Lebanese villages and cities, particularly in the south.
This has paved the way for emergence of currents, opposing military
struggle, where some even cooperated with Israeli hirelings, such as
"the militia of Southern Lebanon troops ( headed by Antoine Lahd)",
and this formed a controversial point in the Lebanese/Palestinian
relations. Yet, since "Al Taaef" agreement, and specifically after
the success of the Lebanese Islamic and National Resistance in an
unconditional expulsion of the Israeli occupation from the Lebanese
territories, and in accompaniment with the escalation of the
Intifada and the militant struggle in Palestine, the policy of
trans-border operation came to an end, and this weapon ceased to
have any regional role. Consequently, reflections affecting the
internal state of affairs of the Palestinian gathering stopped,
struggle against the Lebanese finished and the
Palestinian/Palestinian struggle waned for organizational reasons,
mainly because the fight experienced before has led to many
catastrophes and cracks that only helped the Zionist enemy. Those
catastrophes and cracks had furthermore led to retraction of the
Palestinian society's invulnerability, whose interests and needs
started to be ignored increasing by. Any rare or occasional
incidents such as shooting, launching a rocket (or more) across the
borders, or even clashes inside Palestinian camps, had featured non
Palestinian factors and effects, working to achieve special non
Palestinian goals, though the Palestinian society in Lebanon is
party that has always paid the price. Hence, siege on camps was
tightened, poverty was deepened and detachment from the general
economical, social and security route in
Lebanon
increased.
Palestinians repeatedly state that their experience in Lebanon has
shown that they can not trust promises and can not count much on
quiet intervals during which the Israeli enemy discontinues direct
attacks on them, because the matter would be only temporal. The
experience of Israeli bombing and destruction is not far in memory.
It is this experience that had taught those Palestinians that some
regional forces are ready to seize the opportunity for devastating
them as soon as they feel that the balance of forces is not in the
Palestinians' favor. The aftermath of Sabra and Shatela massacre and
the wars on camps are still present in mind.
Certainly, there is another veiled consideration which is not being
clearly or openly expressed, despite continual hinting thereto. It
is the Palestinians' estimation that negative policies of the
Lebanese government towards them had forced a large number of their
children and youths to migrate, and consequently, very many
registrations were struck off, the thing that encouraged Western
countries to exert pressure for absorbing and settlement of the
relatively small remaining number of Palestinians, which does not
exceed 250,000 people. This political pressure was and still is
directed against the Lebanese economy as a whole, mainly via the
state's foreign debt which amounts to billions of dollars, and via
disarmament of what is described as "Powers that object the
Israeli-Western plans". Therefore, if the Lebanese refuse
"settlement" and aspire to run away from the impacts thereof through
the internationally opened door, using the militias' weapon as an
excuse, then the possibility of drawing a logical commutation should
arise, whereas the Lebanese government is to change its policy
towards Palestinians. The government should grant them their
humanitarian rights: civil, economical and social, in return for
organization of their political/security life, by keeping their
Palestinian nationality, by being represented in PLO and by electing
members of their societal institutions and organizations.
It has become clear for Palestinians that the self-security policy
for camps –dedicated by the Lebanese state- is detrimental. Most of
the proposals –submitted by the Palestinian factions to the
successive Lebanese governments in the form of initiations- have
proved that the quidity of the matter lies in organizing relations
between the two parties via agreement, and not by pretending that
the individual's weapon in camps is against settlement because
non-acquisition of arms in the camps of other countries –such as
Syria and Jordan- did not lead to renunciation of "the right of
return" or rejection of settlement.
The other question in the Palestinian situation is non-presence of a
unified leading body to represent them in Lebanon, where as the past
separations secreted a swell in the number of Palestinian factions,
whose role, size and influence were disparate. Therefore, it was
quite natural for the leaderships of these factions –in front of
this new situation- to hold a chain of meetings to discuss how to
tackle Resolution No 1559 in case the Lebanese authority demands
implementation thereof. The basic grounds of the dialogue have
started to reflect a Palestinian consensus relating to the necessity
of being unified when tackling this issue, and not to side with any
Lebanese party against another in any internal matter, calling
Lebanon as a whole to support their national and humanitarian
rights. There are indications that deep discussions are taking place
over several preliminary suggestions relating to a Palestinian
agenda. This agenda brings up Palestinian rights and obligations
comprehensively, and refuses partition of matters as well as
restriction there of to security and armament. As a preliminary step
towards a positive reaction, the agenda calls for formation of a
Lebanese-Palestinian joint committee or body to tackle and treat all
kinds of matters.
The Settlement Question
The Lebanese and Palestinian stance conforms in refusing settlement.
The Palestinian stance furthermore rejects dislodgement, noting that
the concept of settlement has not been agreed on yet, despite the
two parties' belief that the consequences thereof practically bestow
legitimacy on the Israeli occupation to
Palestine
and confirm legitimacy of the rise of the Israeli state. This
concept forms an assurance to the Zionist allegation of "returning
to the land of promise" and justifies all crimes and massacres
committed by Israel against Palestinians and Arabs. It may also give
matters a completely different dimension, whereas Palestinians would
become responsible for aggressing against
Israel,
and would be accused of having stood against peace for the past 57
years.
Furthermore, this mentioned concept would present Palestinian Arabs
who remained firm since 1948 in their fathers and grandfathers'
country, as a remnant of an older occupation and therefore should be
deported. In short, settlement would burden the host Arab countries
or any third party with finding a solution for the Palestinian
dilemma.
According to the legal tradition, settlement is an increase in the
population, carried out through granting the nationality of the
hosting country. This in itself is reflected by the Lebanese and
resisted by the Palestinians via clinging to "The Right of Return".
Although Lebanon has introduced –through amendment of the "Real
Estate Law"- a new settlemental concept to the effect that "real
estate ownership" in Lebanon leads to settlement, yet this legal
heresy covers the real intention of dislodging Palestinians.
Rejection of settlement in Lebanon is based on a constitutional
text, set up in the wake of "Al Taaef Agreement", whereas many
related settlement to "division of the country", so as to maintain
denominational and political balance, which is a controversial
issue, the acquity of which emerges every now and then, mainly at
times of political stalemates.
In general, settlement is rejected by most of the Lebanese political
powers, and nobody shows readiness to discuss it, though this matter
is sometimes coupled with generous monetary aids from the West, as
compensations. On the other hand, thick deportation of Palestinians
from Lebanon could never be done through a single party decision.
Yet, it could become feasible through agreements between
Lebanon,
Palestine and other countries. As long as the constituents of this
matter complicate the question of Palestinians' destiny, therefore
the present basic factors do not furnish suitable grounds for being
positive about occurrence thereof.
In Lebanon, writing about settlement has relatively widened and many
politicians had been repeating their rejection thereof so frequently
that it became axiomatic. Despite all that, the basic pivot still
lies in normalization, because settlement could never be achieved
without it. In "Al Safeer" daily newspaper Hussein Al Shareef wrote
to take
Lebanon
–and not Palestine- as a final homeland. This is to be followed by
granting Palestinians the Lebanese nationality, where as they would
merge in the Lebanese society and become part thereof, enjoying the
same rights and obligations, including their political rights".
For this same reason, Palestinians adhere to "The Right of Return"
and perceive that keeping the national identity disagrees with
"Settlement", and "normalization". Lebanese political powers also
reject settlement and had constitutionally dedicated this, while
some rush to link it with division of Lebanon.
As for the means that compels
Israel
to implement the UN Resolution No (194) which ordains Palestinians'
"Right of Return", the vision of the official
Lebanon
and the Palestinian society in Lebanon are different. Palestinians
believe that they have a combatative role that includes training,
arming and resisting the occupation attempts to absent their right
of return. Incompatibility between the Lebanese and the Palestinian
visions includes the type of official Lebanese dealing with
Palestinian refugees during the period of time required for
implementation of the right of return. Palestinians demand to have
their civil, economical and social rights, yet preserving their
national identity, considering that their stay in Lebanon is
temporal. The successive Lebanese governments –on the other hand-
chose debarment of Palestinians so as to encourage them to migrate.
In addition to the problem of defining a militia and a liberation
movement, the issue of collecting militias' weapons –stipulated by
Resolution No 1559- raises another problem. It is the fear that
disarmament could be an introduction for settlement, which is openly
rejected by the Lebanese and Palestinian parties. A third problem
that will arise is drafting a reply to the international resolution
No 1559. It is well known that the past experience had taught
lessons to the two parties and has carried various fears.
To choose confrontation and to force the Lebanese army –accompanied
by the Lebanese security crops- to carry out a cleansing attacks ,
and to storm into Palestinian camps is a matter which the Lebanese
and the Palestinians both fully agree to drop because it simply
serves the Israeli enemy. The impact of such a choice is for sure
negative on both parties, and here we recall what happened in "Ba'albak
Camp" on 05/09/2002, whereas a number of Palestinian and Lebanese
martyrs fell as a result of some unclear or bad performance. Thence,
the two parties abriated the results and after math thereof. On the
other hand, it is not possible to turn away from the international
society by not drafting a suitable response that regards the higher
interests of both peoples. So, nothing remains for the two parties
other than serious and responsible talk to look for a settlemental
formula for the Palestinian situation in all aspects of their
living. Such a formula is to be reached by cooperation, high
responsibility and a positive spirit, regarding the national rights
of the two peoples, within the scope of feasible responsibility of
both parties.
Hence, with no settlement and no deportation, there remains the
necessity for a Lebanese-Palestinian understanding formula for
coexistence under a joint agenda and brotherly relations that helps
in facing the enemies of Lebanon and enemies of the right of return.
Surely, things can not be always left as they were…. Deprivation of
Palestinians on the one hand and on going threat to Lebanon on the
other hand…. The solution is a real understanding -between the two
parties- which effectuates Lebanese sovereignty and assures justice
for Palestinians, instead of the current negativity and heavy
restrictions on the refugees' society together with continual
insistence to keep the Palestinian national identity.
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