|
Back
to Studies page
Introduction
Restrictions on
movement
Current restrictions
Excessive use of force
The “separation
barrier/fence/wall”
On grounds of security
The impact on the
Palestinians’ right to work
Discrimination against
Palestinians
National and
international law
Appendix: Case studies
“The
period from June 2002 to May 2003 was marked by a deepening of the
economic and social crisis in the Occupied Territories and its
likely stabilization at a very low level. The severe restriction on
movements of persons and goods within the Occupied Territories and
between these and Israel have resulted in a dramatic decline in
consumption, income and employment levels, and unprecedented
contraction of economic activity.”
Report of the Director-General of the International Labour Office (ILO),
May
2003[1]
“By the end of 2002 Real Gross National Income (GNI) had shrunk by
38 percent from its 1999 level…Overall GNI losses reached US$5.2
billion after 27 months of intifada…The proximate cause of the
Palestinian economic crisis is closure.”
“Twenty-seven Months - Intifada, Closures and alestinian Economic
Crisis:
An assessment”, World Bank, May 2003
“People
can’t work properly in Jenin because they open their businesses; a
tank comes and they have to shut. How can they work? The curfew has
made things worse. The Israeli army announces: ‘Tomorrow Jenin will
be open.’ But the following day, the army comes and announces a
curfew and tanks close the town. What do we have here now? Nothing.”
Faisal ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 34, a welder in Jenin whose permit to work in
Israel was withdrawn at the start of the
intifada.
From earning 300 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) (about US$60) daily, he
was subsequently able to find work for only 10 days during 2001, at
NIS50 (about US$10) a day, on a United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) job-creation
program.
Introduction
The ceasefire reached in the context of the Roadmap peace initiative
has resulted in a marked reduction in violence and killings, and has
brought a welcome respite to the Israeli and Palestinian civilian
populations. Even though the overwhelming majority of Palestinian
detainees remain behind bars in Israeli prisons and military
detention centres, the release of some detainees who had been held
without charge or trial has raised hopes for further releases.
However, hopes that, as part of the implementation of the Roadmap,
Israel would lift the closures and movement restrictions which have
paralyzed life and the economy in the Occupied Territories have not
materialized. By the beginning of August 2003, the Israeli army had
lifted only some four checkpoints, out of a total of more than 300
checkpoints and roadblocks.
Even if all the blockades were lifted immediately and free movement
allowed in the Occupied Territories it would take years for the
Palestinian population to resume a normal life and to rebuild the
economy which has been virtually destroyed by years of siege. Long
term investments and efforts will be required to reverse the
dramatic
increase in poverty and unemployment levels of the last few years.
These efforts will only be possible if Israel restores freedom of
movement in the Occupied Territories.
Restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of Palestinians
within the Occupied Territories reached an unprecedented level in
recent years. The effect has been to deprive Palestinians not only
of their freedom of movement but of other basic human rights – in
particular, their right to work and to provide a living for
themselves and their families.
Palestinians have had their movement restricted to varying degrees
of restrictions since Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip in 1967. Such restrictions increased in the past decade and
have reached an unprecedented level in the past three years, since
the September 2000 renewal of the Palestinian uprising against
Israeli occupation, known as the
intifada
or the
al-Aqsa intifada[2].
Since then, increasing restrictions and new measures adopted to
tighten and enforce closures (the prohibition of movement within
and/or between areas) and curfews have all but destroyed the
Palestinian economy.
Freedom of movement for people and goods, at least within borders,
is an essential requirement for any functional economy, particularly
so for a new economy trying to develop and establish itself against
the backdrop of dependency created by 36 years of occupation. Yet
some 3.5 million Palestinians who live in the Occupied Territories
are often effectively confined to their towns and villages by
closures enforced by Israeli military checkpoints and roadblocks.
Some villages have been completely sealed off and urban areas are
frequently placed under 24-hour curfew, during which no one is
allowed to leave the house, often for prolonged periods.
Palestinians have been prohibited from driving on main roads
connecting one part of the West Bank to another.
Trips of a few kilometres, where they are possible, take hours,
following lengthy detours to avoid the areas surrounding Israeli
settlements and settlers’ roads (known as “bypass roads”), which
connect the settlements to each other and to Israel and which are
prohibited to Palestinians. With the spread of settlements and
bypass roads throughout the Occupied Territories, the prohibited
areas have multiplied. Where the settlements are closest to
Palestinian villages, movement in and out of these villages is even
more restricted than elsewhere. In parts of the Gaza Strip, areas
where Palestinians live surrounded by Israeli settlements have been
declared closed military zones. These are only accessible, and only
at specific times, to the residents, who are also often stopped from
leaving or returning to their homes for days or even weeks.
In addition to the increased time, effort and cost involved,
journeys are also not without risk.
To enforce closures and curfews, Israeli soldiers routinely fire
live ammunition, throw tear gas or sound bombs, beat and detain
people, and confiscate vehicles and documents (IDs). Ordinary
activities, such as going to work or to school, taking a baby for
immunization, attending a funeral or a wedding, expose women and
men, young and old, to such risks. Hence, many people limit their
activities outside the home to what is absolutely essential.
Closures and curfews have prevented Palestinians from reaching their
places of work and from distributing their products to internal and
external markets, and have caused shortages.
Factories and farms have been driven out of business by the losses
incurred, dramatically increased transport costs and loss of export
markets. As a result, unemployment has soared to over 50% and more
than half of the Palestinian population is now living below the
poverty line. With the sharp decline in the standard of living in
the Occupied Territories, malnutrition and other illnesses have
increased. Closures and curfews have prevented Palestinian children
and youths from attending classes for prolonged periods, violating
their right to education and undermining their future professional
prospects.
Amnesty International has documented in numerous reports the
deterioration of the human rights situation and the violence that
has reached a level unprecedented in the 36 years of Israel’s
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In the past three years more
than 2,100
Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli army in the Occupied
Territories, including some 380 children. Palestinian armed groups
have killed some 750 Israelis, most of them civilians, and including
more than 90 children. Tens of thousands of people have been
injured, many maimed for life. The Israeli army has destroyed more
than 3,000 Palestinian homes, and hundreds of workshops, factories
and public buildings in the West Bank and Gaza. They have bulldozed
vast areas of cultivated land, uprooting olive groves and orchards
and flattening greenhouses and fields of growing crops.
These abuses, notably the destruction of land and property, have
contributed to damaging the economy in the Occupied Territories.
However, the stringent restrictions on the movement of Palestinians
imposed in the past three years have been the main cause of the
severe economic depression and the increase in unemployment.
Israel under international human rights and humanitarian law, it is
obliged to ensure freedom of movement, an adequate standard of
living, and as normal a life as possible to the population in
occupied territories. International law also prohibits an occupying
power from imposing collective punishment on the occupied
population.
This report analyses the impact of movement restrictions on the
right to work of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip[3].
It details the findings of Amnesty International’s research and
describes representative cases in different areas of the West Bank
and Gaza. The report contends that the widespread and prolonged
closures, curfews and other restrictions on movement currently
imposed cannot be justified on security grounds, and discriminate
against Palestinians, and are often used as a form of collective
punishment in reprisal for attacks committed by Palestinian armed
groups.
Among its recommendations, Amnesty International urges the Israeli
government to lift the restrictions on movement that constitute
collective punishment and to make every effort to enable as normal a
life as possible for the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. It
calls for the evacuation of Israeli settlers from the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, on the grounds that their residence in the Occupied
Territories violates international law, and that measures
purportedly taken to protect the security and freedom of movement of
Israeli settlers impose serious human rights abuses against
Palestinians. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians and goods
should be imposed only in relation to a specific security threat and
if they are non-discriminatory and proportionate in impact and
duration. They should not obstruct the freedom of movement required
to maintain an adequate standard of living or have a negative impact
on the Palestinians’ fundamental rights, including the right to
work.
Amnesty International’s research
Amnesty International delegates have frequently visited Israel and
the Occupied Territories to carry out field research and to discuss
the organization’s concerns with Israeli and Palestinian
authorities. It has published numerous reports and statements on
different aspects of the human rights situation and on abuses by the
Israeli security forces, by Palestinian armed groups and by the
Palestinian Authority (PA).[4]
In October and November 2002, Israeli government officials and
representatives of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) did not respond
to repeated requests by Amnesty International delegates for meetings
and information about policies and practices relating to
restrictions on movement in the Occupied Territories.
The delegates were able to interview Palestinians, Israelis and
others who have lived or worked in the Occupied Territories, and
whose lives have been affected by closures, curfews and other
restrictions on their movement or who have witnessed or been
subjected to abuses.
They included medical professionals, human rights and humanitarian
workers, journalists, trade unionists, community leaders,
usinesspeople, workers and self-employed people in
various towns and villages, as well as diplomats, government
officials and Israeli soldiers.
Over the years, Amnesty International delegates have frequently
witnessed Israeli soldiers harassing, threatening and blocking the
passage of Palestinians at checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza.
They have themselves experienced similar treatment and lengthy
travel delays between towns and villages caused by the sudden
imposition of closures and curfews, on occasion being threatened and
fired at by soldiers.
In compiling this report, Amnesty International has drawn on
information from international organizations and agencies, including
the United Nations (UN), the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the European Union (EU),
as well as Israeli and Palestinian governmental and non-governmental
organizations and institutions.
Background
Between the two world wars the United Kingdom (UK) ruled Palestine
under a League of Nations mandate. An armed conflict for the control
of Palestine intensified after November 1947 when the UN voted to
partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. On 14 May
1948 the UK’s mandate ended and the State of Israel was proclaimed.
Protests against partition were followed by war between Arab and
Israeli armies.
Israel emerged victorious, expanding its de facto frontiers beyond
those proposed by the partition plan. Two parts of mandate Palestine
remained outside Israel: the Gaza Strip, which came under Egyptian
administration, and the eastern part adjacent to the River Jordan.
The latter was annexed by Jordan in 1950 and became known as the
West Bank.[5]
Hostilities between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan in June 1967
ended in Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and
the Gaza Strip. Israel unilaterally annexed part of the West Bank
including the Old City of Jerusalem and incorporated it into the
Jerusalem Municipality; this area is known as East Jerusalem.
Syria’s Golan Heights were annexed by Israel in 1980. The Sinai
Peninsula, also annexed, was later returned to Egypt.
Peace talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) began in 1991. A Declaration of Principles signed in 1993
envisaged a five year interim period in which the Israeli military
government in the Occupied Territories would transfer some functions
to an elected PA in parts of the West Bank and Gaza.
Negotiations on a permanent settlement and an end to Israeli
military occupation were to be concluded by 1999. Discussion was
specifically deferred on Jerusalem, settlements (the Israeli
colonies established in the Occupied Territories), borders and
refugees (Palestinians forced off their land since 1948) pending
negotiations on a permanent settlement.
An Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II
Agreement) in 1995 defined the network of zones in the Occupied
Territories over which the PA would have jurisdiction in the interim
period and the functions it would take over.
Negotiations broke down after the start of the current
intifada
in September 2000.
East Jerusalem was excluded from the Oslo II Agreement and remains
subject to the internal laws of Israel. Its Palestinian population
are regarded as “permanent residents” and carry blue Israeli
identity cards. Palestinians residing elsewhere in the West Bank and
in the Gaza Strip carry green Palestinian identity cards; they are
not allowed access to the city without a permit.
Duties of an occupying power
According to international law, an occupying power is required to
administer the territory it controls as far as possible without
making far-reaching changes to the existing order, while at the same
time ensuring the protection of the fundamental rights of the
inhabitants of the occupied territory[6].The
core idea of the international rule of belligerent occupation is
that occupation is transitional, for a limited period, and one of
its key aims is to enable the inhabitants of an occupied territory
to live as “normal” a life as possible.
The duties of an occupying power include:
• treating the occupied population humanely at all times (Article
27, IV Geneva Convention);
• ensure the food and medical supplies of the occupied population
(Article 55, IV Geneva Convention);
• ensure and maintain the medical services, public health and
hygiene in the occupied territory, and ensuring that medical
personnel of all categories can carry out their duties (Article 56,
IV Geneva Convention);
• allow and facilitate relief for the occupied population (Article
59, IV Geneva Convention). Relief provided by others in no way
relieves the occupying power of any of its
responsibilities under Articles 55, 56 and 59 (Article 61, IV Geneva
Convention).
An occupying power may NOT:
• use collective punishment or intimidation against the occupied
population (Article 33, IV Geneva Convention);
• forcibly transfer inhabitants of the occupied territory to its
territory or elsewhere nor transfer parts of its civilian population
into the territory it occupies (Article 49, IV Geneva Convention);
• take measures aiming at creating unemployment or at restricting
employment opportunities in the occupied territory, in order to
induce the occupied population to work for the occupying power
(Article 52, IV Geneva Convention);
• destroy private or public property, except where absolutely
necessary for military operations (Article 53, IV Geneva
Convention);
• appropriating private or public property or natural resources, for
which the occupying power shall be regarded only as administrator
(Article 55, Hague Regulations).
Restrictions on
movement
For more than three decades, and especially in the past 15 years
Israel has imposed varying degrees of restrictions on the movements
of Palestinians, and in the past three years it has increased these
restrictions to an unprecedented level. Such restrictions, as
imposed in recent years, contravene Israel’s obligations under
international human rights and humanitarian law to protect freedom
of movement and not to discriminate against or inflict collective
punishment on the population of an occupied territory.
The right to freedom of movement
“Everyone
lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence”.
(Article 12.1, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[ICCPR]).
Security measures taken by Israel in the Occupied Territories
consistently violate the right to freedom of movement of
Palestinians protected by the ICCPR, to which Israel is party.
Already in 1998, prior to the outbreak of the current uprising, the
Human Rights Committee, the UN body of experts that monitors states’
compliance with the Covenant, expressed concern about the grave
consequences of restrictions on movement in the Occupied
Territories:
“While acknowledging the security concerns that have led to
restrictions on movement, the Committee notes with regret the
continued impediments imposed on movement, which affect mostly
Palestinians travelling in and between East Jerusalem, the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank and which have grave consequences affecting
nearly all areas of Palestinian life. The Committee considers this
to raise serious issues under article 12. In regard to persons in
these areas, the Committee urges Israel to respect the right to
freedom of movement provided for under article 12…” (CCPR/C/79/Add.
93, para 22).
Restrictions on the right to freedom of movement and the right to
work may only be imposed if they are based on law, pursue a
legitimate objective, such as protecting public order, and are
strictly necessary. Israeli military and emergency legislation give
military commanders the broadest discretion to declare closed
military areas, restrict the use of roads and impose curfews.
According to the UN Human Rights Committee:
“The application of the restrictions permissible under article
12, paragraph 3, needs to be consistent with the other rights
guaranteed in the Covenant and with the fundamental principles of
equality and nondiscrimination.
Thus, it would be a clear violation of the Covenant if the rights
enshrined in article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, were restricted by
making distinctions of any kind, such as on the basis of race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status”[7]
The sweeping restrictions on the movement of Palestinians are
disproportionate and discriminatory – they are imposed on all
Palestinians
because
they are Palestinians, and not on Israeli settlers who live
illegally in the Occupied Territories. Even though the Israeli
authorities claim that such measures are always imposed to protect
the security of Israelis, the restrictions imposed within the
Occupied Territories do not target particular individuals who are
believed to pose a threat. They are broad and indiscriminate in
their application and as such are unlawful. They have a severe
negative impact on the lives of millions of Palestinians who have
not committed any offence.
Freedom from collective punishment
“… Collective penalties … are prohibited… Reprisal against protected
persons and their properties are prohibited”.
(Article 33, IV Geneva Convention).
Curfews have been routinely imposed and closures tightened in the
Occupied Territories, often after suicide bombs and other attacks by
Palestinian armed groups inside Israel or in other areas of the
Occupied Territories. Such measures constitute a form of collective
punishment and appear to be a retaliation designed to intimidate and
punish the whole Palestinian community, as well as to show to the
Israeli public that the army is reacting to attacks. In June 2003
the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) described the situation as
“approaching
three full years of what can onlybe characterized as collective
punishment.”[8]
Such conduct breaches the prohibition on collective punishment
contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations.
As early as February 2001, the ICRC was expressing concern that
closures contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, including by the
imposition of collective punishment and the obstruction of food,
healthcare and education.
Such restrictions on movement have since been dramatically
increased.
“The
ICRC views the policy of isolating whole villages for an extended
period as contrary to International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
particularly with respect to those aspects of IHL which protect
civilians in times of occupation. Indeed, stringent closures
frequently lead to breaches of Article 55 (free passage of medical
assistance and foodstuffs), Article 33(prohibition on collective
punishments), Article 50 (children and education), Article 56
(movement of medical transportation and public health facilities)
and Article 72 (access to lawyers for persons charged) of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. While accepting that the State of Israel has
legitimate security concerns, the ICRC stresses that measures taken
to address these concerns must be in accordance with International
Humanitarian Law.
Furthermore, these security measures must allow for a quick return
to normal civilian life. This, in essence, is the meaning of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which is applicable to the
Occupied Territories.”
ICRC, “Israel and Occupied/Autonomous Territories: The ICRC Starts
its ‘Closure Relief Programme’,” 26 February 2001.
Freedom from discrimination
“… all protected persons shall be treated with the same
consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are,
without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race,
religion, or political opinion”.
(Article 27, IV Geneva Convention).
The restrictions imposed by Israel discriminate against Palestinians
and are inconsistent with fundamental human rights principles,
notably the principle of equality. Restrictions on movement, such as
the prohibition on the use of roads and the imposition of curfews in
the Occupied Territories are imposed on Palestinians only, not on
Israeli settlers. The measures which the Israeli authorities state
are taken to protect the security and freedom of movement of some
380,000 Israeli settlers[9],
whose presence in the Occupied Territories violates Article 49 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention
[10]curtail the freedom of movement of
some three and a half million Palestinians. Even in cases where
Israeli settlers have attacked Palestinians or their property, it is
the Palestinians who have been placed under curfews or denied access
to the areas, while no such restrictions have been imposed on the
Israeli settlers.
According to international human rights law, it is only acceptable
for a state to treat people differently on grounds that are
reasonable, objective and fulfil a legitimate purpose, such as
protecting public order. The restrictions on the movement of
Palestinians imposed in the Occupied Territories are unreasonable,
disproportionate and constitute discrimination, prohibited by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination.
The evolution of movement restrictions
1967–1993: fostering dependency
For many years, the Israeli authorities fostered the dependence of
the Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy. The majority of
Palestinians in the West Bank were allowed to travel freely into
East Jerusalem and Israel and to the Gaza Strip under a general exit
permit issued in 1972 by the Military Commander of the West Bank.
Most Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip were also able to move
freely into Israel and East Jerusalem. Unable to develop an
independent economy under Israeli occupation, Palestinians often had
to choose between going to work abroad – and risk loosing their
status as residents of the Occupied Territories – or relying on the
Israeli labour market. In Israel, they were paid less than Israeli
workers, but still earned more than in the Occupied Territories.
The first
intifada,
from 1987 to 1993, led to new restrictions. In 1989, residents of
the Gaza Strip were required to obtain a magnetic card, renewable
annually, to enter Israel. In 1991, before the Gulf War, Israel
cancelled the general exit permit and required Palestinians to
obtain individual permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. In March
1993, the Israeli security forces set up checkpoints along the Green
Line separating the West Bank from Israel and started to control
entry to East Jerusalem. This severely disrupted Palestinian
economic activity as the main road linking the north and south of
the West Bank passes through East Jerusalem.
Curfews imposed by the Israeli army routinely confined Palestinians
to their homes. For seven years, the Gaza Strip was under night
curfew until the Israeli army redeployed in 1995.
During the Gulf War, 24-hour curfews were imposed for lengthy
periods. The IDF also often imposed curfews when carrying out
searches and arrests.
1993–2000: The peace process years
In 1994 the Israeli military government started to transfer various
civil functions to the newly created PA. The 1995 Oslo II Agreement
identified the PA’s functions and defined the intricate “zoning” of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that established its interim
jurisdiction. However, Israel retained ultimate and effective
control of all aspects of Palestinians’ movement, both internally
and across international borders.
Its control of border crossings also enabled Israel to control the
import and export of goods to and from the Occupied Territories.
The West Bank
The Oslo II Agreement established three zones in the West Bank. In
Area A, the PA was to be responsible for internal security and civil
affairs – for example, health and education – and Israel for
external security. In Area B, the PA was to be responsible for civil
affairs and public order, while Israel had overriding responsibility
for security. In Area C, Israel was responsible for both civil
affairs and security.
The boundaries of Area A were drawn to include most major
Palestinian towns, refugee camps and villages. Most of the smaller
Palestinian villages were in Area B. Area C included Israeli
settlements, a few Palestinian villages, unpopulated areas and
agricultural land and, significantly, virtually all the main roads.
By 2000, 97.6 per cent of Palestinians in the West Bank lived in
Areas A and B, which covered 18.2 per cent and 21.8 per cent of the
territory
respectively. Area C, under full Israeli control, consisted of 60
per cent of the land and contained only 2.4 per cent of the
Palestinian population. Thus, while Israel retained direct control
over most of the land, it no longer had to provide the services
which an occupying power is required to provide for the occupied
population.
Areas A and B were fragmented into isolated enclaves surrounded by
Israeli settlements and roads in Area C. Main roads linking towns
and villages in Areas A and B remained in Area C. Israel’s control
of Area C therefore allowed it to control many aspects of the lives
of Palestinians living in Areas A and B. In the years following the
signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles, Israel seized
extensive tracts of land from Palestinians to build a network of
bypass roads connecting Israeli settlements throughout the Occupied
Territories to
each other and to Israel. Thousands of dunums of land (a dunum is
one tenth of a hectare) were seized on grounds of military
necessity, usually for temporary, specified periods, but were often
used for permanent features, such as “bypass” roads and settlements.
In May 2002,
the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), estimated that some
350 kilometres of bypass roads had been built on land confiscated by
the IDF through such “temporary” seizure orders. In the same period
Israel stepped up the pace of construction of settlements in the
Occupied Territories to an unprecedented level. The number of
Israeli settlers increased from 240,000 in 1993 to 380,000 by the
end of 2000.
Hebron
The city of Hebron was administered under a separate agreement,
signed between Israel and the PA in 1997, which divided the city
into two areas, H-1 and H-2. In contrast to other West Bank cities,
Israel allowed Israelis to establish four settlement enclaves in the
heart of the town, near the Haram al-Ibrahimi/Machpelah Cave, a
religious site holy to both Muslims and Jews. In Area H-1, populated
by about 100,000 Palestinians, the PA was to be responsible for
internal security and civil affairs, as in other West Bank towns.
Area H-2, which included the Haram al-Ibrahimi/Machpelah Cave and
the four settlement enclaves, is inhabited by about 30,000
Palestinians and 500 Israeli settlers and remained under the control
of the Israeli army.
The Gaza Strip
The Oslo II Agreement divided the Gaza Strip into areas where the PA
was responsible for internal security and civil matters, and areas
under the control of Israel – the settlements, bypass (settlers’)
roads, and a military installation area, adjoining the border
between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.
Some 60 per cent of the Gaza Strip was under the jurisdiction of the
PA. These densely populated areas were separated by 17 Israeli
settlements and by east-west bypass roads connecting the settlements
to each other and to Israel. An electrified perimeter fence ran
along the eastern side of the Gaza Strip adjoining Israel, making
unauthorized exit virtually impossible. Thus, whereas Palestinians
from the West Bank could still slip into Israel to work without a
permit, those from Gaza could not. The movement of Palestinian and
commercial traffic of goods across several crossing points – Karni/Muntar,
Erez/Beit Hanoun and Sofa/Qarara – was often subject to long delays
due to Israeli security checks or closures.
Movement into Israel and to Jordan and Egypt
The individual permit system to enter Israel or to travel between
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on roads other than the safe
passage route remained in place for all this period. Between 1994
and 1997, Israel frequently froze permits and imposed a
comprehensive closure for prolonged periods, preventing Palestinians
from the West Bank and from the Gaza Strip from entering Israel and
East Jerusalem. As with internal closures, comprehensive closures
were imposed in the wake of Palestinian suicide attacks or increased
tension in the Occupied Territories. In February and March 1996,
supporters of
Hamas
and Islamic
Jihad
carried out a series of suicide bombings in Israel and in Jerusalem,
killing 59 Israeli civilians. In September and October 1996, 65
Palestinians, including 37 members of the PA security forces, and 16
members of the Israeli security forces were killed during
demonstrations across the Occupied Territories in protest at the
opening of a tunnel near the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.
According to the Office of the UN Special Coordinator in the
Occupied Territories (UNSCO), 82 out of 277 potential working days
were lost due to comprehensive closure in 1996; that is 31.9 per
cent[11]
.Strict closures were immediately translated into increased
unemployment and poverty.
From the start of 1998 until the autumn of 2000 the situation
improved with the decrease in comprehensive closures (down to 24.5
days). Improved freedom of movement was a major factor in the
recovery of the Palestinian economy. By 2000, unemployment had
dropped to 10 per cent. Even though Palestinians remained dependent
to some degrees on wage labour in Israel and in settlements, the
degree of dependency decreased as the Palestinian economy was able
to develop
[12].However, Israel also retained
control of the movement of people and goods through the Rafah
Crossing and the Allenby Bridge, the border crossings from the Gaza
Strip to Egypt and from the West Bank to Jordan. Palestinian
products often faced delays at borders and Israeli ports, increasing
cost and reducing their competitiveness on external markets.
Internal Closures
The widespread impression, in Israeli society and at the
international level, was that during the peace process years,
following the agreements which resulted in the redeployment of the
Israeli army from most Palestinian populated areas in the Occupied
Territories and the establishment of the PA, Palestinians were in
control of their lives in the new situation of “autonomy” or
“self-rule”. However, this was not the case.
“The
realization of the principle of territorial integrity, as enunciated
in the Oslo accords, has been frustrated during the period under
review by Israeli restrictions on the movement of persons and goods
between so-called A, B, and C areas of the West Bank, between
Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, between the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, and between the occupied territories and the outside
world. Safe passage arrangements have not been established, and
arrangements for a Gaza seaport and airport have not been agreed
upon. The Israeli policy of general closure, which has been in
effect since 30 March 1993, imposes explicit restrictions on the
mobility of goods and persons. There are fixed Israeli checkpoints
on Palestinian roads, including key transport routes, and a system
of differentiated mandatory permits for labourers, business people,
medical personnel and patients, students, religious worshippers, and
all other categories of Palestinians. Restrictions on entry to
Jerusalem block access to the main northsouth transportation route
in the West Bank, necessitating lengthy and costly detours. This
general closure has been aggravated by periodic comprehensive
closures entailing the complete denial of such movements during a
full 353 calendar days between 30 March 1993 and mid-June 1997.
Since 21 March 1997, when a bomb attack in Tel Aviv, apparently
carried out by Hamas, killed three Israeli women, such comprehensive
closures have been imposed for a total of 24 days. Internal closure
days, during which movement is not allowed even inside the West Bank
(between A and B areas) totalled 27 days in 1996. Israeli
restrictions on the movement of goods and personnel are also imposed
on UN officials and project materials, resulting in delays and added
costs for development projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and
in serious disruption of the work of humanitarian agencies.”
UN Secretary-General, June 1997[13]
On several occasions the Israeli army imposed what became known as
“internal closures” in the West Bank, stopping all movement of
Palestinians between Areas A, B and C for days, sometimes weeks.
These internal closures were usually in response to Palestinian
attacks on Israelis inside Israel or during periods of tension
caused by the Israeli army’s excessive use of force. Normal life
came to a standstill, especially for the 60 per cent of Palestinians
living in the predominantly rural Area B. The first comprehensive
internal closure, in March 1996, lasted for 21 days
[14]. In 1997 a total of 27 days of
internal closure were imposed on all or part of the West Bank; in
1998, the total was 40 days.
The internal closures demonstrated how Israel, despite its ithdrawal
from some 40 per cent of the West Bank, could bring Palestinian life
to a halt and the Palestinian economy to its knees through its
control of the areas and main roads around the supposedly autonomous
Palestinian enclaves. The use of curfews, by contrast, declined
following the establishment of the PA as Israel gradually withdrew
its army from most populated parts of the Occupied Territories.
However, the IDF regularly imposed curfews on Palestinians living in
the H-2 area of Hebron.
According to the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles “the
two sides view the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit,
whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period”[15].
However, hopes that the new situation following the agreement would
make it easier for Palestinians to at least travel between Gaza and
the West Bank failed to materialize.
Israel did not allow the opening of the “safe passage” road between
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, contained in the
Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho of 5 May
1994, until October 1999[16].
Use of the “safe passage” by Palestinians remained subject to
security clearance and authorization by the Israeli authorities, who
often refused authorization and at times closed the “safe passage”.
On 6 October 2000, the “safe passage” was closed and has not been
reopened. By the year 2000 most of the 1.3 million Palestinians
living in Gaza had never left the Gaza Strip, an area totalling a
mere 348 square kilometres. Speaking at a conference in September
1994, Israeli lawyer Tamar Pelleg Sryck remarked:
“The
Palestinians have received manifold responsibilities… but lack the
necessary powers to implement such responsibilities. One observes
that Israel, despite redeployment, controls the lives of Gazans and
the functioning of their society… The PA took over responsibility
for education, yet over 1,000 students who wish to pursue their
studies in universities in the West Bank are dependent on the IDF
for their exit permits… The economy in Gaza is the PA’s concern, yet
Gazan workers cannot keep their jobs in Israel, agricultural
products produced in Gaza cannot be exported and experts are not
permitted to visit the Gaza Strip etc, unless the relevant permits
are granted by the Israeli authorities…”[17]
At the same conference, Aaron Back, Development Director of the
Israeli human rights organization, B’Tselem, noted:
“We
have seen an ongoing process of harassment, bureaucratic delays and
refusal of these permits, with reasons of security generally being
cited, and it is our belief that these measures of harassment are
used by the Israeli security authorities as tools for intimidation,
blackmail and coercion.”[18]
Current
restrictions
Although increasingly stringent restrictions on Palestinian movement
in the Occupied Territories are largely in response to the current
intifada,
the uprising itself was a reaction to the restrictions imposed on
Palestinians in the preceding years. Before the outbreak of the
intifada,
movement restrictions were already significant in determining
Palestinians’ quality of life and the development of their economy.
They contributed to the frustration of hopes for improvements in
daily life and future prospects, raised by the peace process.
Palestinians found that their newly acquired freedom extended no
further than the confines of overcrowded refugee camps and
disjointed enclaves, while Israeli settlers expanded and
strengthened their hold on the surrounding land and resources.
Tightening of closures in the West Bank
On 3 October 2002, the then Israeli Minister of Defence, Binyamin
Ben Eliezer, explained the IDF’s policy on internal closures in the
Knesset (Israeli Parliament): “The directives of the military
command are to freeze all traffic on West Bank roads, including
taxis, buses, private vehicles and others according to security
needs.”
According to the Israeli army, the main roads of the West Bank are
for Israeli cars, clearly identifiable by yellow number plates, and
military vehicles. Palestinian vehicles, distinguishable by their
green licence plates, are prohibited. In recent years, Amnesty
International delegates have rarely seen a green-plated car on main
roads, apart from a few shared taxis. Palestinians have often been
in carts pulled by donkeys or mules, a rare sight three years ago.
PERMITS:
Palestinians may apply for permits to travel in private vehicles
between West Bank towns. The legal basis for this new system, the
categories of people who are eligible for permits and the procedures
for application are unclear.
Months after Palestinians were required to obtain such permits and
despite several requests by UNSCO and diplomats, the Israeli
authorities had not provided a copy of any written rules or
procedures. Amit Zuchman, the Deputy Legal Adviser to the Military
Commander of the West Bank, verbally informed the Association for
Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) that doctors and employees of
international organizations were eligible for permits. Another IDF
official informed ACRI that merchants, doctors, teachers, Civil
Administration employees and employees of international
organizations were eligible.
Some Palestinians from these groups have obtained permits after long
delays, and others have been denied them without explanation or on
unspecified “security grounds”. Permits are normally only issued for
a limited period, usually one month, and are only valid for travel
on certain days and between certain hours (often weekdays from 5am
to 7pm). When curfews and/or comprehensive closures are imposed, the
permits cannot be used and at other times Israeli soldiers
arbitrarily deny passage to permit holders. Israeli human rights
organizations have frequently intervened in cases where Israeli
soldiers have refused to allow passage to drivers holding valid
permits and carrying essential supplies, such as food and water.
Many Palestinians refuse to apply for them for fear of lending
credence to an arbitrary system that they regard as completely
illegitimate. In addition, they are reluctant because the system of
permits has, in the past, been used by Israeli military and
intelligence as a means to recruit “collaborators”. Some permit
holders are afraid to travel because, since Palestinian cars
(identifiable at a distance by their green number plates) are not
allowed on main roads, soldiers may shoot at their cars from a
distance, without approaching to check whether they have a permit.
“Every
time I drive on these roads and see a tank in the distance I wonder
if I’ll make it home to see the children again. I have a permit, for
a month, but if the soldiers shoot at me and I am killed the permit
won’t do any good to me or my family. They can always say I was a
terrorist, or that I did something suspicious that made them think I
was a danger. And even if they admit making a mistake and apologize
what good would that be if I am dead? So I try to avoid travelling
as much as possible”
(Human
rights lawyer, to Amnesty International delegates, November 2002).
Requests for permits are often denied without explanation, even for
travel on foot and even in emergency cases. In July 2003, the
Israeli organization Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) contacted the
Coordinator of the Government’s Activities in the Occupied
Territories
requesting that Sa’ad Kharuf be allowed to travel from his home
village of Udala to the nearby city of Nablus – a distance of seven
kilometres - to visit his 5-year-old son in hospital.
Permission was only granted after PHR alerted the media and
threatened to petition the Supreme Court[19].
During a visit in May 2003, Amnesty International delegates saw
Palestinians from nearby villages being denied passage by Israeli
soldiers at the Huwara checkpoint, at the entrance of Nablus, and at
the checkpoint at the entrance of Qalqilya.
On 2 November 2002, two Amnesty International delegates travelled
from Hebron to Jerusalem via the route used by Palestinians
vehicles. The journey, which should take 20-30 minutes on the main
road, took three hours and a quarter and involved changing vehicles
five times. At each point where the road was blocked to vehicles the
passengers had to get out, walk over a dirt mound or around cement
blocks and get into another bus or taxi on the other side. The
length of the journey was only due to the forced detours around
closed roads and prohibited areas, as on that day they were not
stopped at any army checkpoints along the way.
When travellers are stopped and have to wait to pass through
checkpoints, the journey takes even longer.
PHYSICAL BARRIERS:
The Israeli army controls movement in and out of the main towns and
many villages in the West Bank by setting up checkpoints on primary
and secondary roads and by blocking other roads with earth
barricades and cement blocks. In the past year particularly, the
army has increasingly taken to digging deep trenches to stop
Palestinians opening closed roads. During the winter, rain and mud
fill the trenches and make the slopes slippery and sewage is also
sometimes diverted by the Israeli army into the trenches to obstruct
the passage of even the most agile pedestrians. Villages near
Israeli settlements or roads used by settlers have been most cut
off. Some villages have been completely besieged by earth ramparts,
cement blocks and trenches, making access by vehicle impossible,
even for ambulances and tankers carrying essential water supplies.
Passage on foot is also far from easy. Climbing up and down dirt
mounds carrying shopping bags and small children is difficult even
for the young and able. For those carrying heavy or bulky items and
for the elderly or disabled people the task is virtually impossible.
In 2000 Physicians for Human Rights–Israel (PHR–Israel) and the
Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) applied for a court order
prohibiting the establishment of such roadblocks. The Israeli
government denied that any villages were completely blocked by
physical obstacles, and the High Court rejected the applicants’
petition. The court stated:
“Moreover,
if,as claimed by the Appellant, there is a geographical cell that is
truly and absolutely isolated by physical roadblocks, contrary to
policy, the Respondents are interested to know of this,and even
asked the Appellant to inform them thereof during the course of the
hearings, and they undertook to clarify and deal with the case as
necessary… The Court believes that this is indeed the proper course
the Appellant should take: to submit specific complaints about
certain cases in which the procedures are not maintained, and to
enable the Respondents to clarify and process such complaints.”[20]
In another case, PHR–Israel submitted a complaint that the villages
of Burqin and al-Dik in the Nablus area were both blocked in a
manner contrary to the Israeli government’s undertaking to the High
Court. The Assistant to the Minister of Defence responded: “We
have
found that the access road to the villages of Burqin and al-Dik is
indeed blocked, as is the paved road between these two villages…
However, it should be emphasized that these restrictions on movement
were not made arbitrarily, but for clear security reasons.”
He advised the residents to use the dirt road between Burqin and
Salfit. After investigation, PHR Israel found that most residents of
the area had no access to four-wheel drive vehicles, the only means
of using the road.
Palestinians in some villages have opened makeshift tracks but the
Israeli army often blocks these again. In the rainy seasons even
those tracks which have not been blocked by the army become mostly
unusable, except perhaps for four-wheel drive vehicles - which most
Palestinians do not have.
Remote communities cut off
Al-Jaba’a, a remote community of 800 people in Bethlehem
governorate, has a primary school and a clinic that opens on average
only once a month because the doctor is prevented by closures from
reaching the village.
Al-Jaba’a is close to the Green Line (the border between Israel and
the West Bank) and the only Palestinian village on road 367 between
the Gush Etzion settlement block and Israel. The village is hemmed
in by an army checkpoint and by three Israeli settlements, Bat Ayin,
Nahal Giva’ot and Beitar Illit. Since April 2001, the villagers have
been prohibited by the IDF from driving along road 367, which is
used by settlers, even though this is the main road out of the
village. This prevents them from driving east to Bethlehem. The road
south to Tsurif, giving access to Hebron, is blocked. The villagers
have opened a two-kilometre dirt track, leading northwest to the
village of Nahaleen that provides access to Bethlehem. From time to
time, the soldiers stop the villagers from using this path as well.
At checkpoints, soldiers often check cars or pedestrians slowly,
sometimes stopping the flow of traffic and refusing to examine an
identity card without explanation. On occasion, crowds build up at
checkpoints and soldiers fire into the air or throw sound bombs or
tear gas to disperse them. Internal closures frequently operate in
an arbitrary way. The fact that soldiers enjoy broad, individual
discretion to permit or prevent Palestinians’ movement undermines
the Israeli authorities’ contention that the internal closure is a
rational system of control, based strictly on security needs.
Arbitrary closures
On 2 August 2002, two Amnesty International delegates travelling to
Jenin found the Jalameh checkpoint closed. A soldier threatened to
shoot one delegate who asked when the checkpoint would reopen. A
long line of waiting vehicles formed over the next hour. The
soldiers then allowed the two delegates to pass, but not their taxi,
and told them that they should be thankful that one other vehicle
had been allowed through with them so that they could get a lift to
the town. No other vehicle had been checked or even allowed to
approach the
checkpoint.
On 12 October, an Amnesty International delegate was travelling to
Jenin from Qalandia, north of Jerusalem, in a shared taxi which took
a circuitous route in order to access Road 90, the Jordan Valley
Road. At a checkpoint south of Yafit settlement, an IDF soldier
examined all the passengers’ identity cards and, without
explanation, ordered the taxi back. The driver tried to reach a
parallel route, road 508. At an IDF checkpoint near the settlement
of Ma’ale Efrayim, a soldier asked each passenger where they lived,
checked the vehicle and allowed it to continue.
On 25 October, the organization’s delegates negotiated at a mobile
army checkpoint for the passage into Nablus of a Palestinian human
rights fieldworker who had not been allowed into the city for some
time. The checkpoint was on the road connecting the village of Beit
Furik to Nablus, near a bypass road used by settlers from the nearby
Itamar and Elon Moreh settlements. The soldier agreed to let him
pass but refused to allow anyone else through. Scores of
Palestinians had been waiting in the sun for up to three hours. At
one point, the soldier engaged his rifle and threatened to shoot
some people who had taken a few steps forward. They included an old
woman, supported by two people, and two women with babies in their
arms. About five minutes later, without contacting anyone by radio
or telephone (indicating that he had not received any instructions
to lift the roadblock), he got back inside the armoured personnel
carrier and the vehicle abruptly drove off, leaving the road free to
cross for the Palestinians who had been waiting for hours.
On 2 November, two Amnesty International delegates were walking in
Hebron on their way to the hospital, about 500 meters further along
the road, when a group of Israeli soldiers suddenly closed the road
to pedestrians. When the delegates asked how they could reach the
hospital a soldier pointed to a dirt path which ran parallel to the
road and along which people were walking, crouching down to pass
under the very low trees. The soldier said: “Do like them”. There
appeared to be no security reason for closing the road while
allowing people to walk with discomfort on a path right beside the
road.
When manned checkpoints are not open to pedestrians, travellers may
attempt a detour around the checkpoint. As restrictions on movement
have intensified, such detours may take travellers miles out of
their way, sometimes on tracks over or round steep hills. This,
however, involves the risk of being turned back, harassed or even
shot. Even in the best of cases, such detours are difficult or
impossible for the sick, the elderly or those carrying heavy
packages or small children.
The movement of goods has also become increasingly difficult. Since
April 2002, the Israeli army has prevented Palestinian trucks from
driving between towns in the West Bank. The West Bank has been
divided into eight areas – Hebron, Bethlehem, Jericho, Ramallah,
Nablus, Qalqilya, Tulkarem and Jenin. Each has one designated
commercial crossing where goods are transferred, under the
supervision of Israeli soldiers, from a truck on one side of the
checkpoint to a truck on the other side of the checkpoint. This
procedure is known as the “back-to-back” system. When checkpoints
are open, drivers often have to wait hours. The result of these
measures has been to dramatically increase the time and cost of ransport,
as several vehicles and drivers have to be used, as well as extra
people to unload and reload the merchandise at each checkpoint. In
addition, the repeated handling of goods and the waiting period
causes many of the goods, especially agricultural produce, to get
spoilt or damaged.
Curfews
In the past three years, the Israeli army has placed many villages
in Areas B and C under 24-hour curfews, and the H-2 area in Hebron
and other West Bank cities under extended curfews. In Hebron, the
only West Bank city where Israeli settlers live inside the city,
such restrictions apply only to the Palestinian inhabitants. The 500
Israeli settlers in H-2 are allowed to leave their homes
unrestricted.[21]After
the Israeli army retook control of the six main West Bank towns of
Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Bethlehem in March
and April 2002, 24-hour curfews were enforced for days and in some
cases weeks. Civilians were confined to their homes and movement
outside was prohibited. The army almost completely stopped vital
service providers and ambulances from functioning, even if they had
coordinated in advance with the army. From time to time, curfews
were lifted for a few hours to allow Palestinians to purchase
essential supplies. Bethlehem was under curfew for 40 consecutive
days.
The IDF retook control in these towns, and Hebron, in June 2002, and
has remained present continuously in Tulkarem, Jenin, Nablus and
Ramallah and intermittently in Qalqilya, the H-1 area of Hebron and
Bethlehem. When the IDF is maintaining a presence in the main towns,
it often imposes a 24-hour curfew rule. According to the Office of
the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), on 9 July 2002
almost half the population of the West Bank, nearly 900,000 out of
some 2.2 million Palestinians, were under curfew in 71 different
localities. At the beginning of June 2003 more than 350,000
Palestinians were under curfew and by early July the number was
about 150,000. The IDF usually introduces a schedule for allowing
the movement of civilians for a few hours during daylight. However,
such respite is often cancelled without notice. Nablus has been
under curfew for longer than any other city, and remained under
24-hour curfew for five months after 21 June 2002, apart from one
month when it was under a night curfew only.
Increased closures in the Gaza Strip
On the two main north-south roads in the Gaza Strip, the coastal
road and Salah al- Din road (Road No. 4), the movement of 1.3
million Palestinians is subordinated to the movement of about 5,000
Israeli settlers. Since October 2000, sections of these two roads
near Israeli settlements have been completely or partially closed by
the Israeli army. The coastal road running south of Deir al-Balah to
the Egyptian border is closed to through traffic and may be used
only by Palestinians living inside the closed military area of al-Mawasi.
In the north, the coastal road is closed to Palestinian traffic near
the settlements of Dugit and Eli Sinai, and between these two points
of permanent closure the road is often closed at the level of the
Netzarim settlement. The stretch of Salah al-Din road that passes
the Israeli settlement of Kfar Darom has been completely closed to
Palestinian traffic, which has to bypass Kfar Darom by going through
the town of Deir al-Balah. Two permanent military checkpoints on
Salah al-Din road, at Abu Holi (Kissufim) junction and al-Matahin
(Gush Katif) junction, allow Israeli settlers unrestricted access to
Kfar Darom settlement to the north, the Gush Katif settlement block
to the west and Israel to the east. Palestinian and Israeli traffic
are separated on the stretch of road between the two junctions by
concrete blocks, but on the Palestinian side only one line of
traffic may pass at a time, causing frequent delays, often of
several hours, especially in the rush hour. At times the IDF have
opened the checkpoints for only half-an-hour in the morning and
again in the afternoon, at other times they have closed them
altogether, sometimes for several days. Palestinian vehicles and
passengers have been stuck between the two checkpoints for hours,
unable even to get out of their cars for fear of being shot.
Unlike checkpoints in the West Bank, it is prohibited to cross or
even approach these checkpoints on foot. The Israeli army requires a
minimum of two (later three) people in every car, and may fire at
any vehicle that attempts to pass with only a driver (the “security”
logic being that suicide bombers tend to act alone). Lone drivers
have to pick up someone who also needs to cross the checkpoint or
give a shekel or two to a child to ride in the car to the other side
of the checkpoint.
Trapped between checkpoints
“In
order to travel 30 kilometres, to and from work, I spend an average
of six hours a day because of the delays at the al-Matahin and Abu
Holi checkpoints. Before the construction of the bridge, a road used
by settlers used to cross the Salah al-Din Road here. Now the bridge
has been opened, I don’t see any settlers on this road. There is no
reason to hold up the traffic between the northern and southern Gaza
Strip. The only reason for doing it is to make Palestinians’ lives
difficult. All day, most of the time our minds are on this road,
asking ourselves:
‘Is
it open? Is it closed?’
“One
day in October 2002, I left my house at 6am to go to work. The first
checkpoint opened at 7am. After I passed through it, I realized that
the second checkpoint was closed and I was stuck. Initially I
thought that the soldiers wanted to check the cars but for three
hours no soldier approached any car. There were soldiers milling
around, as well as tanks and jeeps moving back and forth. When the
soldiers saw a person getting out of a car, they would open fire
from an armoured vehicle and order the person back in. It was very
hot. Two vehicles ahead of my car was a bus full of children aged
between six and eight.
“At
about 10am many of us left our cars and went to speak to a soldier.
We asked him to let the children out of the bus. He yelled: ‘Shut
up!’ We went back to our cars. At about 11am the soldiers started
checking each car. They would look inside and ask all the passengers
to get out and stand by the side of the road. The men were ordered
to lift up their shirts. Then the soldiers checked the passengers’
identity cards and ordered them back to their cars. The checks
continued until about midday, when we asked for water for the
children. An armoured vehicle returned, bringing barrels of water.
Then GSS (intelligence) officers came and checked each car. We had
to get out again and they re-examined our identity cards. Some
people were taken and put inside a jeep for questioning. Two men
were arrested and forced to sit in the hot sun on the sand. This
process lasted until about 3pm. Many people went to the Abu Holi
checkpoint and asked for food. The soldiers brought food But we
refused to move and demanded that women and children be allowed to
pass across the checkpoint.A soldier came and asked us what we
wanted. We told him that we wanted to go home. He said: ‘I will
allow you to go, but only to Gaza, not to Khan Younes.’ They opened
the road at about 4pm for cars to Gaza. By that time my office was
closed and I wanted to go back to Khan Younes. They opened the road
to Khan Younes at about 5.30pm and I returned home.”
Hassan Abu Hatab, aged 43, a civil servant who lives in Khan Younes
and commutes to the Fisheries Department of the PA Ministry of
Agriculture in Gaza city six days a week. If the checkpoints are
closed, he cannot return home and has to sleep in an apartment
rented by the Fisheries Department for its employees from the
southern Gaza Strip.
Until 2002, Palestinian traffic was routinely held up as priority
was given to Israeli settlers’ cars or military vehicles crossing
the Salah al-Din road between the Gush Katif settlement block and
Israel, on an east-west bypass road prohibited to Palestinians. In
the spring of 2002 the Israeli army opened a bridge (overpass) over
the Salah al-Din road for the exclusive use of settlers and soldiers
travelling between the settlement and Israel. In theory, this should
have ended the closure of the junction (as settlers were passing on
the overpass and no longer using the junction), but in practice
closure of the junction and delays continued.
For much of the past three years, the Shuhada/Netzarim junction on
the Salah al-Din road south of Gaza city has been blocked by the
Israeli army. The army has frequently isolated northern, central and
southern parts of the Gaza Strip from each other by closing both the
coastal road and the Salah al-Din road at the level of the Netzarim
and Gush Katif settlements.
In the south, the road (known as the Western Road) between Rafah and
Khan Younes was also blocked at the point between the Gush Katif and
Morag settlements.
Given the small size of the Gaza Strip - 50 km in length and 3 to 10
km in width – many people lived in the South and worked in the North
or vice versa, as commuting the entire length of the Strip usually
took no more than half an hour. With the imposition of increasing
restrictions on movement in the past three years, many people have
been forced to move close to their work to avoid the long delays at
the checkpoints and the risk of being stuck on the wrong side of a
closed road or checkpoint. However, this solution is not possible
where different family members work in different parts of the Strip.
Others cannot afford to move.
In June 2003, following an agreement between the Israeli government
and the PA, the Israeli army began allowing unhindered passage of
Palestinians at the three-above-mentioned junctions.
Closed military areas in the Gaza Strip
In addition to the above and other closures and restrictions on
movement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army has
formalized the siege of three Palestinian communities living near
Israeli settlements. These three areas – al-Mawasi, al-Sayafa and
the area between the main settlement of Kfar Darom and its
greenhouses - have been declared closed military areas[22].
They are accessible only to the Palestinians who live there, except
for rare exceptions. Residents are allowed to enter and leave the
areas on foot only and only between certain specified times, but at
times the army stops all residents from leaving or returning to the
areas for days at a time. Oppressive restrictions inside these areas
keep residents at a distance from nearby Israeli settlements, and a
dusk to dawn curfew is usually in force.
Food crops rot, prices of local products collapse
Sa’id al-Agha is aged 46, married with nine children. He owns 50
dunums (a dunum is 0.1 hectares) of land in northern al-Mawasi,
within the jurisdiction of Khan Younes municipality. He cultivates
guavas as his main crop, vegetables, lemons, oranges and dates. The
yield from his land has fallen since the IDF stopped fertilizer from
being brought into al-Mawasi. Before the
intifada,
he would expect to make a profit of US$15,000. In 2002 he made
$1,000. Guavas used to be exported from Gaza to Israel, the West
Bank and Jordan. Now it is almost impossible to send the crop even
to the West Bank. The price has collapsed because the market in Gaza
is flooded with guavas at a time when there is reduced demand from
local people who have lost their jobs and have less money to spend.
Before the
intifada
a 15 kilo box of guavas fetched NIS50–60 (about US$10–12). The price
subsequently collapsed to NIS12–15 (about US$2.5–3). Often the crop
is delayed, waiting to cross the al-Tuffah
military checkpoint for two or three days. Less fresh, it sells for
only NIS1 (about US$0.20) per box. At the same time, Sa’id al-Agha
still has to cover his farm’s running costs.
He pays $600 per month for diesel, his main expense, to operate
water pumps on his land. In front of Sa’id al-Agha’s house was a
large pile of rotting dates. They had been picked for the market in
Khan Younes, but he had not been able to transport them across al-Tuffah
checkpoint.
While prices of local produce collapse because of lack of access to
markets, the price of goods from outside the areas increase sharply.
For example, in a village which had all its access roads blocked by
the Israeli army and was thus made inaccessible by vehicle, a fifty
kilogram bag of flour costs NIS115, compared to NIS70 in the nearby
city of Nablus[23].
Excessive use of
force
Closures and curfews are controlled by military force. Members of
the Israeli security forces have frequently resorted to lethal force
to enforce restrictions, killing or injuring scores of Palestinians
who were unarmed and presented no threat. Soldiers opened fire on
Palestinians bypassing checkpoints, crossing trenches, removing
barriers and breaking curfews. They even fired at ambulance
personnel, municipal employees and journalists who had coordinated
their movements in advance with the IDF. Some Palestinians were shot
because they failed to stop at checkpoints. Soldiers have also often
fired live and rubber-coated metal bullets, sound bombs and tear gas
to disperse crowds who had gathered during curfews or at
checkpoints.
Killings to enforce closures and curfews
On 20 August 2002, an Israeli soldier shot dead
Jihad ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Qurini,
a driver for the Nablus municipality, during a curfew. The Nablus
municipality had coordinated with the IDF to ensure that his vehicle
could move during the curfew for the purposes of carrying out
electrical repairs. The truck was marked as a Nablus municipality
vehicle and had a distinctive crane and flashing light. In Faisal
Street, one of four Israeli soldiers searching a Palestinian
ambulance indicated that Jihad al-Qurini should reverse. He backed
the vehicle about two metres. The soldier indicated that he should
drive forward and fired one shot in the air. Jihad al-Qurini drove
the truck slowly forward. The soldier reportedly aimed his weapon
at the truck, motioned with his right hand that the vehicle should
proceed, and then fired twice. One bullet hit Jihad al-Qurini in the
head.
In a letter to B’Tselem, the Chief Military Prosecutor concluded
that the soldiers “did
not deviate from the domain of reasonable conduct expected in
actions by military forces in the relevant area and circumstances.”
She declined to open an investigation into the incident on the
grounds that the vehicle “stood
at the edge of a moderate incline”
and that a bullet fired “at
a relatively flat trajectory penetrated the windshield, and possibly
caused the death of the driver.”
On 3 December 2002, a soldier shot and killed Fatma Obeid, a
95-year-old woman from Ramallah. She was in a taxi on a dirt road
between the Surda and Ayosh junctions, north of Ramallah. The road
is forbidden to Palestinians and crowds of Palestinians gather to
cross the area on foot to reach their destinations. As the taxi
headed onto the road, a soldier fired at it several times. He was
subsequently sentenced to 65 days’ imprisonment at a disciplinary
hearing, 30 days for lying during the investigation and 35 days for
violating the open fire regulations. The sentence imposed for
violating open fire regulations was later lifted, so as not to
constitute double jeopardy, and in April 2003 the soldier was
charged by the military prosecutor with causing death by negligence.
Israeli soldiers who kill or injure to enforce movement restrictions
usually enjoy impunity or, at most, may receive only very light
sentences. In contrast, Palestinians who disobey orders restricting
movement may be tried in a military court under Military Order 378
and imprisoned for up to five years or fined[24].
In many cases Israeli soldiers and border police have meted out
immediate punishment in the form of beatings and assaults. In other
cases they have confiscated the keys of vehicles or the identity
card of the drivers, or have shot at the tyres of vehicles or
otherwise damaged the vehicles.
Security force brutality to enforce closures
Batir is a village in Bethlehem governorate, south of Jerusalem,
close to the Green Line. Before the
intifada,
about 70 per cent of its working population worked in Israel or in
nearby settlements. In the past three years it has not been possible
for most Palestinians to obtain permits to enter Israel. There are a
few small businesses in the village but no alternative sources of
employment nearby.
Khaled Fahd ‘Uwayneh lives in Batir, is married with one child and
also supports his mother. He used to work as an electrician in the
construction industry in Israel, earning about NIS4,000 (about
US$800) monthly. His wages, now averaging only NIS500–700 (about
US$90–140), depend on crossing into Jerusalem or Israel without a
permit to find work. “In
mid-August 2002, I was returning in a Ford taxi at about 4.30pm with
my brother and a friend. That day we had managed to find a day’s
work in Jerusalem. A Border Police jeep stopped the taxi on Okef
Street in the Ein Yalo area in Jerusalem. The police asked for our
identity cards. As soon as they noticed our green Palestinian
identity cards, they pulled us out of the taxi. They threw us on the
ground, searched us and started hitting us. We were then forced to
stand with our hands up in the air for about 45 minutes. Altogether,
the Border Police were holding nine Palestinians standing by the
side of the road. There were also nine Border Policemen.“
One asked to leave as he had been standing there for a long time.
Two policemen grabbed him and threw him down a slope next to the
road and then ordered him to walk back up and return to his
position. One policeman called out the name of Jabr, another Batir
resident. The policeman asked him: ‘Are you the one whose head
hurts?’ Jabr said: ‘Yes’. The policeman asked: ‘Exactly where does
it hurt?’ and Jabr pointed to an ear. The policeman struck him on
that ear with his M16 and told him: ‘That will make it heal
quickly.’ The policeman then called each of us one by one and
ordered us to walk down the slope by the road. Four Border Policemen
were waiting at the bottom. As I waited my turn, I heard those ahead
being beaten.
The four policemen beat me with truncheons. After about an
hour-and-a-half, the policemen
took us to a remote area up the hill. They made us form two lines
and surrounded us. The officer pointed to each of us one by one and
said: ‘I don’t like the look of him.’ Then the policemen would beat
the one selected all over his body, using truncheons. The officer
told us: ‘This is the last time you enter Israel. You are prohibited
from returning. We’re going to let you go now. Next time, we’ll kill
you.’ As we passed the policemen, they threw each of us on the
ground and beat us again. Eventually only Jabr remained at the top
of the hill. We watched from below as the nine border policemen beat
him. I called the Israeli Police on my mobile. They told me that
they would send a patrol. No one came. The Border Policemen beat
Jabr for about half an hour. Afterwards, he could not walk properly.
The Border Policemen asked us to fetch him, so we went and carried
him away.”
A widespread punishment regularly meted out by soldiers at
checkpoints is holding Palestinians on the spot for hours, with no
shelter from sun or the rain, and in some cases placing men in metal
cages. On Monday 14 July 2003, the Israeli Women group Machsom Watch
(Checkpoint Watch) were alerted at 10.00 am that Nasser Abu Joudeh
from al-Arroub refugee camp was being held inside a metal cage (base
area of 1.2 square meters) at the Gush Etzion checkpoint
(between Hebron and Bethlehem) since 6 am, and that some 30 others
were also held at the same checkpoint since 5.30 am. After Machsom
Watch contacted the Israeli Civil Administration, the detainee was
eventually released from the cage at approximately 12.00 noon and
the others were allowed to leave at 1.30 pm, that is, after up to
seven hours in the sun and heat. The previous week two other
Palestinians had also been held in the cage together at the same
checkpoint, one for four hours and the other (aged 17) for seven
hours.
The “separation
barrier/fence/wall”
On 14 June 2002, the Israeli government announced that work would
begin immediately on the construction of a wall/fence (usually
referred to as the “separation barrier”) along the perimeter of the
West Bank, and north and south of Jerusalem (known as “the Jerusalem
envelope”). The stated aim of the project is to prevent Palestinians
crossing clandestinely from the West Bank into Israel, so as to
prevent suicide bombings and other attacks. However, the barrier is
not being constructed on the Green Line separating Israel from the
West Bank. Most of it is being constructed on Palestinian land
inside the West Bank - in some areas up to six or seven kilometers
east of Green Line - in order to include some 10 Israeli settlements
which are nearest to the Green Line. Construction of the first phase
of the barrier (some 150 kilometres), in the northern West Bank
governorates of Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqilya and around parts of
Jerusalem began in the summer of 2002 and was due for completion by
July 2003, but is still ongoing. The course of the barrier has been
altered even further eastwards in some locations so as to include
more Israeli settlements.
Almost 400 km long and 30 to 100 meters wide, the barrier comprises
- in addition to the fence or wall (depending on the area) - a
complex of obstacles, including deep trenches to stop vehicles,
electric warning fences, trace paths, patrol roads and roads to
accommodate armoured vehicles.
In order to build the barrier, large areas of mostly cultivated
Palestinian land have been destroyed, some 11,500 dunums (about
2,875 acres, or 11.5 square kilometres)[25].
In addition, the barrier cuts off several Palestinian villages and
large areas of Palestinian agricultural land from the rest of the
West Bank, and separates other Palestinian villages and towns from
the land of their inhabitants.
Village land seized
In 2002, the IDF informed landowners in Qafin, a village in Jenin
governorate with a population of about 9,500, that 600 dunums of
land was to be seized for five years on grounds of military
necessity in order to build the security barrier. In September 2002,
bulldozers began to clear the land, tearing down most of the olive
trees before their owners had been able to harvest the crop. A month
later, bare earth was all that remained of once productive
agricultural land. The mayor, Taysir Harasheh, told Amnesty
International delegates that, in the Qafin area, the barrier would
lie three kilometres inside the West Bank and surround the village
on three sides. 6,000 dunums, 60 per cent of the village’s
agricultural land, would eventually be on the other side of the
barrier. There are thousands of olive trees on this land.
Nearly all of the 90 per cent of the active population in Qafin who
used to work in Israel have now lost their jobs. The income from the
olive harvest has become crucial for many residents.
The barrier has very serious economic and social consequences for
over 200,000 Palestinians in nearby towns and villages. Some 15
Palestinian villages, home to some 12,000 Palestinians in the
regions of Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqilyia and dozens of homes in the
northern neighbourhood of Bethlehem are being wedged in between the
barrier and the Green Line. Some 19 other Palestinian communities,
most of them in the Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqilyia regions, are
separated from their land by the barrier[26].
The land in these areas is among the most fertile in the West Bank,
with better water resources than elsewhere, and agriculture in the
region constitutes the main source of income for the Palestinians -
especially since those who used to work in Israel are no longer
allowed to. The percentage of land used agriculturally is double the
average in other parts of the West Bank, and the productivity of the
land is substantially higher than elsewhere.
The stranded Palestinian residents of these areas have to cross the
barrier at designated checkpoints to reach the rest of the West Bank
to go to work, to tend to their fields, to sell their agricultural
produce, and to access education and health centres in nearby owns.
Nonresidents will require special permits to be allowed into these
areas.
The city of Qalqilya, home to more than 40,000 Palestinians, is ompletely
walled in from all sides with a single checkpoint in and out of the
city. This is in order for the barrier to encompass the Israeli
settlements which lie to its north east and south east of Qalqilya.
On 8 May 2003, Amnesty International delegates visited Qalqilya. At
the checkpoint at the entrance of the city they witnessed
Palestinian non-residents of the city being denied entry. As usual
with checkpoints, there appeared to be no set time for its opening
and closing. The Israeli soldiers manning the checkpoint told the
delegates that the checkpoint is usually open until 7 or 7.30 pm but
on that day it would close at 5.30 pm. The delegates asked what
would happen to the city’s residents who had gone out and would come
back after 5.30, expecting the checkpoint to be open. A soldier
replied that they would have to stay outside until the following
morning and added that most people know to come back early anyway
just in case.
The experience of similar existing arrangements in other areas of
the Occupied Territories which have been cut off from their
surroundings (such as al-Mawasi and al-Sayafa areas in the Gaza
Strip – see cases studies), and of the functioning of checkpoints in
general, shows that it is impossible to maintain any semblance of
normal life for Palestinians who live or own land in these enclaves.
In its response to a petition to the Israeli High Court challenging
the seizure of land in al- Ras, Kafr Sur and Far’un, the Israeli
government stated that it planned to “reach
an arrangement with the landowners that would enable them to cross
the barrier, so that they can cultivate their land.”
In another case, before the Israeli High Court, the authorities have
responded that owners of land west of the barrier will be issued
with “special permits” allowing them to access their land through
“agricultural gates”[27].
The Israeli army informed UNSCO that there would be different
agricultural gates, for persons, for agricultural vehicles, and for
agricultural goods to be transported through the gates via the
back-to-back system – requiring the off-loading and re-loading of
the goods between two vehicles, one on each side of the gate.
Around the Jerusalem area the wall, two sections of which have
already been built, is being constructed so as to leave 13 Israeli
settlements on the Israeli side and will close off the city
completely, including occupied East Jerusalem, from the West Bank.
The Palestinian land on which the barrier is being built is
requisitioned by the Israeli authorities for “military needs” and
the seizure orders are generally “temporary”, until the end of 2005,
but can be renewed indefinitely. Over the decades Palestinian land
“temporarily” seized by Israel has been used to build permanent
structures, including settlements and roads for settlers, and has
never been returned to its owners. In their response to a case
before the Israeli High Court, the Israeli authorities have
recognized that temporary seizure orders have been and may be used
to establish permanent structures[28].
The Israeli authorities refuse to provide advance information about
the route of the barrier, and the affected Palestinians only learn
about it when they receive the seizure orders for their land or when
the works begin – which in some cases happened before the delivery
of the seizure orders. The barrier’s scheduled location in some
areas was subsequently altered to encompass more Israeli settlements
and Palestinian land[29],
and further changes may still occur in areas where the works are
under way.
In addition to the barrier being constructed at the present time, a
series of secondary trenchstyle barriers, known as “depth barriers”
are due to be established in several areas to the east of the main
barrier. These secondary barriers will create several additional
enclaves, further isolating West Bank communities from one another,
restricting the movements and affecting the livelihood of tens of
thousands of Palestinians.
On grounds of
security
Israel claims that the restrictions it imposes on the movement of
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are justified on security
grounds, to protect Israelis from suicide bombings and other attacks
by armed Palestinians. However, the number of Israeli and
Palestinian victims of such attacks has continued to grow in the
past three years.
Palestinian armed groups have killed more than 750 Israeli
civilians, including more than 90 children, and some 230 soldiers.
More than 320 civilians and some 70 soldiers were killed inside
Israel and 190 civilians and 166 soldiers were killed in the
Occupied Territories.
The deliberate killings of civilians by Palestinian armed groups are
unlawful and unacceptable and the Israeli authorities have not only
a right but a duty to take necessary measures to protect Israelis
from such attacks. However, the increasingly sweeping and stringent
restrictions imposed indiscriminately on all Palestinians have not
put a stop to the attacks. On the contrary, attacks intensified as
restrictions on the movements of Palestinians increased, calling
into question the effectiveness of indiscriminate restrictions that
treat every Palestinian as a security threat and punish entire
communities for the crimes committed by a few people.
The sweeping and indiscriminate restrictions make normal activities
– going to work, to school, to hospital, to visit family or friends
– exhausting, expensive and potentially dangerous. Even though it
may be possible to circumvent military roadblocks and blockades,
someone who is ill may not be able or willing to undertake a lengthy
and tortuous detour or chance being shot to reach a clinic.
Circumventing the closures
On 1 August 2002, a comprehensive closure was imposed in most of the
West Bank in response to a bomb attack in the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem that killed seven people and injured some 80 others. On 4
August 2002, two Amnesty International delegates travelled from
Jerusalem to Nablus. Israeli soldiers at Huwara checkpoint outside
Nablus did not allow them to enter the town, which, like the rest of
the area, was under full curfew. The delegates were nonetheless able
to reach Nablus by a 10- kilometre walk over the mountains to the
west of the town. Since the closure and curfew were being strictly
enforced and there was a risk that Israeli army tanks and
watchtowers on surrounding mountains could open fire at anyone
moving in the area, there were virtually no Palestinians using the
same route. However, anyone prepared to make a long detour and take
the risks involved had a realistic chance of reaching their
destination.
On 1 November 2002, four Amnesty International delegates were able
to enter Jenin, in spite of a strictly enforced curfew and closure,
by taking a long detour around the army checkpoint. A few days
earlier on 28 October 2002, Israeli soldiers eventually allowed two
AI delegates to enter Tulkarem (after having initially said they
could not enter) even, though there was a curfew which was being
fairly strictly enforced. However, they were not allowed to enter
Qalqilya, where there was no curfew in place. As is usually the case
no explanation was provided by the soldiers as to why access was
denied or allowed after an initial refusal. Nor were any security
reasons apparent, especially since there is no record of
international human rights activists having been involved in attacks
or other action posing a security danger to others.
It is important to differentiate between restrictions on Palestinian
movement from the Occupied Territories into Israel, and movement
restrictions within the Occupied Territories. Movement restrictions
may be necessary to prevent attackers entering Israel and carrying
out suicide bombings and other attacks, though the appreciation as
to the degree of restrictions needed may vary. However, it cannot be
said that preventing or restricting the movement of Palestinians
between Ramallah and Nablus is necessary to prevent attackers from
entering Israel to carry out an attack in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv.
Yet closures and curfews are often justified on these grounds and
are routinely imposed or tightened following Palestinian attacks
inside Israel. Like the bombardments of PA buildings which usually
follow Palestinian suicide bombings or other attacks, closures and
curfews often appear to be intended more as punishment or
retaliation for attacks by Palestinians (both inside Israel and
against Israeli settlers or soldiers in the Occupied Territories),
as well as to show the Israeli public that the army is taking
action. This is particularly obvious in the Gaza Strip, where
Palestinians have rarely succeeded in crossing the surrounding
electric fence into Israel. None of those who have carried out
attacks inside Israel in recent years are known to have come from
the Gaza Strip. Yet, in the wake of every major Palestinian attack
inside Israel, the Israeli army usually attacks PA installations in
Gaza, such as the airport, the sea port or police stations, most of
which have been bombed several times.
Mostly the restrictions on the movement of Palestinians within the
Occupied Territories are enforced to keep Palestinians away from
Israeli settlements and from the roads used by the settlers.
Checkpoints, roadblocks and blockades are mostly situated near
settlements and settlers’ roads (see chapter on Israeli
settlements).
The impact on the
Palestinians’ right to work
“The
unemployment rate is the highest amongst those recorded in the 2002
edition of the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics for the 2000-2002
period; very few countries have registered comparatively high rates
of unemployment in situations of conflict”.[30]
No Palestinian living in the Occupied Territories has escaped the
impact of the severe restrictions on movement increasingly imposed
by the Israeli army, especially in the past three years. The impact
on their right to work and to an adequate standard of living,
education and healthcare has been devastating and much more
widespread but less well-documented than other human rights
violations, such as killings, detentions or destruction of homes and
property. Israel has destroyed millions of US dollars’ worth of
Palestinian property by demolishing homes, factories and businesses,
razing agricultural land and uprooting trees[31]
.However, the damage sustained through the less visible effects of
loss of income has been even higher.
The relatively new Palestinian economy had struggled to develop in
the 1990s within the constraints imposed by Israel on the movements
of people and goods to and from the Occupied Territories, as well as
within. In the past three years, it has been all but destroyed by
the draconian extent and duration of the restrictions on movement
imposed by the Israeli army. The domestic private sector has
absorbed much of the shock to the economy[32].
Unemployment sharply increased from some 10 per cent in 2000 to over
40 per cent in 2002 and over 30 percent in 2003[33].
Loss of income from work has in turn caused a steep rise in
poverty. The World Bank estimates that about 60 per cent of the
Palestinian population is living below the poverty line of US$2.1
per day and that real per capita food consumption has dropped by up
to 30 per cent in the past three years[34].
The dramatic decline in the standard of living among Palestinians in
the Occupied Territories has led to increased malnutrition. More
people become ill but have less access to appropriate medical
treatment. Education has been negatively affected. In most areas,
children and youths from kindergarten to university level have
missed about half of their classes in the academic year that started
in September 2002.
The Israeli army has closed some universities altogether. Such a
decrease in access to education will negatively affect the long term
professional development and future prospects of Palestinian
children and youth[35]
High unemployment and poverty rates are a direct consequence of
restrictions on movement. They have deprived hundreds of thousands
of Palestinians of their potential to work with dignity and to
support themselves and their families. Israel has contravened its
obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law to
guarantee the right to freedom of movement, the right to work and
the right to an adequate standard of living.
“No one is starving in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
International organizations including UNWRA and the Red Cross
operate extensively in the territories.”
Colonel Shimshon Arbel, Head of Information and Coordination of
Government Activities in the Occupied Territories.[36]
Israeli officials have acknowledged that closures and curfews have
had a severe impact on the Palestinian economy and living
conditions. However, Israel has relied on international
humanitarian organizations, such as UNRWA and the ICRC, to ensure
the survival of a significant percentage of the Palestinian
population of the Occupied Territories. Despite this, the Israeli
army has frequently hindered the work of aid organizations[37].
Furthermore, charity and humanitarian assistance do not absolve
Israel from its obligation to guarantee Palestinians’ right to work
under international law, so that they can feed themselves. As
Palestinians have increasingly been forced to rely on handouts to
meet their basic needs, feelings of hopelessness and alienation have
grown, damaging the structure of society and fuelling resentment.
The lack of prospects, in a predominantly youthful community, has
contributed to increased radicalization and violence.
Amnesty International has interviewed scores of people who have been
deprived of the right to work and to an adequate standard of living.
Some of their accounts are highlighted in the sections below on
employment, women’s right to work, rural populations, and poverty
and malnutrition. Others appear in the Case Studies of different
parts of the Occupied Territories in the appendix to this report.
The right to work
The impact of the restrictions on the movement of Palestinians on
economic, social and cultural rights in the Occupied Territories –
including the right to work – has been a recurrent concern for the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the UN body that
examines states’ implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (CESCR)). This was already the
case prior to the increased restrictions imposed by Israel in the
past three years. In its conclusions on Israel’s initial report in
1998, the Committee expressed concern that the emphasis on security
considerations, including in policies on closures, had hampered the
realization of those rights:
“The Committee notes with grave concern the severe consequences of
closure on the Palestinian population… Workers from the occupied
territories are prevented from reaching their workplaces, depriving
them of income and livelihood and the enjoyment of their rights
under the Covenant. Poverty and lack of food aggravated by closures
particularly affect children, pregnant women and the elderly who are
most vulnerable to malnutrition.”
[38]
The Committee urged Israel to respect the right to
self-determination as recognized in article 1 (2) of the CESCR,
which provides that “in
no way may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence”.
It stated: “Closure
restricts the movement of people and goods,cutting off access to
external markets and to income derived from employment and
livelihood.”[39]
The Committee also described Israel as perpetrating
“continuing gross violations of economic, social and cultural rights
in the occupied territories, especially the severe measures adopted
by the State party to restrict the movement of civilians between
points within and outside the occupied territories, severing their
access to food, water, health care, education and work.”[40]
In May 2003, the Committee stated that it continued “…
to be gravely concerned about the deplorable living conditions of
the Palestinians in the occupied territories, who – as a result of
the continuing occupation and subsequent measures of closures,
extended curfews, road blocks and security checkpoints – suffer from
impingement of their enjoyment of economic,social and cultural
rights enshrined in the Covenant, in particular access to work,
land, water,health care, education and food”[41].
Restrictions imposed by Israel on movement contravene its obligation
to secure Palestinians’ right to work. Closures and curfews, in
particular, have regularly prevented thousands of people from
reaching their places of work in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Quality of employment has also been affected as Palestinians have no
choice but to opt for casual jobs or to work for substantially
reduced wages.Israel has failed to fulfil the right to work in the
Occupied Territories. Article 6(2) of the CESCR specifically
requires Israel to “take steps to … achieve the full realization of
[the right to work] and … full and productive employment under
conditions safeguarding fundamental and economic freedoms to the
individual”. The consequence of measures to restrict movement
between and within the Occupied Territories is the creation of
unemployment, the antithesis of full and productive employment.
Thousands of Palestinians became unemployed in October 2000, after
Israel cancelled work permits for Palestinian workers to enter
Israel and East Jerusalem. Since then Israel has made no serious
attempts to facilitate the creation of alternative work. On the
contrary, its restrictions on movement in the Occupied Territories
have dramatically reduced the employment opportunities which existed
and prevented the creation of new ones. A small percentage of
Palestinians are granted permits to enter Israel – for work, medical
treatment, visits to relatives or travel abroad. However, they are
extremely difficult to obtain, have time limits (often of a single
day or even a few hours), and are often cancelled without notice.
The right to an adequate standard of living
“The
right to food in the occupied territories had been seriously
violated with a number of households suffering from chronic
malnutrition”
UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, 15 July
2003[42]
Restrictions on movement contravene Israel’s obligation to take
steps to ensure the right to an adequate standard of living. They
obstruct Palestinians’ ability to work and undermine their
livelihoods. As a consequence, some Palestinians cannot obtain clean
and sufficient water or food of a quantity and quality to meet their
dietary needs.
Many families have been forced to sell assets, borrow from relatives
and friends, purchase food on credit, and ultimately to cut
consumption of essentials, including food. Such coping mechanisms
have been eroded with the protracted and worsening economic crisis
and, in an increasing number of families, shortages are now
manifesting as malnutrition.
Freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
The nature and severity of the suffering inflicted by the systematic
practices of closures and curfews in the Occupied Territories is so
grave that it may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, particularly as it is discriminatory.
In 2001, the UN Committee against Torture, which monitors states’
compliance with the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, expressed concern that
Israeli policies on closure might, in certain instances, contravene
Article 16, which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment[43].
It recommended that Israel should desist from such policies where
they offended Article 16[44].However,
since then the extent of the closures imposed by Israel in the
Occupied Territories has substantially increased, increasingly
confining Palestinians to a form of house or town arrest.
Unemployment
Prior to the outbreak of the
intifada,
516,000 Palestinians were working in areas controlled by the
Palestinian Authority[45],
while some 110,000 Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and West Bank
were working in Israel, on settlements and in Israeli-controlled
industrial zones[46]
.Since 1998, unemployment had been steadily decreasing.
In the third quarter of 2000, the standard unemployment rate was 10
per cent, 7.5 per cent in the West Bank and 15.5 per cent in the
Gaza Strip[47].
In October 2000, most Palestinians working in Israel or on the
settlements lost their jobs. A comprehensive closure of Israel and
Jerusalem was declared and all work permits were cancelled. Israeli
army checkpoints on routes to Israel and the settlements prevented
or discouraged employees from trying to go to work clandestinely.
Employment in Israel picked up again in the first half of 2001,
though most of the Palestinian workers who were able to return to
work in Israel have done so without permits. With the redeployment
of the Israeli army in most West Bank towns in early 2002 and the
imposition of prolonged curfews, the number dropped again and has
continued to fluctuate[48].
Loss of jobs in Israel, where wages are much higher than in the
Occupied Territories, has been followed by a reduction in demand for
goods and services in the Occupied Territories.
Palestinian businesses have faced grave problems as a result.
Closures and curfews have disrupted the import and transport of raw
materials, creating shortages and sharp price increases. Businesses
have extreme difficulty in exporting their products, transporting
them between the West Bank and Gaza, and even moving them short
distances to local markets.
Perishable foodstuffs spoil when repeatedly handled and delayed at
checkpoints or border crossings, making them unmarketable or
reducing their price.
Closure of quarries and factories
‘Omar Ahmad Kababji, aged 56, owns a stone factory in Nablus and
supports his wife and seven children. Before the
intifada,
the factory employed five workers to produce stone building blocks
for markets in the West Bank and in Israel. The raw materials come
from stone quarries near Nablus. ‘Omar Kababji had to close the
factory and lay
off the workers after the Israeli army blocked off the main roads
and back roads into Nablus at the beginning of the
intifada.
Transport of the raw materials and finished stone became impossible.
All 85 quarries and stone factories in the Nablus governorate were
forced to close. ‘Omar Kababji now has no income and is unsure
whether he will be able to find the fees to continue his sons’
university education.
Transport costs have soared, in particular because of the
“back-to-back” system, where at least two trucks are required to
transfer goods from one destination to another. In addition to the
extra cost of using more trucks, unloading and reloading goods takes
time and drivers often have to hire extra help, especially if the
merchandise is heavy. Goods are often damaged in the process. One
lorry can no longer make several deliveries to different towns and
villages in one journey.
Over the longer term, there has been very little internal or
external investment due to lack of business confidence. All these
factors have resulted in reduced demand for workers in the domestic
market. By the second quarter of 2002, 418,000 Palestinians were
employed in the domestic economy, a fall of nearly 100,000 from
before the
intifada,
largely as a result of closures and curfews. Most job losses have
been in the private sector, the sector of the Palestinian economy
which had demanded particular efforts, including the investment of
private individuals, to develop.
The Occupied Territories has one of the highest rates of population
growth in the world, creating huge pressures on the job market.
Since the beginning of the
intifada,
the population of working age (over 15 years) has increased by more
than 155,000. Youth unemployment has risen significantly. In the
fourth quarter of 2000, the standard International Labour
Organization (ILO) unemployment rate rose sharply to 28.3 per cent –
35.5 per cent in Gaza and 22.2 per cent in the West Bank. After a
slight decline in the first half of 2001, unemployment began to rise
again. There was a dramatic increase in the second quarter of 2002,
when 17,000 jobs in the West Bank were lost and the unemployment
rate rose to 36.9 per cent, mainly because of the Israeli
incursions, blanket curfews and severe restrictions on movement
between the northern, southern and central Gaza Strip. By the second
quarter of 2002, the standard International Labour Organization (ILO)
rate was 49.9 percent in Gaza (20–24 year-olds) and 35.8 percent in
the West Bank.
Many “discouraged workers” have left the labour force because they
have given up hope of finding a job[49].
The labour force participation rate (the labour force expressed as a
percentage of the working age population) fell from 43.5 per cent in
the third quarter of 2000 to 36.9 per cent in the second quarter of
2002. Adjusted unemployment rates, which take account of
“discouraged workers”, show overall unemployment at 35.3 per cent in
the third quarter of 2001, rising to close to 50 per cent by the
second quarter of 2002.
Since the Israeli army invaded West Bank towns in March 2002, the
unemployment rate has fluctuated according to the extent of curfews.
UNSCO has argued that the unemployment estimates for the second
quarter of 2002 produced by the Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics (PCBS) should be seen as conservative as they are based
on areas to which PCBS field workers could gain access[50].
UNSCO estimated that, in the non-Jerusalem West Bank, the adjusted
unemployment rate at times rose as high as 63.3 per cent in the
second quarter in 2002.
In addition to increased unemployment, there has been a huge
increase in underemployment and a significant drop in wages. Those
who still have jobs have often been unable to reach their workplaces
due to curfews and closures. For labourers who are paid on a daily
basis, failure to show up for work means loss of a day’s wages, as
well as an increased risk that their place will be filled by others.
In 2002, the ILO Director General expressed his concern that child
labour is likely to have increased during the
intifada
as impoverished families seek all possible means of adding to
household income”. Information on child labour in the Occupied
Territories is scarce. There do appear to be more boys involved in
peddling in Gaza and the West Bank than before the
intifada,
particularly near busy checkpoints and roadblocks.
Child peddlers
Ramzi Muhammad Yusef, aged 14, lives in Beit ‘Anun village in Hebron
governorate. In October 2002, he was earning about NIS20 (about
US$4) a day at the Beit ‘Anun roadblock, carting goods across Road
60 for Palestinians forbidden to drive there. In the previous week,
he had worked three afternoons to cover the costs of going to
school. His father had lost his job as a driver in a quarry in Sa’ir
at the start of the
intifada,
after closure prevented the quarry from transporting stone out of
the area.
Muhammad Jihad ‘Isa, aged 12, lives in Bani Na’im village, Hebron
governorate. He works in Beit ‘Anun, selling socks from early
morning until 4pm and making about NIS10–15 (about US$2–3) daily. In
October 2002, he had been working for about a year and had stopped
attending school. His work helped support his family. His father had
lost work as a labourer in Israel at the start of the
intifada.
Women’s right to work
Restrictions on movement have had a particular effect on Palestinian
women.
Historically, their participation in the labour force has been low,
but before the
intifada
it had risen to 15.8 per cent of women aged over 25 years. This
trend has since reversed and, by the end of 2002, women’s
participation had declined to 10.4 per cent.
Women who work outside the home normally remain responsible for
taking care of family members. Such working women cannot afford the
increased loss of time and energy in long and dangerous journeys to
and from work caused by checkpoints, roadblocks, curfews and
closures. They have additional domestic tasks, such as preparing
food and childcare. Working mothers have the further anxiety of
being unable to return home to care for their children because of a
closed checkpoint or unexpected curfew.
Unable to get home from work
Fatima is a physician who lives in Ramallah in the West Bank with
her husband and two children. She holds a Jerusalem identity card
but her husband does not, so they cannot live in Jerusalem. The
Israeli authorities have not issued him with a family reunification
permit to live in Jerusalem despite years of applications. Fatima
Salameh works the night shift in a Jerusalem hospital. In the past
two years, she has left home early in the afternoon (often by 2.30
to 3pm) to make sure of getting through the long queues of
Palestinians at Qalandia checkpoint to reach Jerusalem in time for
work. When it is impossible to get home because of a closure or
curfew, she has to return to Jerusalem and try to stay with friends.
Often, by the time she gets back to Jerusalem, her friends have gone
to work and cannot be contacted, and she has to pay for a hotel
room, all the time worrying about her children in Ramallah. Nadia,
also a Jerusalem resident, has been married for 10 years but to date
has not been able to obtain a family reunification permit for her
husband to live with her in Jerusalem. Therefore, the couple has no
choice but to live in the West Bank. Two years ago Nadia gave up her
job in Jerusalem because she could no longer cope with at best long
delays at the checkpoints every day on her way to and from work, and
often could not get to work or could not return home because of the
closures.
Palestinian women endure the worst of unemployment and poverty. They
normally have the responsibility of eking out a small income to feed
their families, and are expected to be the primary source of care
for the family. The overall increase in unemployment has reduced
their prospect for employment while, at the same time, the increase
in male unemployment has increased the pressure on women who do not
normally work outside the home to find employment. In a society in
which men have traditionally been the breadwinners and where women
who work outside the home usually do so in skilled positions, more
women have been forced to do menial or casual low-paid jobs. This
has increased tensions within the family. As the Palestinian Women’s
Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling states:
“This
sudden and involuntary reversal of gender roles disturbs the
stability of intrafamily relationships, and puts women in a perilous
position. Many men resort to violent means to assert their control
over the family, feeling insecure about their status in the family,
and frustrated by feelings of helplessness and powerlessness.”
Many Palestinian institutions have observed that, as often occurs in
times of violent conflict and social instability, domestic violence
against Palestinian women is on the rise, mirroring the rise in the
level of violence occurring outside the home.
Women are particularly reliant on their own families as a source of
emotional support.
Those who marry someone from outside their home community often move
to live in their husband’s town or village. Many have found
themselves increasingly isolated as the expense and difficulty of
travelling has cut them off from their own families.
Prevented from travelling to work
Wafa’ Akram Masri, aged 42, is responsible for supporting her mother
and sister, and also helps her unemployed brother and his family.
She has worked for 22 years in the Sukhtian factory, which
manufactures household cleaners, and was earning a monthly salary of
NIS1,600 (about US$320) before the IDF invaded Nablus in April 2002.
Since then, 24-hour curfews have caused frequent stoppages at the
factory and a fall in turnover. Now she is paid on a daily basis and
loses a day’s wages if she misses work because of a curfew. She
cannot reach the factory in the western part of the city from her
home on the eastern side when there is a curfew on either side of
the city. She is fortunate to have kept her job. Out of four male
and six female workers before the
intifada,
seven have been laid off since April 2002.
Wafa’ Masri has a disability in her left leg, from being shot by IDF
soldiers during the first
intifada,
and finds walking difficult. However, she often has no choice but to
walk part of the way to work. Even when public transport is running,
she may have to cross IDF roadblocks on foot. On 7 October 2002,
Israeli soldiers opened fire and threw sound bombs when she and
other workers were trying to cross the roadblock near the
governorate building.
Rural populations
Rural areas of the West Bank have been particularly badly hit by job
losses in Israel.The majority of West Bank inhabitants working in
Israel were unskilled workers from the villages. Now, most are
without work. With a smaller number of jobs available in the
Palestinian economy, and most of those in towns that may be
difficult to access, there are few opportunities to earn a living in
rural areas. Families in rural areas traditionally turn to farming
in times of rising unemployment and declining incomes, but farm
incomes are shrinking and some operate at a loss.
Most farmers’ problems are caused by restrictions on movement
[51]. The weather and the seasons do not
wait for curfews and closures to end. In many areas, farmers do not
have regular access to their land. If it is within a closed military
area near a settlement, they may be barred from it or fear attack by
settlers or the army. Loss of access at key times of the year may
result in crops being lost, damaged or severely reduced in yield.
Expenditure on agricultural inputs – such as fertilizers, pesticides
and animal feed – has risen sharply, as suppliers have passed on
increased transport costs. Some such products are no longer
available or farmers cannot afford to buy them. Some villages are
not connected to a water network and farmers have to buy water for
personal use, for their livestock and to irrigate their land. The
price of water has increased on average by 80 per cent, according to
the international non-governmental organization Oxfam, because of
increased transport costs.
Regular supplies cannot be assured when villages are sealed off by
the IDF. Some people simply cannot afford to buy adequate amounts of
potable water for their own use, let alone for their livestock.
Farmers have sold off productive assets, such as livestock and even
land, because they need money to support their basic, immediate
needs. This jeopardizes their long-term prospects even when economic
conditions improve.
In many cases, the prices that farmers can obtain for their produce
have fallen. Frequent closures of border crossings have deprived
farmers in the Occupied Territories of markets in Israel and abroad.
Many farmers can only sell their produce locally because of curfews
and internal closures within the Occupied Territories. However, few
people have money to spend and there is little local demand. Often
the result is a flooded market and a price collapse in one area and
a price increase due to shortages in another area.
For example, the 2002 olive harvest was particularly bountiful, but
the closures often made it difficult or impossible for the farmers
to market their produce. Humanitarian agencies and organizations set
up projects to buy the olive oil from the farmers and distribute it
to other areas in the Occupied Territories. However, these projects
were also hampered by closures and restrictions on movement[52].
Retirement prospects dashed
Jamil ‘Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Ghoul, aged 64, bought 25 dunums of
land in al-Sayafa for 65,000 Jordanian Dinar (JD) (about US$92,300)
in 1987. He used his part of his retirement payment from UNRWA to
invest, with his sons, in his land in al-Sayafa in the Gaza Strip.
They spent about JD40,000 (about US$56,800) building a small house,
preparing the land and planting trees. In 1995 they planted 10
dunums with lemons and clementines.
The trees made a loss in 2001 instead of an expected profit of
JD3,000–4,000 (about US$4,260–5,680) because of transport problems
and a collapse in prices. To continue irrigating the trees costs
NIS120 (about US$24) a day in diesel, which has doubled in price
since the start of the
intifada.
They grow slowly because it is impossible to bring in fertilizer and
manure. He lives in constant fear that his land will be bulldozed.
Jamil al-Ghoul’s wife and 16-year-old daughter, Rima, used to live
with him in al-Sayafa but moved to Gaza city in early 2002 to ensure
Rima could attend school regularly.
Poverty and malnutrition
For the vast majority of Palestinians, wage employment is the
principal source of household income. There is no unemployment
benefit system in the Occupied Territories. An unemployed person’s
only means of support are from family or community networks and the
limited assistance available from UNRWA (normally only available for
Palestinian refugees), the PA’s Ministry of Social Welfare, and
charitable and humanitarian organizations. The traditionally strong
system of mutual support among family members is under severe
strain. As unemployment increases, the number of people dependent on
every wage earner has increased.
Dependent on relief
‘Abed Mansur Manasra, aged 36, lives in Shaja’iyeh in Gaza city. He
is married with four children, and also supports his aunt, who is
ill, and two brothers, one unemployed and the other studying. Before
the
intifada,
he worked in Israel in the construction industry, as a day labourer,
earning NIS150–200 (about US$30–40) per day. He has not worked since
Israel imposed a general closure and cancelled Palestinians’ work
permits for Israel. In August 2002, he heard that Israel was
increasing the number of permits for workers from the Gaza Strip and
went to Erez Crossing to apply for a new magnetic card, the first
step to acquiring a permit. The General Security Officer refused to
issue him a card, without explanation. At first ‘Abed Manasra lived
on his savings. Now there is no money left. He has been unable to
find any work in the construction business. He cannot pay his rent
and owes more than NIS7,000 (about US$1,400) for unpaid water and
electricity bills. He and his family survive on the food
distributions occasionally organized by the Palestinian General
Federation of Trade Unions. Every two to three months, they are
entitled to receive a 25kg sack of flour from the Ministry of Social
Welfare. His main difficulty is finding the money to buy medicine
for his sick aunt. The dramatic drop in employment and income levels
is the main cause of growing poverty in the Occupied Territories. At
a poverty level set by the World Bank at US$2.1 per day in the
Occupied Territories, 33 per cent of the population were living on
less than that amount in 2000 and 46 per cent in 2001. The World
Bank now estimates that some 60 percent of the Palestinian
population – over 70 per cent in certain areas of the Gaza Strip -
is living below the poverty level.
Earnings plummet
Daoud Fakhouri is a taxi driver, married with eight children and
living in Hebron city. Before the
intifada,
he made NIS250 (about US$50) daily on the Hebron–Ramallah route. Now
that the roads are closed, he is confined to Hebron and carries
passengers between Hebron and
Beit ‘Anun, a distance of only five to six kilometres. He earns only
NIS100 (about US$20) daily. One third goes to the costs of renting
the taxi and one third for overheads. Travelling on tracks and
secondary roads has increased his maintenance costs. His repair
costs were normally NIS500–1,000 (about US$100–200) monthly. In
September 2002 he spent NIS2,500 (about US$500) on repairs. The
Fakhouri family is left with about NIS30 (about US$6.00) a day on
which to live, the same as the daily cost of sending the children to
school.
Israeli officials have argued that “[n]o one is starving in the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank”.[53]
In fact, there is growing evidence that declining incomes amongst
Palestinians are a primary cause of acute and chronic malnutrition
in young children. In October 2002, the international humanitarian
organization, CARE, published findings of a nutritional assessment
conducted in the Occupied Territories in July and August 2002 that
showed high rates of both short and long-term malnutrition[54]
A household survey by CARE that monitored regular trends in food
security, indicated that households were cutting down on how much
food they ate because of lack of money and the curfews[55].
Ra’ed Hussein Matur, aged 28, lives in Beit ‘Anun, near Hebron city.
Before the
intifada,
he worked as a cleaner for two years in an Israeli public school in
Malkat Kiryat Noah. He did not have a work permit. He recently
married and he and his brother, who peddles socks in Bethlehem, are
the only members of the 14-member household who are working.
For many months Ra’ed Hussein Matur used his savings to support his
family. After his money ran out, he bought a handcart and started
working in Beit ‘Anun. The village is divided by Road 60, which
Palestinians may not use. They cannot even drive across it at Beit
‘Anun junction, which links Hebron city to the villages east of Beit
‘Anun, Sa’ir and al- Shyoukh. To travel between these villages and
Hebron, Palestinians must get out of taxis or their private cars on
one side of Beit ‘Anun and cross on foot to the other side of the
road. Merchandise of all kinds is transported across the road in
donkey carts, hand carts and wheelbarrows.
Now Ra’ed Matur pushes his handcart all day from one side of the
road to the other. He earns NIS20–50 (about US$4–10) a day. When the
IDF imposes a curfew on Hebron city or stops Palestinians from
walking across the road, there is no work.
Israeli settlements and human rights abuses in the Occupied
Territories
Since its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, successive
Israeli governments have actively promoted the creation or expansion
of Israeli settlements in these areas, including through the
provision of generous grants and financial benefits and incentives.
Such actions contravene Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which prohibits an occupying power from transferring its nationals
into occupied territory. The establishment and continuing expansion
of settlements have repeatedly been condemned as illegal by the UN
Security Council and other UN bodies, as well as by many states.
There are 17 Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip inhabited by some
5-6,000 settlers and 123 officially recognized settlements,
containing some 198,000 settlers, in the West Bank.
There are also a fluctuating number of small, unrecognized
settlements, known as “outposts”.
Even though these “outposts” are unauthorized by the Israeli
authorities, Israeli soldiers are sent to guard them around the
clock. In 2002, attempts by the Israeli army to dismantle some of
these “outposts” resulted in confrontations between the soldiers and
the settlers, some of whom returned to the site soon after having
been evacuated by the army.(in a normally nourished population, the
rate would be 2.3 per cent). The assessment found that 17.5 per cent
of children in the Gaza Strip and 7.9 per cent of children in the
West Bank were suffering from global chronic malnutrition: chronic
malnutrition or stunting that indicates past growth failure,
implying a state of longer term under nutrition.
Some settlements have fewer than 100 residents. Others, such as
Ariel, with a population of about 16,000, are established,
well-resourced towns. Many started as unauthorized “outposts”,
others as religious schools and others still were army bases which
were later given to settlers.
These settlements are spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, connected by extensive networks of recently built roads which
crisscross the Occupied Territories, north to south and east to
west. Israeli settlements and settler roads surround all the major
Palestinian cities and many villages, making it impossible for
Palestinians to travel very far without passing close to an Israeli
settlement or a road used by settlers.
The settlements’ position has ensured that there is no territorial
contiguity between Palestinian communities in different areas of the
Occupied Territories. For example, the built up area of Nablus,
including eight villages and two refugee camps, with a total
population of about 184,000 Palestinians, is surrounded by eight
settlements inhabited by some 6,000 Israelis. Palestinian villages
such as Bidya, Kafr Thult, Azun and Hable are islands, their
contiguity broken by the land controlled by a large number of
Israeli settlements and a new settler road to the south built after
the Oslo Agreements.
Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza have long been points
of tension.
Confrontations between Israeli settlers and local Palestinians have
often occurred both because the Palestinians resent the
establishment of Israeli settlements on their land and because
Israeli settlers have often attacked local Palestinian residents and
their properties, to push them off their land. The rapid spread of
settlements and related infrastructure, notably the connecting
roads, in the past decade, has resulted in a multiplication of such
tension points.
Throughout the 1990s, Palestinian hopes that the peace process would
lead to an independent Palestinian state were dashed by the spread
and growth of settlements and infrastructure, which were built on
their land and used their water and other resources.
Palestinians’ frustrations grew as more and more of their land was
seized, in theory “temporarily” and for “security” needs, to build a
network of roads to bypass Palestinian villages and connect the
settlements to each other and to Israel.
“The Israeli army comes with a ‘temporary’ seizure order valid for
five years, uproots the olive trees that someone’s
great-grand-parents had planted more than 100 years ago, bulldozes
the land flat and in its place builds a tarmac road for the nearby
settlements. Who is supposed to believe that there is anything
temporary about it? Indeed other roads built on land ‘temporarily’
seized 20 years ago are still there”.
Jeff Halper, The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
As tension increased so did Palestinian attacks on Israeli settlers
in the Occupied Territories.Since the beginning of the
intifada,
attacks on settlers by armed Palestinian groups have dramatically
increased, mainly in drive-by shootings on the roads, resulting in
the killings of
some 190 Israeli civilians and the injury of many others. Attacks by
settlers on Palestinians and their property have also increased.
Several Palestinians have been killed by Israeli settlers and scores
of others have been killed by the Israeli army near settlements or
settlers’ roads in situations where they posed no danger to the
lives of Israelis. The Israeli army has multiplied measures to
prevent Palestinians from coming into physical proximity with
settlers, maximizing settlers’ freedom of movement at the cost of
freedom of
movement for Palestinians. Even though only a very small percentage
of Palestinians have been engaged in attacks against Israeli
settlers or soldiers, every Palestinian is regarded as a potential
attacker. To ensure the freedom of movement of some 380,000 Israeli
settlers, the Israeli army has increasingly confined more than three
million Palestinians to some form of house, village or town arrest.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon described Israeli policy in June
2002, after a series of drive-by shootings. Israel Radio reported
him telling West Bank military commanders, “[R]ight
now, roads are the main security problem … Palestinians must not be
allowed to feel they can safely use these roads. They have to know
they may be surprised at any movement and face an endless variety of
situations.”
Discrimination
against Palestinians
“… States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of
everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or
ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment
of…civil rights, in particular…[t]he
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borderof the
State …”
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Article 5)
Closures, curfews and movement restrictions inside the Occupied
Territories are fundamentally discriminatory. They are imposed on
the Palestinian population alone, and not on Israeli settlers, and
are often imposed on Palestinians for the benefit of Israeli
settlers. Even on occasions when Israeli settlers have initiated
confrontations, attacking Palestinians or destroying their property,
the Israeli army invariably imposes closures, curfews or other
restrictions on the Palestinians, including by declaring a closed
military area and excluding them from it. Palestinians’ fear of
settler violence also restricts their movement, particularly in
villages near land controlled by settlements or in the H-2 area of
Hebron. This results from the failure of the Israeli security forces
to exercise due diligence in responding to human rights abuses by
Israeli settlers against Palestinians. Investigation and prosecution
of those responsible for such abuses are extremely rare. Most
Palestinians seek to avoid confrontations with settlers, aware that
settlers generally enjoy impunity for abuses against Palestinians
and that the Israeli security forces are unlikely to provide
protection to Palestinians. In the past three years at least two
Palestinians have been killed while working on their land,
apparently by Israeli settlers. Palestinians living in villages near
settlements avoid going to their land, even to tend their crops, if
there have been acts of intimidation in the area by settlers, such
as firing at Palestinians or into the air.
In October and November 2000, Palestinian farmers in many villages
did not bring in the olive harvest because they feared attack by
settlers, even though the expected bumper crop was particularly
important in the dire economic situation. In 2002, the UNRWA and the
Land Defence Committee, a local human rights organization, recorded
incidents of violence and intimidation against Palestinian olive
pickers in 113 villages in the West Bank.
Israeli settlers’ attacks on Palestinian olive pickers
On 6 October 2002, Israeli settlers, apparently from the nearby
settlement of Itamar, opened fire on farmers from the village of
‘Aqraba, Nablus governorate, as they picked their olives, killing
Hani Bani Maniyeh, aged 22, and injuring Fahdi Fadil Bani Jaber.
About 150 people, the entire population of Yanun, a small village
near ‘Aqraba, abandoned their homes in October 2002 because of
settler attacks. Some families returned to the village later in the
month under the protection of Israeli and international peace
activists.
On 21 October 2002, Israeli settlers from nearby settlements
attacked Palestinian farmers who were picking their olives in the
West Bank village of Turmus Aya (off Road No 60, between Jerusalem
and Nablus). Palestinian farmers told Amnesty International
delegates that a group of Israeli settlers came to their fields and
threatened to shoot them if they did not leave. When the
Palestinians, fearing that if they left the settlers would steal
their olives or burn their olive trees, refused to leave, the
settlers set fire to seven of their cars. When the Amnesty
International delegates visited the place on 26 October 2002, the
seven burned cars were still there. As the delegates were finishing
interviewing the Palestinian farmers Israeli settlers drove past and
shortly afterwards an Israeli army patrol arrived and a soldier
asked the Amnesty International delegates to leave the area.
In some cases, the response of the army and police to violence and
intimidation by Israeli settlers has been to declare the olive
groves closed military areas, forcing Palestinians to leave these
areas, rather than protecting them and enabling them to harvest the
olives.
Exclusion of Palestinians in response to settler attacks
From 29 September 2002, settlers from Tapuah came to the lands of
Kafr Yasuf, a village in Nablus governorate, and picked olives on
land belonging to Muhammad Mahmoud ‘Ubeid. On 1 October, they threw
stones at Palestinian harvesters and beat Angie Zelter, a British
peace activist with the ISM (International Solidarity Movement) who
accompanied Palestinians to their field to protect them from Israeli
settlers’ aggression. Despite complaints to the IDF and the Israeli
police, there was no intervention to stop them or to launch a
serious
investigation of the beating. On 3 October, the Palestinians
returned to pick olives,
accompanied by Israeli and international peace activists. A group of
Israeli soldiers and police were standing on the hill near the
settlement, when a group of settlers, some of them with firearms,
arrived in the area and began to move towards the Palestinians. In
response to a request from an Israeli army officer to leave the
land, the harvesters moved to another piece of land and continued
picking. Then the Israeli army district commander arrived, informed
the harvesters that the area had been declared a closed military
area and ordered them to leave immediately.
On 21 October 2002, the IDF Chief of Staff issued a blanket ban on
olive picking by Palestinians throughout the West Bank after a
suicide attack by an armed Palestinian in Israel that killed 14
people. The decision attracted widespread protests from human rights
organizations and threats to challenge the decision in the High
Court, and the IDF rescinded the order the following day. An IDF
representative initially informed the Association for Civil Rights
in Israel (ACRI) that the ban was a response to the attack; he later
explained that the IDF was unable to protect Palestinian olive
pickers from attack by settlers.
The IDF has declared areas around some settlements to be closed
military zones, which Palestinians may enter only with a permit.
These zones have been established even around settlement outposts
considered illegal by the Israeli authorities.
Lost harvests
Muhammad Younes Suleibi, aged 33, farms in the village of Beit
‘Ummar in Hebron governorate. He owns 12 dunums of land near Karmei
Tsur settlement. Karmei Tsur is on the top of a hill and farmers
from Beit ‘Ummar and Halhoul cultivate land on its slopes. On 8 June
2002, armed Palestinians fired on trailer homes near the perimeter
fence of the settlement, killing three Israeli civilians. Following
the attack, the IDF declared the land below the settlement a closed
military area. Farmers from Beit ‘Ummar could not access about 1,000
dunums of their land. Four weeks later, the closure on 600 dunums
was lifted. During the closure, Muhammad Suleibi could not farm
seven dunums of his land or access about 1,000 tomato plants, his
plum trees and grape vines. The plums ripened and rotted on the
trees. The grapes spoiled because he could not spray them. He lost
all three crops, at an estimated cost of NIS35,000 (about US$7,000).
Failure to protect
Israel has a duty to protect Palestinians living in the Occupied
Territories from acts of violence. However, Israel has consistently
failed to take effective action to stop attacks and threats by
settlers, to the point where some areas near settlements have become
“no go” areas for Palestinians.
An occupying power is required to make life in the occupied
territory as normal as possible – “to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety”
(Hague Regulations, Article 43). This report shows how restrictions
on movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have nearly paralysed
ordinary life for Palestinians and been the primary cause of severe
economic depression, rising unemployment and widespread poverty.
The unwillingness and/or inability of the Israeli government to
provide the conditions for as normal a life as possible for the
Palestinian population under its occupation is directly related to
the presence of Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories. As
previously noted, the moving of settlers by Israel into the Occupied
Territories and its efforts to transform the demographic composition
of the Occupied Territories are illegal. Article 49 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention absolutely prohibits an occupying power from
transferring its nationals into occupied territory. Successive
Israeli governments have breached this prohibition and have
encouraged the establishment of settlements in all areas of the
Occupied Territories, making millions of dollars available for
financial support, tax incentives, and massive road and
infrastructure projects.
The impact of restrictions on movement on the lives of Palestinians
documented in this report - officially claimed as justified by the
need to protect settlers - makes it impossible for the Palestinian
population of the Occupied Territories to live a normal life. The
experience gained over the past years indicates that the
restoration of public order and safety required by Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations is impossible, as long as Israeli settlements
remain. Most
of the restrictions on movement placed on Palestinians, such as the
establishment of closed military areas in the Gaza Strip, and the
prohibition on Palestinians sing roads or approaching certain
areas, are imposed to prevent the Palestinian population from coming
into
contact with the Israeli settlers. This results in the Palestinian
population being subjected to grave human rights violations,
including collective punishment and discrimination.
National and
international law
In law as well as in practice, the Israeli authorities have breached
their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian
law to respect and protect the rights of the Palestinian inhabitants
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The sweeping and indiscriminate
restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of people and goods
in the Occupied Territories not only violates the right to freedom
of movement, but also infringes the right to work and other economic
and social rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
Israeli military law
Israel has applied military law in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
since their occupation in 1967. Military Order 378 of 1970 gives the
Israeli army absolute discretion to impose severe restrictions on
the movement of Palestinians living in the West Bank.
A similar order is in force in the Gaza Strip. These orders do not
require the IDF to take into account the well-being and needs of the
occupied population before imposing such restrictions.
It is a criminal offence, punishable by up to five years’
imprisonment and a fine, to contravene orders issued under Articles
88 to 90 of Military Order 378. Article 88 empowers a military
commander or a person acting under his general or specific authority
to prohibit, restrict or regulate the use of certain roads or set
the routes to be followed by vehicles, animals or persons. Under
Article 89, a military commander may order everybody within a
specified area to remain indoors during certain hours. Article 90
enables a military commander to declare any area or place a “closed
area” and to require individuals to obtain a written permit to enter
or leave it.
International humanitarian and human rights law
Two sets of complementary legal frameworks apply to Israel’s conduct
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: international human rights law and
international humanitarian law.
Relevant international human rights law includes the human rights
treaties that Israel has ratified. The most important of these
treaties are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Others relevant to the issues raised in
this report are the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
The ICESCR, ratified by Israel in 1991, requires states parties to
secure the realization of certain basic rights, including the right
to work, health and education, and the right to an adequate standard
of living. The right to work is instrumental to the realization of
other rights, such as an adequate standard of living. Work is also
an intrinsic aspect of human dignity and fulfilment, and a basic
human need worthy of inclusion as a separate right in the ICESCR. It
includes wage employment, self-employment and other activities that
are productive or generate income, whether paid in money or in
kind.
The right to work is guaranteed by ICESCR (Article 6), which states:
“1.
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to
gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will
take the appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
“2.
The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to
achieve the full realization of this right shall include technical
and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and
techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural
development and full and productive employment under conditions
safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the
individual.”
Everyone has the right to “A decent living for themselves and their
families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant”
(Article 7).
The right to work imposes three types of obligations on states
parties: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. The
obligation to respect requires states parties not to take any
measures or impose any obstacles that prevent access to work. The
obligation to protect requires measures to ensure that non-state
institutions and individuals do not deprive individuals of access to
work. The obligation to fulfil requires states parties to engage
proactively in activities intended to strengthen individuals’ access
to work.
The ICESCR requires that every state party should “take
steps…to the maximum of its available resources…with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means”
(Article 2). Measures must be adopted to achieve “full
and productive employment”
(Article 6).
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights interprets
this as requiring states parties to adopt policies and measures
aimed at ensuring “work
for all who are available for and seeking work.”[56]
In the words of the Committee: “The
right to decent work…demands the creation of a social, economic and
physical environment in which all people have fair and equal
opportunities to prosper by virtue of their own endeavour and in a
manner consistent with their dignity.”
The ICESCR foresees that states parties will only be able to secure
full realization of the human rights guaranteed under the treaty
progressively and over time (Article 2).
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has affirmed,
however, that they are required to “move
as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal”,
and any “deliberately
retrogressive measures… would require the most careful consideration
and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of
rights provide for in the Covenant and in the context of the full
use of the maximum available resources”[57].
Article 11 of the ICESCR requires states parties to “recognize
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself
and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and
to the continuous improvement of living conditions”.
States must refrain from impeding access to the resources needed for
the realization of this right, including income generating
activities that allow individuals to maintain an adequate standard
of living.[58]
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
“Liberty of movement is an indispensable condition for the free
development of the person”.[59]
The right to freedom of movement is guaranteed by Article 12 of the
ICCPR. Under exceptional circumstances states may apply restrictions
to this right in order, among other reasons, to protect national
security or the rights and freedoms of others, but the restrictions
must be provided by law and be consistent with the other rights
recognized in the Covenant.
According to the Human Rights Committee:[60]
“The restrictions must not impair the essence of the right; the
relation between right and
restriction, between norm and exception, must not be reversed. The
laws authorizing the application of restrictions should use precise
criteria and may not confer unfettered discretion on those charged
with their execution.
“…It is not sufficient that the restrictions serve the permissible
purposes; they must also be necessary to protect them. Restrictive
measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must
be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be
the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the
desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be
protected”.
“The application of restrictions in any individual case must be
based on clear legal grounds and meet the test of necessity and the
requirements of proportionality. These conditions would not be met,
for example, … if an individual were prevented from traveling
internally without a specific permit”.
It is basic to the rights in the ICCPR, including the right to
freedom of movement and the right, under Article 7, not to be
subjected to “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”
that the State party must “respect
and ensure”
these rights “without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.”
(Article 1).
The restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of Palestinians
in the Occupied Territories violate the above-mentioned rights
guaranteed by the ICCPR. The restrictions are discriminatory, for
they are imposed on Palestinians
because
they are Palestinians. They are not proportional, for they are
imposed on all Palestinians and not on specific individuals who may
legitimately be considered as posing a security threat. Confining
the entire population of a town to their homes for days or even
weeks in response to an attack carried out by some individuals from
that area constitutes a form of collective punishment.
In addition, permissible restrictions must be provided by law.
However, it is often difficult or impossible to know the
regulations according to which closures and curfews are imposed or
the criteria for obtaining a permit for passage. The restrictions
are also often imposed in an arbitrary fashion, with soldiers on
duty seemingly having absolute discretion and applying the measures
in an inconsistent manner.
International humanitarian law
The most important rules governing the conduct of an occupying power
in its treatment of civilians in occupied territories are set out in
the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations. These rules
are considered to be customary international law, binding on all
states.
Article 27 is the cornerstone of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
establishing the principle of respect for the human person, the
inviolability of his or her basic rights and their right to
nondiscrimination.
It states that:
“Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect
for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.
They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and
against insults and public curiosity. …Without prejudice to the
provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex,all
protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by
the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any
adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or
political opinion.”
The authoritative ICRC commentary on the Geneva Conventions states
that :
“the freedom of movement of civilians of enemy nationality may
certainly be restricted, or even temporarily suppressed, if
circumstances so require. That right is not, therefore, included
among the other absolute rights laid down in the Convention, but
that in no wise means that it is suspended in a general manner.
Quite the contrary:
the regulations concerning occupation and those concerning civilian
aliens in the territory of a Party to the conflict are based on the
idea of the personal freedom of civilians remaining in general
unimpaired.”
Article 27 also recognizes the right of an occupying power:
“to take such measures of control and security in regard to
protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.”
However, the ICRC commentary states that:
“regulations concerning occupation…are based on the idea of the
personal freedom of civilians remaining in general unimpaired. …
What is essential is that the measures of constraint they adopt
should not affect the fundamental rights of the persons concerned.
As has been seen, those rights must be respected even when measures
of constraint are justified.”
Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 50 of the
Hague Regulations prohibit collective punishment. Article 33 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention states that:
“No
protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures
of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited.”
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations sets out the general principle
that an occupying power should make every effort to make life in
occupied territory as normal as possible:
“The
authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country.”
The applicability of international law
Israel is accountable for its obligations under international human
rights and humanitarian law for its treatment of the Palestinians
living in the Occupied Territories. However, it currently denies
that it is under an obligation to apply the UN human rights
treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (except for
East Jerusalem) on two grounds[61].
Firstly, Israel has argued that under international law it is not
required to apply these treaties to areas that are not part of its
sovereign territory. It takes the position that humanitarian law
should be applied in the Occupied Territories to the exclusion of
international human rights law. However, it is a basic principle of
human rights law that the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and other human rights treaties are applicable
in all areas in which states parties exercise effective control,
regardless of whether they exercise sovereignty in that area or not.
In addition, Israel argues that it cannot be internationally
responsible for ensuring the implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in these areas
because the majority of civil powers and responsibilities have been
transferred to the PA under the Oslo Agreements. Israel claims that
the PA “is
directly responsible and accountable vis-à-vis the entire
Palestinian population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with
regard to such issues.”[62]
The Oslo Agreements envisage that the PA should exercise extensive
powers and responsibilities in the Occupied Territories. However,
the PA is clearly dependent on Israel’s cooperation to exercise
these powers and responsibilities. Israel can and does control the
movement of Palestinians within the Occupied Territories, as well as
access to many vital resources such as land and water. Increasingly
in the past year, it has redeployed its forces in towns and villages
which according to the Oslo Agreements are under the PA jurisdiction
and where most Palestinians live. There can be no doubt that Israel
continues to exercise effective control over the Occupied
Territories and is therefore responsible for implementing its
obligations under international human rights law.
Most importantly, article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
stipulates that:
“Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be
deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits
of the present Convention by any change introduced as the result of
the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government
of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the
authorities of the occupied territory and the Occupying power, nor
by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied
territory”.
Israel’s position on the applicability of the UN human rights
conventions in the Occupied Territories has not been accepted by any
of the UN human rights treaty bodies. For example,
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its
conclusions on Israel’s initial
reports in 2000, stated: “The
Committee is of the view that the State’s obligations under the
Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its
effective control.”
[63]The Committee requested Israel to
provide it with additional information on the realization of
economic, social and cultural rights in the Occupied Territories “in
order to complete the State party’s initial report and thereby
ensure full compliance with its reporting obligations”.[64]
The Committee has reconsidered this issue in the past two years and
in 2001 maintained its position that the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is applicable in the Occupied
Territories. It stated that: “Even
during armed conflict, fundamental human rights must be respected
and…basic economic, social and cultural rights as part of the
minimum standards of human rights are guaranteed under customary
international law and are also prescribed by international law.”[65]
Even though Israel has argued before the UN human rights treaty
bodies that the appropriate legal regime to be applied in the
Occupied Territories is humanitarian law only, it has refused to
accept that many of these norms are applicable. While recognizing
the
de jure
applicability of the Hague Regulations, it has consistently rejected
the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. Israel maintains that it applies
de facto
unspecified “humanitarian provisions” contained in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, while arguing that it is not required to do so by
international law.
Israel stands alone in contending that the Fourth Geneva Convention
does not apply to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The UN, the ICRC and the international community at large have
consistently maintained that the Fourth Geneva Convention fully
applies to the Occupied Territories and that the Palestinians are a
protected population under the terms of the Convention.
Refusal to accept international monitoring
The Israeli authorities have frequently refused to cooperate with UN
human rights mechanisms set up to monitor human rights practices
in situ,
including the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian
territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing. In 2002, a UN visiting
mission ordered by the UN Commission on Human Rights and headed by
the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and a
UN fact-finding mission set up by the UN Secretary-General and
welcomed by unanimous vote of the UN Security Council, were not
allowed to enter Israel and had to be disbanded.
Amnesty International has repeatedly called for an international
monitoring presence with a strong human rights component in Israel
and the Occupied Territories. This call has received substantial
support both at the local and international level, but the Israeli
authorities have consistently refused to accept such a monitoring
presence. In addition, the Israeli army has recently increased its
targeting of international peace activists present in the Occupied
Territories, whose activities include monitoring restrictions on the
movement of Palestinians and assisting Palestinian medical personnel
and ordinary people to move around the Occupied Territories and
cross Israeli army checkpoints.[66]
Appendix: Case
studies
Al-Mawasi, Gaza Strip
At least 9,000 Palestinians live in al-Mawasi, a 16-kilometre strip
of land running from south of Deir al-Balah to the Egyptian border,
along the Mediterranean Sea. Most farm the fertile land or fish in
the sea. Northern al-Mawasi is within the jurisdiction of the Khan
Younes municipality, the southern part within the jurisdiction of
Rafah municipality. Only three kilometres separate al-Mawasi Khan
Younes from Khan Younes city and five kilometres separate al-Mawasi
Rafah from Rafah city. Al- Mawasi’s residents need to travel to
these two cities, and the rest of the Gaza Strip, to access schools,
health facilities and markets. Al-Mawasi has few services – two
health clinics with very basic facilities, two primary schools and a
secondary school for al- Mawasi Khan Younes – and some of the
teachers who live outside the area cannot enter the area to go to
work. Most facilities were set up after the
intifada
because residents could not reach Khan Younes and Rafah.
Before the
intifada,
al-Mawasi was a place of escape from the densely populated areas of
Khan Younes and Rafah. People would come to relax by the sea in
restaurants, coffee shops and wedding halls. Leisure was a growing
source of income for the residents.
There are 12 small Israeli settlements in al-Mawasi: the Gush Katif
block, with a combined population of 5,300. Under the Oslo
Agreement, part of the area where most Palestinians lived was
designated as Area B. The PA was responsible for civil affairs and
public order for Palestinians, and Israel retained responsibility
for security.
Before the
intifada,
Palestinians could use three roads leading into al-Mawasi: the
coastal road running north to Deir al-Balah, a road leading east to
Khan Younes through the IDF military checkpoint at al-Tuffah and a
road leading east to Rafah through the IDF military checkpoint at
Tel al-Sultan. A two-lane highway runs through the centre of al-Mawasi
with signs for destinations in Israel. Palestinians are prohibited
from using this road. It is for the exclusive use of settlers and
the Israeli military. Since the outbreak of the
intifada,
al-Mawasi’s residents have been subject to severe and increasing
restrictions on movement, spelling isolation and economic ruin for
the residents. In November 2000, the IDF closed off al-Mawasi,
preventing non-residents from entering. Residents could travel to
Khan Younes and Rafah only during daylight hours. Following the
January 2001 killing of an Israeli settler, Roni Tzalah, the IDF
registered all residents, allocating a number to each. Only
Palestinians with this number on their identity card could enter the
area. Some residents outside al-Mawasi at the time were able to
obtain a number only after long efforts by human rights
organizations. Children under 16 could enter only with a parent who
had the child registered on his or her identity card.
Following the killing of an Israeli settler, Nissan Dollinger, by a
Palestinian resident of al- Mawasi on 12 May 2002, the IDF
strengthened and formalized the closure of the area. On 19 May, the
IDF issued residents with new magnetic identity cards. Men under a
certain age are often prevented from moving in and out of the area,
even if they have the right documentation. Al-Mawasi checkpoint is
frequently closed for extended periods. Anyone who leaves the area
risks not being able to get back home for days, or even weeks. When
Amnesty International’s delegate visited al-Mawasi on 20 October
2002, the checkpoint had been closed since 6 October. Residents who
had been in Rafah and Khan Younes when the checkpoint closed
were unable to return home for two weeks. On 20 October, the IDF
allowed men over 50 and women to return.
On 30 October at 2pm two Amnesty International delegates arrived at
the checkpoint between al-Mawasi and Khan Younes and found it
closed. Scores of people, mostly women, who had left their homes in
al-Mawasi to go to the shops or for medical care in Khan Younes,
were unable to return home. Some had been waiting for four days to
go back home. Even though the checkpoint had been open for some of
the time in the previous days, not all of those waiting had been
able to pass and each day more inhabitants of al-Mawasi were left
stranded at the checkpoint. The delegates approached to ask the
soldiers why the checkpoint was closed and when it would reopen. One
of the soldiers said that the checkpoint would reopen the following
morning at 8am. Upon the delegates’ insistence to know why it would
not reopen that day, the soldier shouted at the delegates to go back
or he would shoot at them. Residents are prohibited from bringing
veh icles in and out of al-Mawasi. When the checkpoint is open, a
back-toback system operates for loading and unloading goods.
Palestinians pass goods over a low wall from a truck coming from al-Mawasi
onto a truck coming from outside the area. From Sunday morning until
midday on Friday, agricultural produce may be transported out of al-Mawasi.
On Friday afternoon, equipment and iron may be brought into the area
(stone and cement are prohibited). On Saturdays, food may be brought
in. At best, only ten trucks from al-Mawasi may be loaded or
unloaded each day. Often truckloads of fruit and vegetables rot
before they reach the front of the queue. If the checkpoint is
closed, the agricultural produce rots. There are strict controls on
movement inside al-Mawasi. There are four permanent checkpoints
inside the area. The IDF and Border Police also frequently stop
Palestinians for surprise checks. Sometimes, the IDF imposes a
24-hour curfew. After the attack on 12 May 2002, the residents were
under curfew for seven days. At other times they are required to
remain indoors at night. The IDF has closed off many of the
agricultural roads that crisscross
the area, making it even more difficult for farmers to cultivate
their land and to transport their produce.
No permit to work in Israel
Shahta Zu’rub, aged 30, is married with four children. He lives in
al-Mawasi Rafah. Before the
intifada,
he used to work for a construction company in Israel as a plumber.
He earned between NIS130–150 (about US$26–30) a day. After he lost
his job, he stayed at home for
two months, hoping that he would be able to return to work in
Israel. In December 2000, he started working as an agricultural
labourer in al-Mawasi. His daily wage was only NIS20 (about US$4).
He could not even find this work on a regular basis. In September
2002, he managed to obtain a permit to work in Israel again. He had
to leave
al-Mawasi clandestinely, as men of his age were prohibited from
leaving at the time. He left Rafah at 1.30am so that he could cross
al-Matahin and Abu Holi checkpoints and arrive at Erez checkpoint in
time to cross. He would arrive back in Rafah between 9.00 and
9.30pm.
On three nights, he had to sleep at Abu Holi checkpoint because it
was closed and he could not reach Rafah. He had only worked for a
week when an Israeli soldier confiscated his permit at Erez Crossing
without explanation. Now he is back doing casual agricultural work.
Al-Sayafa, Gaza Strip
The tiny area of al-Sayafa stretches over about 4,000 dunums by the
Mediterranean Sea in the northern tip of the Gaza Strip, south of
the “no man’s land” separating the Gaza Strip from Israel. It lies
between two Israeli settlements: Dugit to the south, with a
population of about 60,
built on land confiscated from al-Sayafa, and Elei Sinai to the
north, with a population of some 330[67].
Before the
intifada,
the coastal road was used by Palestinians to reach al-Sayafa and by
Israelis travelling to Dugit. A secondary road gave access to al-Sayafa
from the east. Under the Oslo Agreement, al- Sayafa was located in
an area where the PA was responsible for civil affairs and Israel
for security.
Al-Sayafa is an agricultural area, well known for its guava and good
quality water. Farmers also grow citrus fruits, apricots, avocados
and vegetables, and have invested in irrigation systems and
greenhouses to increase production. The area lacks basic services:
there is no school, health clinic or mains electricity. Before the
intifada
about 180 people lived in al- Sayafa, most earning their living from
agriculture, and other Palestinians entered the area regularly to
cultivate their land or work on others’ land.
Since the start of the
intifada,
the IDF has destroyed hundreds of dunums of agricultural land,
including scores of wells and their pumps, and scores of houses and
greenhouses. Land adjoining the settlements of Dugit and Elei Sinai
has been completely razed. According to a community leader, Musa
al-Ghoul, only 600 dunums out of the original 4,000 dunums remain.
The IDF has imposed increasing restrictions on the movement of
Palestinians in and out of al- Sayafa, and prohibited them from
entering a 150-metre zone around the area. If they do so, they risk
being shot. A curfew prevents residents from leaving their homes
between dusk and dawn.
In October 2000, the IDF started to prevent Palestinians from using
the coastal road to al- Sayafa, which is now for the exclusive use
of Israelis and the IDF. Al-Sayafa’s residents used the secondary
road until June 2001, when the IDF closed off that road too after an
attack by
Hamas
near Dugit, in which two IDF soldiers were killed and another was
injured. The IDF moved the fence around Dugit 700 metres north, so
that part of the secondary road was on the settlement side, and
surrounded Sayafa with sand barricades about 2.5m high and topped
with barbed wire. All entrances to the area were closed and a
crossing point was set up 50 metres northwest of Dugit, to control
entry and exit. The IDF prevented any Palestinians from entering or
leaving the area until 8 July 2001, including landowners and workers
who lived outside[68].
Since then, al-Sayafa’s residents have been able to leave and enter
the area only at limited times. When Amnesty International visited
on 17 October 2002, the opening hours for the crossings were
6.30–8.30am and 2–4pm, indicated by the presence of an IDF armoured
personnel carrier. Sometimes the crossings do not open at all. After
Hamas
attacked the Elei Sinai settlement and killed two Israeli teenagers
on 2 October 2001, the IDF closed al-Sayafa for 11 days. Only
Palestinian, residents and some landowners who have a special number
on their identity cards, are allowed to enter and leave.
The IDF also ordered all residents to remove their cars and tractors
from the area in July 2001. For a long time, there was not a single
vehicle in the area, and residents had to transport agricultural
supplies and produce, fuel, food and other supplies by donkey cart
or by hand.
After many months, the IDF agreed to allow one tractor to enter and
leave al-Sayafa when the crossing was open.
On 1 May 2002, the Military Commander of the Southern District,
Major General Doron Almog, ordered the confiscation of a large area
of land for five years on grounds of military necessity, an order
upheld by the Israeli High Court of Justice on 28 May. The land will
be used to build a military road with an electrified fence on both
sides from Elei Sinai to Dugit settlement and an adjacent IDF
military post. Most of the lands of al-Sayafa will be inside the
fence, together with the settlements and the military post. This
will leave the residents of al- Sayafa indefinitely cut off from the
rest of the Gaza Strip. To exercise their right to freedom of
movement, they will be at the mercy of the IDF. Work has already
begun.
The impact of the closure has been devastating. In October 2002,
only 70 residents remained. Most families with children had left the
area because they could not ensure getting them to school and back.
Most, if not all, are farming at a loss in an area where agriculture
was previously very profitable. Some have lost all or part of their
land through confiscation or destruction. Those cultivating the
remaining land cannot obtain essential materials because of the
prohibition on Palestinian vehicles, and face problems transporting
their produce out. If the crossing is closed, fruit and vegetables
rot before they reach market. Sometimes it is simply not possible to
transport all the produce to market with a single tractor and
trailer or a few donkey carts, within the hours the area is open.
Farming at a loss
Musa Mahmoud al-Ghoul,
55, lives with his wife, son and daughter-in-law in al-Sayafa, where
he owns about 60 dunums of land in two separate areas. Before the
intifada
their income from the land was between 15,000 and 20,000 JD (about
US$21,300–28,400). At least 20 day labourers from outside the area
came to work on the land. On the 40-dunum plot next to their house,
the family continues to cultivate lemons, clementines, guavas and
avocados. In February 2002, the IDF razed 14 dunums of a 20-dunum
plot near Elei Sinai settlement that had been planted with date
palms and vegetables and contained a fish pond. The family continues
to cultivate potatoes on the other six dunums, but was worried in
October 2002 that they might also lose this crop to the IDF.
The family no longer makes any profit. If their produce has to wait
to be transported, quality declines and the price drops. Even if
they can get it to market, prices have crashed with the fall in
exports to Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. In October 2002, a 14kg
box of clementines was fetching JD3 (about US$4.25), compared to
JD10 (about US$14.20) before the
intifada;
a box of guava JD2, compared to JD8 (about US$11.35).
From time to time the IDF has made the family leave their homes in
the middle of the night because of alleged infiltration of the area.
During the night of 12 October 2002, a tank came to their house and
the family were ordered to the checkpoint for two hours before being
allowed to return home.
Sea fishing, Gaza Strip
At the beginning of 2001, 2,543 fishermen were registered in the
Gaza Strip, working from the port in Gaza city and the wharves in
Deir al-Balah, Khan Younes and Rafah. Since 1994, the Oslo Agreement
has restricted fishing by Palestinians to a relatively small area,
known as Zone L, extending up to 20 nautical miles from the shore of
the Gaza Strip. It is policed by Israeli naval patrols.
The sea has been completely or partially closed to fishermen since
the beginning of the
intifada.
For most of this period, there has been a ban on fishing off al-Mawasi
Rafah and al-Mawasi Khan Younes in the southern Gaza Strip. From 12
May 2002 fishermen from Khan Younes and Rafah have been prohibited
from fishing off the coast and from 1 July 2002 the same applied to
fishermen from Deir al-Balah and Gaza. Fishing has been allowed up
to 12 miles, normally limited to six miles, off the central and
northern coast for most of this period. At some times, such as
between 15 February and 16 March 2001, fishing was completely
prohibited throughout the Gaza Strip.
About 1,000 fishermen are registered to fish from Khan Younes and
Rafah. Many of them live outside al-Mawasi and have been prohibited
from entering the area completely since its closure in May 2002.
Some living in Khan Younes refugee camp told Amnesty International
that, even if they were not allowed to fish, they wanted to retrieve
valuable equipment stored in the area, such as motors and nets. On 9
January 2002, the IDF had confiscated at least 20 motors belonging
to fishermen in Rafah, and on 18 February, the IDF reportedly broke
into buildings used by fishermen in al-Mawasi Khan Younes and broke
10 more motors. The average cost for replacing such motors is about
NIS16,000 (about US$3,200).
Since the start of the
intifada,
harassment and detention of Palestinian fishermen by the Israeli
navy has increased. Fishermen told Amnesty International’s delegate
that the navy fired in the air and sprayed their boats with
high-powered water jets. Dozens of fishermen have been detained and
accused of fishing in a prohibited area, and in some cases reported
being ill-treated. Many said they were questioned by Israel’s
General Security Service about the activities of the Palestinian
Naval Police and a boat belonging to the Palestinian Authority,
suggesting that the real motive for at least some of these arrests
was to gather information on the Palestinian Authority’s activities
in the Gaza Strip.
Fishermen detained and ill-treated
Early on 2 September 2002, Muhammad Murad al-Hissi went to sea to
fish, skippering his boat with his brothers, 25-year-old Sameh
Mahmoud al-Hissi and 20-year-old Ahmad Murad al-Hissi, and Jamail
Khalil al-Shantaf, aged 52 and Muhammad Mustafa al-Shantaf, aged 18,
working as a crew. At about 4.15pm, they were about three to four
kilometres from the shore, in an area where fishing was permitted.
An Israeli navy patrol boat approached them and officials demanded
their permits and ordered them to take up their nets. The
Palestinians complied. After about an hour, officials told the
Palestinian crew to follow their boat and led them westwards for
about two kilometres. At that point, Muhammad al-Hissi stopped his
boat, as he feared being led into a prohibited area and accused of
fishing there. The patrol boat then fired towards the boat and
sprayed it with a high-powered hose for about one hour, breaking
windows in the cabin. Muhammad al-Hissi was ordered to strip and
swim over to the patrol boat. There he was handcuffed with his hands
behind him, blindfolded and forced to crouch. Other members of the
crew were brought to the patrol boat, which returned to Ashdod port
in Israel, towing the Palestinian boat. After being medically
examined at the port at about 1.15am, they were blindfolded and
handcuffed again, then driven for between one and one-and-a-half
hours on a bus, still stripped down to their vests and shorts, and
extremely cold.
After arrival at a building, they were interrogated. An
interrogator, with two policemen present, accused Muhammad al-Hissi
of being in a prohibited area, an accusation he denied, and asked
him to sign a statement written in Hebrew, which he did. The five
men were then taken to Erez detention centre. They arrived at about
6pm, still wearing only their shorts and vests, and were medically
examined again. On 10 September, they were brought to court to face
charges of fishing in a prohibited area but the charges were
withdrawn and they were released The Israeli navy returned their
boat 16 days later, and the PA held the boat for another nine days
before releasing it. Equipment worth about NIS4,000 (about US$800)
was missing, and Muhammad al-Hissi lost all his income for every day
that he could not go out to sea. Closures at sea have seriously
damaged the Gaza Strip’s fishing industry and dependent businesses,
such as mechanics’ shops and wholesale merchants. The total catch
has fallen from 3,650 tonnes worth nearly US$11m in 1999 to 1,950
tonnes worth just over US$6m in 2001[69].Fishermen
in Rafah and Khan Younes have completely lost their livelihoods, and
some in Deir al-Balah and Gaza city are not working or are operating
at a loss because they can catch so little in the narrow area where
they are allowed to fish. They have also suffered direct losses from
damage or seizure of their property by the IDF and loss of income
during periods of detention or when boats were confiscated.
Lost income, failed businesses
Hisham Khaled Bakr, 34,
lives in Gaza city and is responsible for his wife, two children,
his mother and unemployed brother. With three partners, he fishes
for oily fish such as sardines and tuna in the most profitable
seasons during April and May and September and October.
Before the
intifada,
their annual profit was about NIS10,000 (about US$2,000). In October
2000, he made no money because the IDF imposed a complete closure on
the sea, and in 2001 he made only about NIS2,000 (about US$400) each
season because of partial closures. During the first season of 2002
he made about NIS2,000–3,000 (about US$400–600). Before the
intifada,
each crew member would earn about NIS1,000 (about US$200) each
season. Because of the drop in the catch, the partners cut the
crew’s wages to NIS600 (about US$120) in the last three seasons. The
boat did not go out in the second season of 2002 as the crew had
left to look for better-paid work. Hisham Bakr also used to have a
business in Gaza, making and selling clothes. In the early days of
the
intifada,
the market for Gaza-made clothes collapsed because many Palestinians
lost their sources of income and switched to buying cheaper clothes
imported from China. He gave up this work and has no source of
income.
Sa’ir, West Bank
Sa’ir is a village of about 14,500 people northeast of Hebron city.
Before the
intifada,
about half of those working were employed in Israel and settlements.
Due to the comprehensive closure of the West Bank from Israel,
virtually all lost their jobs. Most have been unable to find
alternative work in the West Bank. The IDF has closed the two exits
out of Sa’ir. Road 356, which links Sa’ir to Hebron and Bethlehem,
is closed by roadblocks, one just northeast of Sa’ir on the
Bethlehem side and the other at Beit ‘Anun to the southwest, at the
intersection with Route 60, a road used by Israeli settlers. Any
movement, even on foot, near the settlement of Asfar, which lies
off Road 356 to the east of Sa’ir, is dangerous. IDF soldiers or
settlers frequently fire in the air or in the direction of
Palestinians in the area.
The IDF has also dug a deep trench, between one and two metres deep,
along parts of road 369, north of Sa’ir and accessible from an
agricultural road. Palestinian drivers have started crossing road
369 to use the road from ‘Arb al-Shama’a to travel to Bethlehem.
Road 369 is also used by Israeli settlers.
In the face of growing unemployment, income from farming could have
helped Sa’ir’s residents during the
intifada,
but closures have slashed farmers’ incomes. The main crops grown on
village lands are grapes, plums and olives. However, 90 per cent of
Sa’ir’s agricultural land lies on the other side of the roadblock to
the northeast, with access provided by road 356. Now, farmers can
get to their fields only by foot or by riding a donkey or mule.
Farmers’ incomes slashed
Ahmad ‘Abd al-Nabi Shalaldeh, aged 64, is the largest landowner in
Sa’ir, with more than 2,000 dunums. He told Amnesty International
that about 800 dunums of Sa’ir’s land is planted with plums, located
in Wadi Sa’ir on the other side of the north-eastern checkpoint,
which yield about 1,700 tonnes annually. In 2002, he and other
farmers lost nearly all the plums, which were virtually
inaccessible when they ripened in June and July because the road was
closed and because of the problems of transporting them, even to the
nearby towns of Bethlehem and Hebron. The price of plums has also
plummeted. A kilogram of Santa Rosa plums, the most prevalent
variety in Sa’ir, fetched NIS6–7 (about US$1.2 – 1.4) before the
intifada,
but in 2002, only NIS1 (about US$0.20). Owing to the closure, the
farmers lost their markets in Israel, the Gaza Strip and most of the
West Bank. The market for grapes also collapsed. The price before
the
intifada
was NIS3–3.5 (about US$0.6 – 0.7) a kilogram, in the 2002 season
only NIS1 (about US$0.20).
Ahmad Shalaldeh was very concerned about the olive harvest due in
October 2002. He said: “We
lost the plums. We lost the grapes. They
[the IDF]
should at least open the roads and protect us from the settlers so
that we can harvest our olives.”
The 1,200 to 1,300 dunums of land planted with olives also lie on
the north-eastern side of the roadblock, near the settlement of
Asfar.
Ahmad Shalaldeh’s turnover has dropped dramatically in the last two
years. Before the
intifada,
in 2000 he made NIS120,000 (about US$24,000) from the sale of
produce. By contrast, his grapes, plums and apricots sold for only
NIS40,000 (about US$8,000) in 2001 and for NIS15,000 (about
US$3,000) in 2002.
Shepherds’ livelihoods under threat
Zuheir Yousef Shalaldeh, 21, is married with two children and
supports a household of 13
people, including 7 children. The family is completely dependent on
the income from its herd of 150 goats. The extended family owns
1,000 dunums of land, near Asfar settlement. Before the
intifada,
1,000 goats and sheep grazed on this land. Now the family can reach
their land only with difficulty because of the closure of road 356.
Sometimes the IDF even stops them from walking on the road and they
have to trek through the mountains, dangerously near Asfar
settlement. Settlers and IDF soldiers fire in their direction, even
when they are on their own land, so the extended family now grazes
its herds on 100 dunums furthest away from the settlement.
Bran is rarely available to feed to the goats because of the
closure. Zuheir Shalaldeh and his family are able to buy hay but,
when there is a tight closure, even hay is not always available
because the merchants cannot transport it to Sa’ir. The family have
to transport the hay to the land using donkeys.
Before the
intifada
Zuheir Shalaldeh’s immediate family earned JD6,000–7,000 (about
US$8,520–9,940) annually from the goats. Now it has dropped to
JD4,000–4,500 (about US$5,680–6,390). The family has stopped milking
the goats, because of the difficulties of transporting dairy
products to Sa’ir to sell them. In early 2002, they could sell goats
for only 64 JD50–55 (about US$71–78), which before the
intifada
had been worth JD80–90 (about US$113–128). Demand has fallen, as
many people can no longer afford meat regularly.
Hebron, West Bank
Hebron is the most populous city in the West Bank, with about
140,000 inhabitants.
As a commercial centre, it serves the villages in the Hebron
governorate, which has the highest population of any governorate in
the West Bank. Hebron has a significant industrial base,
particularly for clothes, stonework, shoemaking and metal work.
Hebron is the only city in the West Bank where Israeli settlers live
inside the town. About 500 settlers live in four settlement enclaves
inside and adjacent to Hebron’s Old City – Beit Hadassah, Beit
Romano, Avraham Avinu and Tel Rumeida. In addition, about 7,000
settlers live in two settlements on the edge of the town, Givat
Harsina and Kiryat Arba’, and regularly enter the city. There is a
large contingent of IDF soldiers, Border Police and Israeli Police
present in the town to protect the settlers. In 1997, the Israeli
security forces withdrew from about 80 per cent of the municipal
area of Hebron, known as H-1, and handed over control to the PA.
However, they retained control over the remaining part of the city,
H-2, which includes the Old City, the four settlement enclaves, the
Haram al-Ibrahimi/Machpelah Cave and the city’s industrial area. The
Old City has traditionally been the commercial and cultural heart of
Hebron. The IDF reoccupied H-1 on 25 June 2002, taking control of
the entire city.
On 25 October, it withdrew from part of H-1 but remained on the high
ground in Hara al- Sheikh and Hara Abu Sneineh. On 16 November, the
IDF re-occupied the whole of Hebron and has remained in H-1 ever
since.
Hebron is often tense because of the presence of the settler
community and the security forces in a densely populated Palestinian
area, and confrontations are common. However, the Israeli security
forces respond in a different way to attacks by Palestinians and by
settlers.
They rarely intervene to protect Palestinians from frequent settler
attacks in the Old City on Palestinians and their property. By
contrast, they respond, often with excessive force, to attacks on
settlers and Palestinians risk prosecution before military courts
for such attacks.
As previously noted, since the start of the
intifada,
the IDF has routinely imposed 24-hour curfews on Palestinians in
H-2, sometimes for weeks, lifting the curfew occasionally to enable
them to stock up on supplies. However, such curfews are only imposed
on Palestinians, leaving Israelis to move freely. Sometimes a
curfew is imposed to enable the settlers to celebrate a religious
festival. In September 2002, parts of Hebron were placed under
24-hour curfew for the Sukkot festival. Thousands of Israelis walked
the streets of the Old City, even attending an open-air music
concert, while the Palestinians were forced to remain shut up in
their homes.
Severe restrictions on Palestinians’ movement inside the Old City do
not apply to settlers. Since the start of the
intifada,
Palestinian vehicles have been prohibited from entering the area.
All goods, whether for personal or commercial use, have to be
carried in and out by hand or on a handcart. Palestinians are
forbidden even to walk in some streets of the Old City, unless they
are residents, because three nearby settlements have been declared
closed military areas by the IDF. One of the streets, al-Shuhada’
Street, is a main road connecting the eastern and western parts of
Hebron.
More than 300 Palestinian shops in the Old City have been shut for
months on the orders of the IDF. On 10 March 2001, Israeli settlers
attacked Palestinians and their property in the Old 65 Market after
an Israeli at Avraham Avinu settlement was shot. The next day, the
IDF ordered the closure of more than 70 shops and sealed off most of
the area with barbed wire. The order, initially to be in effect for
two weeks, has remained in force until now.
Generally, the Israeli security forces have not stopped settlers
taking control of property in the Old City in areas closed to
Palestinians. For example, Israeli settlers have converted shops in
the Old Market into apartments.
After an armed Palestinian shot and killed an Israeli and wounded
his three sons near the Avraham Avinu settlement on 23 September
2002, the IDF prohibited Palestinian merchants from opening the 36
shops in the nearby Suq al-Laban market. The order remains in force
until now.
Amnesty International delegates visited Hebron on several occasions
in October 2002. On 24 October,
H-2 was not under curfew. However, there were very few Palestinians
walking inside the Old City, and most stores and workshops were
shut. Hebron’s economy has suffered a combination of setbacks: the
strict siege imposed on Hebron city which cuts it off from the
surrounding villages; the closure of Israel; curfews; and
Palestinians’ lack of money.
The Old City’s situation is even worse: vehicles cannot move inside;
some of its main streets and most important markets are closed;
curfews are frequent and sometimes last for days.
Many Palestinians avoid coming to the Old City, or at least to areas
near settlements, because they are afraid of settler violence.
Manufacturing costs rocket, output slumps
‘Abd al-Rahman Jobe’, owns the al-Nada factory, in Hebron’s
industrial area in H-2, producing decorative metal objects, such as
banisters, from metal pipes manufactured in Israel. Before the
intifada,
the factory operated two eight-hour shifts each day and employed up
to 25 day labourers. Some 40 to 50 per cent of production was
destined for the market in Hebron governorate, the rest for other
areas of the West Bank and for export to Jordan.
Output has declined sharply since October 2000, and ‘Abd al-Rahman
Jobe’ estimates that profits are down to between 10 and 20 per cent.
By October 2002, the factory was employing only four workers, three
of whom were family members, and there was normally only one shift
each day. When curfews were imposed in H-2, the factory was unable
to operate.
Because of the difficulties of transport out of Hebron to other
parts of the West Bank, 80 per cent of production is now for Hebron
governorate alone. Other orders are normally for the Bethlehem
governorate and rarely for the northern West Bank.
Transport costs have soared for the factory. Haulage charges to
bring a truckload of metal pipes from Tel Aviv to Hebron have risen
from about NIS600 (about US$120) to NIS1,600–1,800 (about
US$320–360). Until late 2001, a yellow-plated Israeli truck would
transport the pipes to Tarqumiya checkpoint near the Green Line,
where they would be transferred to a green-plated Palestinian truck
for transport to Hebron. The IDF has since prohibited the import of
metal pipes through this checkpoint. Now a yellow-plated truck must
bypass Israeli checkpoints to bring the goods to Hebron, travelling
a circuitous route from Tel Aviv to Beersheva in Israel and through
the
southern West Bank.
Nablus, West Bank
Nablus is the second largest town in the West Bank, with a
population of about 120,000. It is the economic heart of the
northern West Bank, serving surrounding villages as well as Salfit,
Tubas, Tulkarem, Qalqilya and Jenin governorates. Nablus has a
stronger industrial base than other Palestinian cities, with
factories producing a wide variety of products, in particular
foodstuffs and clothing. The city also had a large number of
artisans undertaking such activities as stonework and carpentry.
Since the beginning of the
intifada,
the city’s economy has suffered from increasing internal closures,
preventing movement between towns and villages. Surrounding villages
depend on Nablus for health and educational services. It is also the
centre for marketing agricultural products in the northern West
Bank, particularly for farmers working in Jiftlik in the Jordan
Valley. Before the
intifada,
products from Nablus factories, such as Safa milk and olive oil
soap, were distributed throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
A further blow to the economy was delivered on 29 March 2002, when
the IDF occupied six Palestinian towns, as well as many villages,
after a series of suicide bombings in which Israeli civilians were
killed. Nablus was invaded on the night of 4 April and the entire
city was under curfew until the IDF withdrew on 22 April. Fighting
between the IDF and armed Palestinians centred in the Old City.
During the invasion, 80 Palestinians died, a number of whom were
civilian non-combatants.
The IDF also destroyed buildings and infrastructure. An assessment
of the physical and institutional damage resulting from IDF actions,
conducted by the Donor Support Group of the Local Aid Coordination
Committee, concluded that Nablus had been the hardest-hit area, with
repair costs estimated at US$113m. Over US$28m of damage was to the
private sector, most of it to offices and shops. During this and
subsequent occupations, curfews confined residents to their homes
for days, stopping almost all economic activity. They would be
lifted irregularly for a few hours, with no predictable schedule.
The loss of income from curfews and internal closure was even more
significant than the physical destruction.
The IDF reinvaded Nablus on 31 May 2002 and remained until 6 June,
imposing a 24-hour curfew throughout the period. It invaded again on
21 June 2002 and has remained since. A 24-hour curfew regime, until
7 October in western Nablus and 11 October in eastern Nablus,
was replaced with a system of night curfews until 3 November when
24-hour curfews were reinstated. According to the Palestine Red
Crescent Society, a curfew was enforced in Nablus for nearly 90 per
cent of the time between 21 June and 20 November 2002, and was
lifted for only 497 hours.
For much of the time, the IDF has enforced the curfew strictly.
Soldiers have sometimes opened fire on Palestinian civilians, even
when they posed no danger[70].
As time has passed, however, the curfew has increasingly been
broken, particularly after the start of the school year. On 15
September 2002, for example, more than 100 women and schoolchildren
defied the curfew and marched to an IDF roadblock inside the city to
protest at the closure of Nablus schools.
The IDF has also restricted movement inside Nablus. In early
September 2002, the IDF physically divided the eastern and western
parts. When Amnesty International’s delegate visited the city on 29
September, a tank was preventing Palestinian vehicles from crossing
the city. By 5 October, the tank had been replaced with high earth
banks and a felled tree. After it divided the city, the IDF would
frequently lift the curfew on one or other side. The western part
contains the main commercial district, al-Najah University and
Rafidia governmental hospital, the eastern part the industrial area.
As a result, many Palestinians found that, even though the curfew
was lifted in their area, they could not necessarily reach work,
visit a
doctor or attend school or university.
Israel has repeatedly claimed that the curfew is necessary to
prevent attacks on Israeli civilians, both in Israel and the West
Bank. In a newspaper interview on 2 October, the IDF colonel
responsible for the infantry brigade in Nablus strongly implied,
however, that the restrictions were also a form of collective
punishment:
“They
[the residents of Nablus]
will suffer until they understand… My job is to stop suicide bombers.”
He also said: “Life
here is miserable… This is the price. They went back more than 20
years.”
Unable to reach vital medical treatment
Nabil Hani ‘Ashur, aged 49, is a self-employed plumber. Married with
four children, he also supports his mother. He installs plumbing in
newly constructed buildings in Nablus. Before the
intifada,
he used to earn NIS2,000–3,000 monthly (about US$400–600), but in
the past 18 months has earned only NIS200–250 (about US$40–50) a
month. There has been little construction in Nablus because of the
depressed economic situation and the shortage of building materials.
Some months, he earns nothing.
He had to find money to buy drugs for his wife, Suhad ‘Ashur, who
was suffering from breast cancer. She had been receiving treatment,
including radiation treatment, but after the IDF occupied Nablus in
April 2002, she was unable to receive any treatment for nearly two
months because of curfews and closure. Even after the IDF withdrew
from Nablus on 22 April, the specialist doctor could not reach the
hospital in Nablus from his home in Jenin for weeks. Suhad ‘Ashur
died on 9 July.
Jenin, West Bank
Jenin is the northernmost town in the West Bank. With the
neighbouring refugee camp, its population is 43,000. Owing to its
proximity to Israel, there were many economic and social contacts
with Israelis. Before the
intifada,
nearly 30 per cent of residents in Jenin and Tubas governorates
worked in Israel, a higher percentage than in any other area of the
West Bank. By the time of the IDF’s March 2002 invasion of West Bank
cities, nearly all these people had lost their jobs in Israel. Every
weekend hundreds of Palestinians and Israelis used to come to the
city to shop, taking advantage of the low prices. Now it is illegal
for Israelis to enter Area A and they have stopped coming.
As in Nablus, the economic situation in Jenin deteriorated further
when the IDF occupied the city on 3 April 2002 and put it under
curfew until it withdrew on 18 April. Following several incursions
by the IDF into the town in the following months, the IDF re-entered
Jenin on 25 July and has since remained. The city has been under
24-hour curfew for months. According to the Palestine Red Crescent
Society, between 25 July and 22 November 2002, Jenin was under
curfew for nearly 70 per cent of the time. Amnesty International’s
delegate visited Jenin on 8 October and Deir Ghazaleh, a village in
Jenin governorate, on 12 October. Several people complained about
the confusion regarding the schedule for curfews. Sometimes, the IDF
would announce that the curfew was to be lifted the following day.
People would start preparing, but the next day would discover that
the IDF had maintained the curfew. Many residents had started
ignoring the IDF’s announcements and were moving around in areas
where there was no IDF presence. They were relying on information
from the local taxi offices about the location of IDF tanks and the
“no go” areas.
A dangerous commute to a declining business
Taraf Khaled Jarrar, 33, is a mechanic who owns a garage with his
brother in Jenin. He lives with his wife and children in Hashimiya,
a village about 9 kilometres east of Jenin. They used to live in a
flat above the garage, but moved out in 2002 because his elder
daughter had panic attacks whenever she heard an Israeli army
helicopter or a tank.
Before the
intifada,
it used to take 10 to 15 minutes to drive from Hashimiya to Jenin.
Now that short commute has become a dangerous and frightening
journey, which can take an hour or more. He said: “Sometimes
I have to go through the hills and travel through dirt roads to get
to Jenin. Today there was a tank on the road so we had to go on one
of these routes.”
Sometimes his brother phones from Jenin to warn him of any shooting
near the garage, “In
that case, I don’t come because the soldiers shoot at cars.”
He described the current state of his business. “Before
the intifada the business would bring in NIS600
[about US$120]
daily. Now if we have any work, we normally don’t make more than
NIS40
[about US$8.00]
a day, after the expenses. My brother and I used to employ three
workers. Now there are none. Many people have sold their cars
because they don’t have money. In any event, people don’t use their
cars very much because it is so difficult to get in and out of Jenin.
A lot of what is left of our business involves repairing cars which
have been shot at by the Israeli tanks.”
When Amnesty International visited his garage, they were working on
a car and a tractor, both of which had bullet holes in them.
Salary halved
Hassan Jarrar lives in Jenin. He is married with a baby and another
expected. He has a good job, working in the credit control
department of the Jenin office of a large Palestinian enterprise
which owns and runs petrol stations all over the West Bank. He used
to be paid a monthly salary of NIS2,800 (about US$560). In April
2002, the company started paying its workers on a daily instead of a
monthly basis, and two out of the 40 employees in the Jenin office
were laid off. The company’s turnover had decreased drastically due
to the economic situation and because the curfews prevented workers
from getting to work regularly. Hassan was only able to reach work
on 12 days in September 2002, and took home less than half his
normal monthly salary.
Prohibited from driving on the main road
Walid Ahmad Hussein Khaledi, 34, lives in Deir Ghazaleh, a village
about 5kilometres from Jenin, where he works as a night watchman in
a factory. Before the
intifada,
his journey to work took between 5 and 10 minutes. Now it can take
hours. Sometimes he never arrives.
Deir Ghazaleh is one of [eight] villages east of Jenin, that have
been cut off from the city by a north-south bypass road serving two
Israeli settlements so that settlers do not have to travel through
Palestinian communities to reach Israel. Palestinians are now
prohibited from travelling on this road.
Walid Khaledi leaves home at 1.30pm to try to be on time for his
shift at 4.30pm. Apart from the three weeks in April 2002 when it
was impossible to enter Jenin after the IDF invasion, he has tried
to go to work every day. At best, his journey takes one hour, but on
10
October there were so many checkpoints that he had to make a
diversion of about 45km to try to reach Jenin. Eventually, he ended
up spending the night in Burqin village, on the other side of the
city.
His transport costs have soared. Before the
intifada,
his fare in a shared taxi was NIS2 (about US$0.40) each way. Now the
round trip costs NIS10–25 (about US$2–5) depending on the distance
and how many taxis he has to take. His monthly salary of NIS1,200
(about US$240) is often late because production is about one quarter
of the factory’s capacity and there are cash flow problems.
He is in his third year of studying social work at al-Quds Open
University in Jenin. The semester that should have finished by July
2002 had still not been completed by October because of the closures
and curfews.
[1]
Report of the ILO Director-General, International Labour
Conference, 91th Session (Conference
Report/2003-05-0185-8a.EN.Doc/v2)
[2]
The
intifada
is named after the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem where the killing
of Palestinians in
September 2000 triggered the uprising but it is more truly seen
as a protest against the restrictions of
movement which were harming individual Palestinians and holding
back economic development.
[3]
The
legislation and policies applied in East Jerusalem, which is
part of the occupied West Bank, are
very different, although they too have had a severe impact on
Palestinians both living in and denied
access to the city. For the purposes of this report, references
to the West Bank do not include East
Jerusalem.
[4]
Amnesty International reports, news releases and other public
documents are available in English,
Arabic, Hebrew and other languages at www.amnesty.org (in
English with links to sites in other
languages).
[5]
In
1988 Jordan relinquished claims to the West Bank.
[6]
The sources for the obligations under international humanitarian
law applicable to belligerent
occupation are found in:
- The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (Hague Convention)
and its annexed Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (Hague Regulations) of
18 October 1907;
- The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth
Geneva Convention) of 12 August 1949;
- Article 75 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I);
- Rules of customary international law.
For more details see the chapter on International human rights
and humanitarian law.
[7]Human
Rights Committee General Comment 27, of 2 November 1999 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9),
para 18.
[8]
UNRWA
6th
Emergency Appeal (July-December 2003), 6 June 2003.
[9]
The total number of settlers is about 380,000. Of them, some
5,000-6,000 live in the Gaza Strip and
some 198,000 in the West Bank; the rest lives in East-Jerusalem
settlements.
[10]
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the
occupying power from transferring its
population into the territories it occupies.
[11]
See UNSCO Report on the Palestine Economy 1997, IV.4, Table 21.
[12].
In 1999, 34.6 per cent of new jobs created for Palestinians were
in Israel and Israeli-controlled areas,
compared to 56.4 per cent in 1998.
[13]
Report of the Secretary-General submitted in accordance with
General Assembly resolution ES-10/2,
dated 26 June 1997. Ref: A/ES-10/6, S/1997/494. GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, Tenth emergency special
session. Security Council; SECURITY COUNCIL, Fifty-second year.
Agenda item 5: Illegal Israeli
Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territories [paragraph
22].
[14]
The
closure followed four suicide bombings by the armed Palestinian
groups
Hamas
and Islamic
Jihad
which killed 59 people as retaliation for the extrajudicial
execution by Israeli forces of a member
of
Hamas.
[15]
Article IV of the Declaration of
Principles on the Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed by
both
sides on 13 September 1993.
[16]
The
provision for the establishment of a “safe passage” is contained
in the Israeli-Palestinian
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area (Protocol
Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Military
Forces and Security Arrangements) signed by both sides in Cairo
on 5 May 1994. The provision was
restated and further detailed in Article X (Safe Passage) of the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, signed by both sides in
Washington DC (US) on 28 September 1995.
[17]
Paper presented at a conference organized by the Centre for
International Human Rights
Enforcement and convened by Pax Christi International in
Jerusalem on 17-18 September 1994.
International Human Rights Enforcement: The Case of the Occupied
Palestinian Territories in the
Transitional Period
(CHRE, Jerusalem 1996), p.17.
[18]
Ibid.
p.52.
[19]
See:
“Does
a 7 Kilometer Journey between the Village and the City endanger
Israel?”,
PHR Update,
17 July 2003.
[20]Case
9242/2000.
[21]
In
2002, there was a full curfew in H-2 for 79 days and a partial
curfew in this area for 103 days.
Following the IDF’s reoccupation of H-1 in November 2002, there
was a full curfew in this area for 15
days and a partial curfew for 35 days. In the first two months
of 2003, there was a full curfew in H-2
for 36 days and a partial curfew for 24 days, while there was a
full curfew for 10 days in H-1 and a
partial curfew for 46 days. In June, full curfew in H1 was
imposed for 22 days and partial curfew for
31 days.
[22]See
Appendix for case studies on al-Mawasi and al-Sayafa.
[23]
See: The Villages of Deir al Hatab, ‘Azmout & Salim in the
Nablus Governorate; an OCHA
discussion paper, 15 April 2003.
[24]See
chapter “National and international law”.
[25]Ibid.
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Ibid
[29] In
the Tulkarem area after Palestinian land had been bulldozed and
trees uprooted for the
construction of the barrier, the route was altered and other
land was similarly destroyed to build the
barrier in its current location.
[30]
“The
situation of workers in the occupied Arab territories”,
Report of the Director-General of the
International Labour Office (ILO) to the International Labour
Conference, 91st
session, 2003.
[31]
31
According to the World Bank physical damage resulting from the
conflict reached US$ 728 million
by the end of August 2002. See “Two
Years of Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis; An
Assessment”,
March 2003, and “Twenty-Seven
Months - Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic
Crisis; An Assessment”,
May 2003..
[32]
Ibid,
(All 3 above reports)
[33]
Ibid.
This includes discouraged workers who no longer see any point in
seeking work.
[35]Hebron
University and the Palestinian Polytechnic in Ein Khair al-Din
were been closed by a
military order on 14 January 2003. The original order, for two
weeks, has since been renewed for
another six months. In October 2002, Pierre Poupard, UNICEF
special representative, said that at least
580 schools had been closed as a result of curfews and closures.
[36]In
an interview with Israel Radio on 13 October 2002.
[37] Organizations
which provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian
population in the Occupied
Territories have repeatedly complained about movement
restrictions which have impeded their
activities and curtailed their ability to carry out their tasks
efficiently.
See for example the report of
Catherine Bertini, Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the UN
Secretary-General, 11-19 August 2002,
paras. 70–81. Also, the statement by the UN agency workers
(Statement attributable to international
UN workers operating in the Occupied Palestinian Territory) of 3
December 2002, and the statement
issued on 15 March 2003 by the World Health Organization (WHO)
and other international and local
organizations.
[38]
E/C.12/1/Add.27,
para. 18, 31/08/2001.
[39]
E/C.12/1/Add.27, para. 39.
[40]
E/C.12/1/Add.69, para. 13
[41]E/C.12/1/Add.90,
para 19, 23 May 2003.
[42]
UN Seminar on Assistance to the Palestinian People, Geneva, 15
July 2003.
[43]
CAT/C/XXVII/Concl. 5, para. 6 (i).
[44]Ibid.
para. 7 (g).
[45]
According to the Labour Force Survey of the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) for the
third quarter of 2000.
[46] 40,000
had permits to work in Israel and nearly 15,000 had permits to
work in the settlements and
industrial zones. 24,370 workers from the Gaza Strip had valid
permits. Only 16,500 workers from the
West Bank had valid permits but it was estimated that up to
60,000 clandestine workers were working
illegally in Israel.
[47]
Employment
statistics are based on PCBS Labour Force Surveys and include
Palestinian residents of
East Jerusalem, unless otherwise stated.
[48]According
to the PCBS, about 43,000 people with West Bank identity cards
and 2,000 Gazans were
working in Israel, settlements and industrial zones in the third
quarter of 2001. Those from the West
Bank were almost all clandestine workers, who had taken
advantage of a slight easing of the closures to
return to work. With the intensification of movement
restrictions by the IDF at the end of 2001 and the
first half of 2002, the number of workers with West Bank
identity cards in Israel declined again. In the
second quarter of 2002, when the IDF reoccupied major
Palestinians towns and imposed blanket
curfews, the number had dropped to 15,000.
[49]
The
ILO standard unemployment rate does not take account of
“discouraged” workers, people of
working age who are not actively seeking work and therefore not
counted as unemployed under the
standard ILO definition.
[50]
UNSCO
states: “In
order to understand what happened to the labour market in
Q2-2002, the PCBS
estimates for ILO unemployment must be explained. First, this
number was obtained from a survey that
selected 7,559 households, but to which only 4,508 households
were able to respond. That is a 60 per
cent response rate; average response rates typically exceed 85
per cent. The results of the survey,
therefore, should be understood to be valid for those areas to
which the PCBS had access, on days that
those areas were accessible. Therefore, this ILO unemployment
rate must be understood to be valid for
those areas to which the PCBS had access, on days that those
areas were accessible. Therefore this
ILO unemployment rate must be understood to reflect reality in
some of the places, some of the time –
or, in more basic terms, in the economically active areas during
relatively favourable time periods.”
UNSCO, “ UN New economic figures for West Bank and Gaza show
rapid deterioration leading to
human catastrophe,” 29 August 2002.
[51]
Oxfam International,
Forgotten villages: Struggling to survive under closure in the
West Bank,
September 2002.
[52]
See
for example the World Food Programme (WFP) Emergency Report No.
24 of 13 Jun 2003.
[53]
Colonel Shimshon Arbel, see footnote 36.
[54]
Among 936 children surveyed, aged between 6 and 59 months, 13.3
per cent of children in the Gaza
Strip and 4.3 per cent in the West Bank were suffering from
global acute malnutrition: acute
malnutrition or wasting that reflects inadequate nutrition in
the short-term period preceding the survey
[55]
Of 2,240 households surveyed, 55.5 per cent said they had
reduced their food intake for more than
one day during the previous two weeks, especially more expensive
food, such as meat, fish and chicken.
In the West Bank, lack of money and curfews were the main
reasons given. In the Gaza Strip, lack of
money was the main reason given.
[56]
Revised general guidelines regarding the form and contents of
reports to be submitted by states
parties under articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
E/C.12/1991/1.
[57]
Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3,
para 9.
[58]
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 12 (E/C.12/1999/5).
[59]Human
Rights Committee General Comment 27 of 2 November 1999 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9).
[60]Ibid,
para 11, 13, 14 , 15 and 16.
[61]
E/1998/5/Add. 14, paras. 2-5 and E/1990/6/Add. 32, paras 5-8.
[62]
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Additional
information submitted by States parties to the Covenant
following the consideration of their reports by
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Addendum,
Israel, 20 April 2001;
E/1989/5/Add.14, 14 May 2001, para. 3.
[63]
E/C.12/1/Add.27, para. 8.
[64]Ibid.
para. 32.
[65]E/C.12/1/Add.69,
para. 12.
[66]
Palestinian
Centre for Human Rights,
www.pchrgaza.org.,
Closure Update No.38.
[67]
Figures from the Department of Fisheries, Ministry of
Agriculture, Palestinian Authority.
[68]
For example, the killing of Jihad al-Qurini, above.
[69]
Figures
from the Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture,
Palestinian Authority.
[70]
For
example, the killing of Jihad al-Qurini, above.
|
