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Fatah in the presidential castle
·
Dialogue and the search for closed roads
·
The scenario of alternative elections
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The horizons of the call…a look at the future
No two honest observers disagree that the early 2006
Palestinian Legislation Elections were a significant step in the
Palestinian Political Life when Hamas, the biggest symbol of
Palestinian Islamic Movements, decided to enter the political
process for self determination and national political authority over
the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem… this matter gave the Authority a
real plurality instead of the former organizational state, either
within the PLO or the Palestinian National Authority(PNA), whose
style it can be said belongs to the hegemony of the one strong
Political Party type of systems. In the Palestinian case the powers
that be was Fatah tolerating in this process smaller and less
powerful partners, thus less effective in setting goals and making
decisions.
It does make sense in the light of this change and its
consequences, for the strengthening of the Palestinian National
Liberation Movement to take place, because political plurality by
definition means a realignment of the political powers and the
organizational methods with closer adherence to the democratic
principles and rules and its manifestations. In truth, those who
care about plurality and ending the era of the one pole rule with
its control over this national movement with all its complicities ,
were very optimistic for this change. If the hope was for the
involvement of Hamas, with its importance in the national liberation
movement after its ideological conditioning to enrich the
Palestinian Political Scene in general and put an end to this
discrepancy on many levels, most importantly being the differences
between Fatah and Hamas about the aims of the national struggle and
the means to achieve it. And even in the case where the partners in
the regime are not able to agree on all these aims and means, it was
hopped that the involvement of Hamas in the political process from
within will allow for the easiness of going back to the people, to
public opinion, or to the national will through election mechanisms.
These mechanisms will allow for peaceful and democratic separation
between the parties away from the unsubstantiated accusations put
forth that does not reflect the standards of public acceptance or
the level of the overall aspirations of the Palestinian populous.
What is meant is that the acceptance by Hamas of the rules of the
political democratic process lit the hopes of normalcy in the
Palestinian National Movement into two prongs, which will protect it
from the evils of splintering. Between those who are inside the
ruling body and those who are outside it; between the proponents of
peace through pure negotiations and those who favor the armed
struggle that does not exclude violence; between the pragmatic
secularists and the fundamentalist religious ideologues.. Also, this
acceptance lead to the strengthening of the general belief that the
Palestinian polity will get rid of corruption associated with the
era of the one party rule that controls the state, the
administration and the decision making; furthermore , it will be an
incentive for political, economic and administrative reforms, as
well as, the democratic practices in general.
In spite of this, it became evident at the eve of the
general elections, and its unexpected results that some of the
partners have ulterior motives behind welcoming the participation of
Hamas in the heart of the regime after resisting it for long. It
became obvious that the intention from this welcome is to bring
Hamas closer to the circle of rules and regulations that the players
themselves go by, in other words taming Hamas away from its
ideological thought and practices. It appears that this course was
based on the bigger expectation that Hamas will become the
opposition and its troublemaking can be overcome as long as it has
accepted the democratic process.
What was expected by most, with Fatah at the forefront, is
to entice Hamas into the folds of the Palestinian political life as
is, to occupy the post of the opposition from within. Hamas was
expected at the most to be a robust minority, albeit limited, and
its influence can always be circumvented, while Fatah will maintain
a larger role in determining the aims of the national movement and
the means to accomplish them as was the case through out the stages
of Palestinian politics since the mid sixties of the last century,
to be followed by the capitulation of Hamas to the general
Palestinian will, that is to say the will of the majority as
expressed by Fatah. As a result, those who call for political
settlement and nonviolent civil struggle will rid themselves of the
headache that is Hamas and its sisters with their fundamentalist
outlook and believe in armed struggle. For who accepts the
democratic principles has to submit completely to its results.
We think that these expectations motivated many to urge
Hamas to enter the Palestinian Political Authority and stop its
outside medaling…But we realize that since June 2006 the failure of
those who have this agenda, and how instead of closing the curtains
on Hamas by democratic means, it began a new unprecedented era for
the Movement, the PA and the Palestinian National Movement and its
cause not knowing the new rules or how to deal with it.
In fact the elections outcome followed by Hamas forming the
PA'S government and the discourse that took place afterwards in all
departments concerned with the Palestinian situation disappointed
all the expectations: the optimists hoping for a revitalization of
the National movement and the reorganization of the Palestinian
political house in general, and those of the rotten ones, who
thought that they have captured Hamas in the nets of their tactics
forcing it to enter "the House of Obedience" by obeying the afore
mentioned sneaky scenario of the political process. And so Hamas, as
per the will of the voters and democratically, became the one
primarily qualified to take over the seat of the government and the
administration and to control the aims of the PA and the means to
achieve it. As soon as this happened, all that was hidden came into
the open. A reading of the internal Palestinian news and the stands
of concerned individuals with the Palestinian issue in the external
four regions following the day of the elections is enough to point
to this conviction.
What mostly concerns us from this review here is the validity of the
claim that the Palestinian elections has failed to achieve some of
its most important aims and goals. Chief among the justifications
for this belief is the continued appearances of enmity and the
roughness of the discourse and actions between the partners in the
rule as if the elections never took place… In fact there are
indications to an inflammation of these appearances and a downward
slide in the dealings between the two poles of the Palestinian
political life: Hamas and Fatah to the point of using more
frequently and more widely only the languages of force and violence.
It is known theoretically and by proof that the main
advantage of election mechanisms is its ability to force the
competing parties at any level to submit peacefully to the concerned
populous' word as presented at the ballot box, putting aside all
other means, mostly the ones that smells of force and violence. And
so there is no sense in continuing the state of the tug of war in
the Palestinian Scene in spite of employing these mechanisms, as
well as, adding to it the National Dialogue only because it suffers
from a gross error in practicing democratic politics…an error,
maybe, lies in adopting the democratic form without believing in its
jest….agreeing to the judgment of the voters and their decision then
bitterly turn against it, and trying to circumvent it and go against
it by some. That what can be inferred from the sudden and continuous
proposals to the Palestinian Political Scene by President Mahmoud
Abas under the title "a
plebiscite on the Prisoner's Document", then the talk about calling
for early presidential and legislative elections.
FATAH IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CASTLE:
It is hard to fathom the strong argument put forth by the
Palestinian President by which he tried to change the balance of
power inside the PA favoring Fatah's side as opposing that of Hamas
without looking at the mechanisms by which he can bolster his
position under the heading of "the Institution of the presidency".
Moreover, from following the reaction of Fatah to the situation, one
can infer that it saw in the president and the presidency one of the
most important posts inside the PLO and the PA. This explains
Fatah's attempt at bolstering Mahmoud Abas' position inside her as a
means of holding an important and effective pressure cards in
determining the regime's direction, policies and decisions.
Fatah is not the only one to take, and still in, this road
leading the presidency to a face off with the institution of the
Government and the Legislative Council which by virtue of elections
are under the control of Hamas... the disgruntled powers from the
results of the elections and the ascension of Hamas and its role, be
it Israeli, Arabic, or international aided this course. Each one of
them has his own tools ranging from money, propaganda, media,
political and security unsettling, changing of laws, political and
economic boycott, launching protests, and jailing some of Hamas'
ministers and Deputies…
To these tools also belongs what is rumored to be the
buttressing of the presidency with money and loyal troops under its
command, and the strengthening of Fatah by providing political and
electoral advice that is supposed to attract the hearts of the
general public. To it also belong the use of dialogue and the rounds
of discussions, as well as, the process of political taming of Hamas
and it's Governments under the banner of the necessity of accepting
reality and give up the obsession of ideology in the hands of
practical politics.
In the category of putting on notice whoever is concerned
comes the presidential threat of calling for a general plebiscite on
the document of national conciliation at the end of spring 2006,
then the threat of calling for general elections in early winter of
the same year, among the most important to whom it may concern
notice tools regarding the position of the presidency and its
capability to take back the Palestinian Political initiative for
itself, and therefore to Fatah. And here it should be believed that
raising the issue of elections is a result of the President's belief
himself, along with wide sectors of Fatah and allied regional and
international powers that the Palestinian atmosphere is ready to
vote for Fatah in the Legislative institution if the elections are
to be held indeed. We project that this feeling was based on the
reading that Abas' position and his status have gone up inside the
regime as a result of continuous steps taken during Hamas's
government tenure. These steps are but not limited to:
1- The hastening of Fatah to take advantage of its
legislative majority during the last minutes, before being replaced
by the new Hamas Majority, to issue a series of laws and legislative
directives that almost leaves the new inheritor government nothing
of the authority of the previous Fatah Government especially on the
security and political maters. These powers were put in the
presidential basket to grantee Fatah a continuous control of the
nuts and bolts of the Palestinian regime and its important
political, administrative, monitory and security decisions. Knowing
that the direction of strengthening the president verses the
legislature and the government is contrary to what the reformist on
the Palestinian level, among them Abas himself, and internationally
like the granting powers during the last days of the late president
Yasser Arafat's regime. It should be pointed here that the invention
of what is now known as the premiership was one of the tools used to
limit the power of the Authority's presidency!
2- The agreement among the granting powers, that became
denying and boycotters during Hamas' Government tenure, on making
the Palestinian President the principle receiver and maybe the sole
pipe for monitory and economic aid to the PA and its institutions.
And that what granted Abas a big status verses Hamas' Government
which appeared empty handed from necessary resources for its public
support.
3-Presenting President Abas as the almost sole speaker on
behalf of the PA with the outside world, and grating him the liberty
of movement on the Palestinian, Arabic and International levels
verses gigantic limits on Hamas and on its legislative and
governmental members. Abas' agreement over this was evident for none
of them accompanied him on his internal and external tours, in spite
of holding on to the legal stand that "the government assists the
president in accomplishing his task"!...
4- Giving President Abas the presidency of Fatah and its
general leadership. And that in the light of disputes between him
and other historical figures inside Fatah like Ferrous Kadomi.
5- What is being said about American supervision over
buttressing the Presidential Guard Troop by increasing its size and
bolstering its fighting capability and stressing its strict loyalty
to the Palestinian President by budgeting huge resources for these
purposes.
In general these steps and the like lead some to talk about the
Presidency as an idea and an institution almost surpassing what was
for the Palestinian President in general of stature and role during
the tenures of Ahmad Al-Choucairy the founder of the PLO and of
Yasser Arafat with his famous charisma!... What is more important in
this matter is that the proponents of this discourse have shown an
extraordinary care to prop up the qualities of this institution
verses those of the institution that show off Hamas' role and shore
it up as in the Legislative counsel and the premiership. Based on
this it became common to distinguish between the Presidency and the
Premiership; between Mahmoud Abas and Ismail Hanieha; between the
Presidential Guard and the Security Protectorate verses the
Executive Force of the Internal Ministry…this discrepancy is a
deeper sign of disunity within the Authority by talking about two
heads for it with different views, outlooks, programs, aims and
means, one is Fatah's the other of Hamas… the first is moderate open
to both the Arab and international legitimacies, the second is
fundamentalist going in the opposite direction.; the first is
concerned with breaking the siege on the Palestinian People and to
immerse in peace process according to the conditions of the
International Four and the Road Map; the second is not concerned
with these matters and is not responsible for the continuance of the
siege because of his disobedience to these conditions and the Map.
Therefore, it is imperative to solve this dreadful duality either by
national dialogue in order to reach common ground and a national
unity government or by going to the people through a plebiscite or
early elections!
Dialogue and the
search for closed roads:
There are many writings strived to detect the means
used by the opponents of Hamas to spoil its new leading role at the
eve of its election ascension. Some of these writings alluded to the
state of disbelief that struck some symbols in the leadership of
Fatah that lead them to declare honestly there refusal the option of
dialogue with Hamas or entering a national unity government
considering it to be a shame on Fatah. But the elders of Fatah were
not convinced with this vulgarity and were more cautious in their
enmity to the idea of dialogue in the fear of raising Hamas' stock
among the general populous who just got out of an election
experience that can not be taken lightly in its symbolism. And so,
disgruntled they welcomed the idea, after public and rank and file
pressure that considered the National Unity government to be the
best of choices to deal with the siege and the most trusting for
civil peace and national rights.
In fact many rounds of dialogue took
place after national and international initiatives especially from
Cairo. Two important rounds should me mentioned during the regime of
Hamas separated by the issuing of the Prisoner's Document and
signing it on 27-06-2006.
What concerns us from these events
that following them the Palestinian Presidency came out in the open
with what looks like a warning: to go back to the plebiscite after
the failure of the dialogue before agreeing to the accord document,
then going to the early election after disagreeing on the
interpretation of the document itself and how to divide the
authority in one government.
Incidentally, the criticisms that
faced the threat of the plebiscite on the Prisoner's Document, look
a lot like the discourse rose on the possibility of a final settling
on the choice of early elections. Moreover, the reasons and
justification presented by the Palestinian President reinforced by
the discourse of his inner circle within Fatah are very similar to
that given to the idea of the plebiscite. At its core was and still
is "the necessity of the emergence of a government able to attract
external acceptance that leads to ending the siege around the
Palestinian People".
Some of the treatises that justify
the elections, is a long speech presented by president Abas on
16-12-2006. It is considered a total and comprehensive in its
content, we understand that the Palestinian Presidency and Fatah
have lost patience with the ability of reaching successfully the
choice of a National Unity Government. And it is Hamas who is
responsible for the failure of this choice, by sticking to her
sticking to her rigid fundamentalist ideology and her employing
muddy rhetoric for the purpose of not responding to: the Palestinian
Authorities, as represented by the PLO, to the Arabic ones, as in
refusing the Arabic Summit's recommendations in Beirut, and the
International one, as in refusing the three conditions set by the
Group of Four which are: acceptance of Israel, all the
Palestinian-Israeli agreements, and give up terrorism-resistance…
based on this outlook the elections seems to be, or presented as the
savior where the people will say their word, ending decisively the
dialogue of who has the right to go all the way with his program,
outlook and policies…
But the debates and the arguments
that filled the Palestinian Arena, especially the one presented by
Hamas, other groups, and public figures for the way the dialogue was
taking after the signing of the Prisoner's Document critiquing Abas
and his story, gives the impression that the choice of a National
Unity Government was not an impossible goal. It also points the
legal and constitutional pitfalls in going the way of elections and
the political dangers it entails. If the intentions of some were
genuine regarding the choice of the unity government, they would
have shown more patience dealing with it as much as they have shown
when dealing the Israeli enemy, even much less than that. By the
testimony of some just middle men, like Mustapha Barghouti, the
differences between Hamas and Fatah when Abas proclaimed the choice
of elections, the differences do not go beyond disagreement on some
specialties and who is going to in charge of it, solving this needed
only little time and discussion. This matter suggests that one of
the negotiating parties was not serious in accomplishing the unity
government, and negotiations were nothing but throwing dust in the
eyes and that he was negotiating to reach, or try to find a dead
end.
Some of the observers and middle men
confirm the great external pressures applied to the Palestinian
Powers that prevented the consensus over the unity government and
removing the blocks ahead of it. And because there is no cause to
believe that these effective pressures are going to go away in the
near future, the efforts for the resumption of talks will be
extremely hard. This is enforced by the conviction that Israel and
the granting counties responsible for the siege have sided quickly
for the option of elections, and it have no moral deterrent for the
consequences on the social and Palestinian political scenes. And
maybe they are pressuring Arabic forces to line up behind this
alternative in an Arabic atmosphere that allows it. Also, not far
from the mind the pressures by the American Administration to
prevent some Arabic Countries from putting into effect the Arabic
decision to break the siege on the PA and its People issued after
the Arab Foreign Ministers meeting on November last.
The scenario
of alternative elections
In a dense and turbulent atmosphere
because of pulling, differences and poles, the decision maker is
unable to take sudden stands that affect this atmosphere without
making it worse. So wisdom dictates that he prepares for these
stands by what will attract a large segment of the public opinion
away from his political adversaries especially when they own the
intention and the ability to impede decisions. The sequence of
events shows that the Palestinian Presidency and its party were
aware of this conviction when they went the road of the election
alternative. Among them what was pointed to before, namely the
immersion in many rounds of dialogue on the National Unity
Government regardless of true intentions in this matter. But there
are other indications no less important for the beginning
preparations of the Palestinian theater to react positively with the
change to the alternative that is the early elections… before Abu
Mazen's speech, the PLO's executive Committee convened, where Fatah
maintains a position of control and authority lead by Abu Mazen, and
issued a decision that favors elections. This meeting was coincided
with demonstration by branches of the security forces, brought back
to mind the consecutive objections against the un-payment of
salaries, the economic hardship and the political siege against the
Palestinian People and his Authority holding the government of Hamas
responsible where attacks on the Legislative council took place.
Also before the presidential speech an exceptional state of
lawlessness prevailed over the West Bank and Gaza lead to events
that are no less exceptional and tragic…among them the killing of
three children of a Palestinian security official from Fatah with
their driver, the death of a judge who belongs to Hamas, ending with
firing at the Palestinian premier motorcade as he arrived at the
Rafah Crossing that almost ended Hanieha's life on his way back from
an outside trip, and the destruction of part of the Crossing and his
body guard as a result of wide spread rioting.
Also the President's speech was
proceeded a political media campaign where high ranking officials
from Fatah and Hamas exchanged accusations of treason and threats
that warns of open armed clashes, civil war! These hot consecutive
events lead to a belief that there is a scenario to prepare the
Palestinian scene for a hard choice Abu Mazen was avoiding or unable
to take, that is cut short Hamas' legislative tenure and push the
Palestinian society to early elections under conditions that does
not favor Hamas, i.e. hit the iron while it is hot!
Thinking of such a scenario was
common to many after the ascension of Hamas into the position of the
PA's decision making and forming its government. And what was talked
about among those who know that the siege on the government of Hamas
and on the Palestinian people in general, was meant to increase the
people's anger against Hamas and ripen the aspects of tumbling it by
way of a method or another. Thusly, the president's last step
becomes the ending chapter of the fall and rise of Hamas in the
hands of the PA. Or this was the view…
Someone might argue here that the
Palestinian President's decision did not only affect the legislative
tenure of Hamas and its government, but also his own. Thus, he put
his position under the trust of the people. This is true, it is
meant to end the stage of the two warring presidencies inside the PA
and it might lead to rid Abu Mazen from carrying the weight thrown
at him in this stage; as it will lead, when it happens, to the unity
of Fatah, for it will face a decisive battle for its political
strength and its popularity on the presidential and legislative
levels.
But Abu Mazen's call for a
confidence vote from the electorate is not enough to prove his good
intention. For if the aim is to renew this confidence, all the man
had to do is resign. Therefore, linking the call for legislative
elections with a presidential one, aims only to pass the legislative
elections at a bad timing for Hamas economically, socially, and
politically.
The horizons
of the call…a look at the future:
We do not think that the Palestinian
president is unaware on the wide negative echoes that might occur if
he went all the way with his call. These echoes that were not late
to come have left very gloomy Palestinian atmosphere where blood was
spilt and warns of a state of lawlessness and civil strive that is
difficult to mend for any one. And so Abu Mazen's hard line was and
probably will continue to be pliable. He kept the door ajar for the
resumption of national dialogues about other choices ex. "agreement
on a National Unity Government of experts with the aim of lifting
the siege on the Palestinian people". It could inferred from this
that he realizes the size of the difficulties- which might be the
most dangerous- the election alternative will face, most noticeable
is the unhesitant refusal by Hamas for this call, accompanied by
refusal stands adopted by other Palestinian groups partners in the
regime like the Popular Front and the Democratic Front and those who
are not like Islamic Jihad.
And so Abu Mazen's choice is a prayer
call for the resumption of political disagreement rather than
cutting the road before it. More importantly he arose, and will
arise all the issues and warnings that were used for his rejections
since Hamas won the elections of 2006. Among them: it is not
constitutional, because the president does not have the right to
dissolve the Legislative Council before its tenure. And it should
not be resorted to in the light of the internal division between the
two poles of the regime, in fact it might lead the whole society to
a terrifying internal strive. Moreover, insisting on it in spite of
Hamas' position and certainly its boycott, will not put an end to
the multi shaped strive between Fatah and Hamas and their members
and supporters.
Hamas was quick to raise these
contentions, which were anted up by other groups since lifting the
siege does not represent a reasonable goal for any government if the
price is at the heart of the Palestinian rights, and it is shameful
to take advantage of the siege to tame the Palestinian political
scene with all its powers. Other choices must be sought that better
safe guard the political and civil peace, while the enormous
pressure will increase because of disagreement over the electoral
process. Based upon this we might be in the process of a tenuous war
game Abu Mazen wants through it to hurry Hamas up and make clearer
changes away from its outlook and political program. Bolstering this
probability is that the Palestinian president did not set a specific
date to implement the choice of elections. The talk regarding this
is from three to six month. That is a relatively long period during
which it is difficult to control the lawlessness, the repercussions
of the siege or to control the rapid and dangerous nervousness on
the streets between Fatah and Hamas. It will be difficult to bare
the internal Palestinian political rigidness. But it is a period
suitable to reinvigorate and quicken the national dialogue to become
more serious between Fatah and Hamas, with bigger involvement by
other powers and groups which started to refuse lately, before Abu
Mazen's announcement and after it, to be on the fringes leaving the
Palestinian arena a toss up between the two big poles.
Still, the seriousness of the
Palestinian President on calling for early elections should not be
discounted uttering in the open all the contentions against this
act. Here we raise some suppositions:
First supposition: Hamas and other
groups take a stringent stand in their refusal reaching boycott.
That means taking back the Palestinian scene to below square one,
the time when Hamas refused the immersion in the national authority
regime with all what that stand caused in splintering and enmity
between the National and Islamic powers. Of course it will make
matters worse if the boycott was coupled with deeds causing the
failure of the elections, and that is an easy task to a power that
proved its capability and presence on the Palestinian scene with all
its dimensions elections and otherwise. Then, the scene will open
the gates of hell in a way no one will relish the President's move,
neither the possibility of building bridges and trust between the
poles of the Palestinian Politics, in this bloated situation
precious blood will be spilled.
Second supposition: for Hamas and her
sisters inside the open resistance to boycott the elections or to
spoil it as what happened in 1996 in taking the side of the
opposition from outside the regime. Here Hamas will consider that
she took the initiative and cooperated democratically with this
regime but it rejected and failed her. This feeling might lead to
acts of revenge against the state of after the elections, especially
if Fatah, the only alternative ruler in these circumstances, went
ahead in the settlement process under very low national ceiling. In
such an atmosphere it is not expected for such a settlement to pass
by Hamas and the rest of the boycotters who will take her side. The
Palestinian scene will be open then to slander those who, according
to them, sacrificed national goals in return of returning to the
seat of government under the conditions of the Occupying Zionist
Camp in the hope of satisfying him even at the expense of blood and
destiny partners.
Third supposition: for Hamas to
refuse the elections choice under conditions, most important among
them is breaking the siege and relief the Palestinian scene monitory
and economically first. And leave the last word on the political
relief and the settlement conditions to voter's choice. The core of
this picture is that Hamas does not want to go back to the voters,
not because she is not confident of its popular strength but because
of the fear that the ramifications of blitzing the voters with
propaganda connecting her tenure with these miserable conditions. If
these fears are removed, Hamas will cool down and her confidence
will remain in continued popular support under ordinary
circumstances, that of after the siege.
What is obvious that Hamas was not
given a chance in governing, administering and reform internally,
nor she had the right atmosphere to test her mode of dealing with
the occupation externally? But what was tested during her tenure are
the democratic limits of the Authority Partners internally and the
callers for reform and democracy and human and people's rights
externally, and the intentions and the agendas of the international
granting powers, which proved to be nothing more than the theory "
bread for rights".
At any rate there is no confidence in
the Palestinian Presidency's courage and behind it Fatah's camp and
her rank and file in talking again about going back to elections,
nor on their self confidence of winning the hearts of the voters
because of fundamental changes in their internal status. Fatah is
still dealing in the same circle of incidences that slayed a part of
her popularity and lost her the trust of the voters in 2006. This
understanding is enforced by her symbols' trials at beautifying
their speech and their external image. In general Fatah, leadership
and mid level cadre, did not recuperate yet from the signs of power
disease that befell her after the era of Oslo. That disease that
smeared the reputation of many of her symbols by corruption and
internal mismanagement and their quickness to bend before some of
the powers that opposes the Palestinian National Political Rights
externally. Does this mean that the choice of early elections nears
the uncalculated adventure…it may be so.
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