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Preface
Since the departure of the Palestinian President Yasir Arafat
brought about a significant vacuum in the leadership of Fatah, and
the absence of the prominent historical generation of leadership, a
clear vacuum has appeared, too, on the part of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization. This vacancy urged the reconsideration of
the organization not only by the national Palestinian powers in the
organization which had felt the marginalization of their roles, but
also by other resistance factions born outside the organization and
have become effective player on the Palestinian arena like Hamas and
Islamic Jihad .The debate was not due to the demands of some civil
sectors but of Fatah itself who dominated the PLO for four decades.
A silent dispute broke out among the leaders in Fatah which
reflected a double conflict. The first, between the leaders inside
and those on exile, and the other was over the prime position that
determines the Palestinian liberation movement represented by the
PLO. But one can say that only Fatah leaders were basically
interested in the organization whereas other members of the PLO, or
other groups outside the PLO were remotely observing and studying
what was going on inside Fatah but with no
role to play.
After Arafat passed away and Mahmoud Abbas took office as the
head of the Palestinian Authority, talks were held in Cairo and were
devoted to revive calm and truce which the resistance organizations
were previously committed to. Once again the future of the PLO was
included in the agenda in order to reach a comprehensive political
understanding. Sowing down the tension was one of the points
discussed in that understanding and wasn’t the only issue the
meetings would result in , for it was clear that the previously
decided agenda of the talks wouldn’t allow it to be tackled
separately , i.e. Fatah and PA weren’t interested in addressing the
revival and the reform of the PLO in order to make a frontal
frame
that might unify the efforts of the Palestinian factions in the
face of occupation, and put an end to divisions within the
Palestinian national movement. But that question was regarded as a
frame through which the resistance factions, who refused to adjust
the Palestinian National Charter after Oslo Accords and other groups
who don’t belong to the PLO, might be compelled to adopt the formal
political program of the PA and two other strategic and problematic
questions: the recognition of Israel and the attitude towards the
military struggle.
At that time, the PA and Fatah formal leadership and Arab
countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan along side with U.S.A and
the European Union were all interested in adopting and implementing
once again the understandings that led to calm. This implies the
commitment by the Palestinian factions to stop their attacks against
the occupation and the settlers, especially the attacks inside the
Palestinian territories occupied in 1948 since those operations
caused catastrophic impacts on the Zionist entity, especially on the
military, political, and economic scales.
Cairo
Meetings to Revive the PLO
In the light of this agenda, and the priorities of the PA and
Fatah leadership, it was clear that the revival and reform of the
PLO and its institutions had already been agreed upon and can’t be
ignored, and this was the price the PA had to pay so that it would
be possible to renew the understandings of calm which both Israel
and Washington insisted on. The PA responded in order to facilitate
the implementation of the disengagement plan which Sharon decided to
abide by and in order not to imply that the occupation army
withdraws under fire.
The basic principles to reform the PLO were agreed upon. Below
are the most prominent principles:
1-The establishment of a new national council in which all
resistance groups take part, including the factions that don’t
belong to the PLO (namely Hamas and Islamic Jihad).
2-The members of the new national council shouldn’t exceed
300 both inside and abroad.
3- Half of the members of this council should be members of the
legislative council elected by the Palestinian people in Gaza and
the West Bank, i.e. by those whose territories were occupied in
1967.
4-The second half should consist of Palestinians in exile,
specifically those in the neighboring Arab countries.
It was also agreed upon that the way of electing those members
would be discussed later on, and whether the formula would be
through elections or by distributing the seats as shares among the
popular and political organizations and the civil society groups. It
was supposed that the dialogue should have started immediately after
Cairo meetings, in order to put the mechanisms that allow them to
start the process of reforming PLO, and put into action what had
already been agreed upon. But the internal crisis within Fatah and
the PA delayed the implementation of the Cairo understandings.
Thus, it seemed clearly enough that both leaderships of Fatah
and the PA were willing to postpone tackling the revival and the
reform the PLO until after the elections of the Legislative Council.
It was widely believed that two factors were behind the lingering of
PA and Fatah leadership not to be in a hurry:
1- The acute internal crisis that befell Fatah and some groups
inside it refused the option of elections in the occupied
territories and thought that the priority should be given solving
the crisis Fatah and the PA before the revival and the reform of the
PLO. The participation of Fatah, facing an internal crisis, in
implementing Cairo understandings would transfer the crisis into the
organization itself and have adverse effects on the role of the
movement and on the possibility of realizing binding understanding
for all parties in the movement.
2-The results of the Legislative council elections and knowing how
far these results are compatible with promoting the role and power
of Fatah and assuring its leadership of the PLO following the
current example since 1968 when Fatah assumed the leader of the
Organization.
Thus, more than a year and a half passed over, and Cairo
understanding are still of no effect. Moreover, some were convinced
that it was difficult to revive and reform the PLO under increasing
calls inside the Palestinian scene to abandon the right of the
refugees to return. A number of Palestinian leaders, some of them
from Fatah, took part in the meetings which resulted in Geneva
Document between some Israelis and some Palestinians. The revival
and reform of the PLO, while highlighting the prime role of the
refugees and the people in the camps in countries neighboring of
Palestine, would constitute a difficult obstacle in the way of the
efforts aiming at neglecting the right of return as a condition to
achieve a settlement with Israel that might lead to a withdrawal
from large parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Hamas'
Victory Changes the Equation
The elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council and their
surprising results, especially the sweeping victory of Hamas ,
raised the question of reviving and reforming the PLO and was
included on the list of Palestinian concerns, but far more seriously
this time, and in an unprecedented manner, though the motives are
different:
-As Fatah lost both the elections and the authority and, isn't the
leading power in the Palestinian field any more, the movement is
betting now on that revival and reform, making the PLO its main
reference. This might compensate for the loss of authority, and
enable Fatah itself to supervise Hamas performance and impede any
objectives inconsistent with Fatah policies; furthermore, Fatah
hopes to gain the majority in the National council especially the
seats decided for those abroad .There is a consensus on this
question among all Fatah trends .This consensus resulted from the
shock that stroke Fatah after losing the leading authoritative role
it has been playing for forty years.
Hamas, on the other hand, regards the rebuilding of the PLO and
reforming its institutions after the big victory as being a historic
chance that enables it to be the leading power in the PLO in the
coming period, and this opportunity should be seized firmly
whatsoever the price is , and whatsoever the hindrances are.
Undoubtedly, most of the Arab countries, particularly, Egypt,
Jordan and Saudi Arabia which previously encouraged neglecting the
PLO, alongside
U.S.A and the European Community, will encourage the
revival and the reform of the PLO if this eventually leads to the
siege of Hamas and limits its domination in the Palestinian scene
and then forces it to change some of its strategic starting points.
In the light of all mentioned above, the efforts to revive and
reform the PLO receive a considerable backing, and one can say that
this issue would be strongly listed in the future political agenda
in the Palestinian arena. But it would be hard enough to expect
decisive results in this respect very soon, for the results of the
elections created a new political reality which was itself regarded
as an obstacle in the way of reviving the role of the PLO. Hamas
will demand renewing the PLO and all its different institutions;
including the establishment of the National assembly, the Central
Council and the Executive Committee according to the results of the
Legislative Council elections and the level of representation these
elections has showed. Fatah on its part will insist on its position
as it is still the largest faction and will demand bigger share in
these institutions.
This, consequently, will trigger differences that can’t be
easily solved, and may constitute a hindrance that foils all the
effort to revive and reform the Organization keeping the current
situation as it is.
Therfore, one may conclude that the fate of the PLO for the few
coming years will depend primarily on the results brought about by
the assuming of the Palestinian Authority by Hamas Leadership. If
this experience works well, the equation, resulting from the
elections, will be firmly adopted. It may, furthermore, eliminate
the hindrances in the way of building the PLO up again and the
Palestinian national movement as a whole. But if Hamas failed and
Fatah regained Power, this would surely freeze the expected reform
process. Fatah, accordingly, will revive its forty year-adopted
policies. Moreover, the fate of the organization will be
determined by how much most of the national factions, Fatah and
Hamas in particular, see the importance of building the PLO on new
bases to confront the occupation that is still repressing the
Palestinians and threatening their national existence.
Two expected scenarios:
The First scenario:
In the light of all the above mentioned, there are two scenarios:
The First Scenario: The aggrevation of differences between Palestinians and
the failure in reaching common denominators that could be a launch
pad for reviving and reforming the PLO and its institutions. It is
regretful that this scenario is still predominant.
The second scenario: All should agree that the Palestinian Liberation
Organization constitutes the all-inclusive frame to which all
Palestinians resort, and within which they make reciprocal
concessions until they reach a formula that satisfies all parties.
In this context all should agree on some axioms through which they
resort to elections when choosing the members of the Palestinian
National Council as representatives of the Palestinians abroad and
make use of the Iraqi experience in this regard, for it is an
unprecedented experience that might be adopted for urging the
international community to accepts repeating it on the Palestinian
scale, but this scenario obviously faces many important impediments
such as:
1-The possible absence of international support to holding
elections abroad, we witnessed in the Iraqi example. U.S.A itself
called for facilitating the Iraqi elections while most probably the
U.S Administration and the European countries will adopt a quite
different position towards the Palestinians lest they revive the
refugees issue and strongly present it before the international
public opinion; besides, it is against the interests of Israel which
the west used to favor.
2-Most of the Arab governments won't support the option of
elections, firstly because the United States will stand against this
choice, and secondly because this experience could strongly
accentuate the political dimension of the refugees' issue and
highlight it more than ever before, Whereas most of the Arab
countries intend to omit the right of return so that it would be
easier to achieve a compromise that puts an end to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
3- Jordan will be the pioneering
Arab country that opposes the elections not only because it is more
vulnerable to American pressures, but also because half of the
citizens are of Palestinian origin and most of them have the
Jordanian citizenship. Therefore, this would be a good excuse for
Jordan to reject elections or demand being an exception to it.
Anyway, the efforts of reviving and reforming the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, which will witness a new turning point in
the coming period, face many challenges. Following are some
prominent challenges:
-The adjustment of the Liberation organization Charter: After
signing the Oslo Accords, the Organization, in a meeting attended
only by a number of its National Council members held in Gaza
urgently, adjusted its charter in consistence with Oslo agreements.
Today, after the collapse of these agreements, because Israel didn’t
abide by them, and in the wake of the victory achieved by Hamas, who
refuses the recognition of Israel, won the elections of the
Legislative Council, the adjustment of the charter has become a
pressing issue.
The second challenge:
-The acceptance by all sides, particularly Hamas and Fatah, of the
fact that the Palestinian people is still in the National Liberation
stage, and that the question of authority is symbolic as long as the
majority of the territorries and the Palestinian people are
suffering from the occupation .This necessitates establishing a wide
national front containing all resistance factions and effective
representatives of the Palestinian people. The basic function of
this front is to lead the national struggle in its various forms in
order to defeat the occupation and provide all means of victory in
the national battle. This implies that the major factions must halt
their dominating policies and stop behaving as if the Palestinian
people were liberated, and as if the only remaining issue were
"authority" and how to manage it. Ignoring the fact of the
occupation and giving the priority to the "conflict over authority"
whether through elections or any other means, will definitely
deviate and mislead the Palestinian struggle. Then the first winner
will be Israel, and the main loser will be the Palestinian people
and its national movement.
-All must be convinced that the renewal of the Liberation
Organization on new bases could unify the Palestinian people
internally and abroad under one national leadership. This seems to
be an important development and could be used to stop all attempts
of eradication aiming at neglecting the right of the refugees to
return.
-Both the PLO and PA should review the provisional nature of their
politics. This provisional nature, which is based on relinquishing
the right of the return, has failed not only because the refugees
constitute the majority of the Palestinian People, but also because
it ignored their destiny and left it undetermined, whereas the
periodicity which is based on a long- term truce, that lasts for
tens of years after restoring the occupied territories doesn't take
into consideration two basic issues:
-First, the sacrifices exerted by the Palestinian People at least
since 1967, for the sake of liberating Palestine and restoring all
usurped rights.
-Second, ignoring the issue of the refugees again and the
satisfaction with were refusing to neglect their right of return in
principle as it is well acknowledged that stopping the combat for a
long time wouldn’t be much different from erasing the right of
return which some Palestinian groups overly used to call for.
A new Interim Program
According to the above mentioned, the Palestinian national
factions, while trying to open a dialogue over the reform of the
PLO, have to propose a new program that takes into consideration
another completely different periodicity that meets the aspirations
and interests of the Palestinians in all areas especially, the
refugees. This could be realized if the PLO adopts a program based
on some indisputable points:
-
The call to implement the resolutions of the United Nation General
Assembly, 194 and 181 in particular, because these resolutions
ensure the right of the refugees to return to their houses in the
Palestinian territories occupied in 1948.
-
If Israel implements these resolutions completely without any
deviation, the recognition of Israel would be possible on this
base, for the majority of the population in this state would be of
the Arab Palestinians!
-
This periodicity allows communication with the International
community and embarasses the major powers that allege their
commitment to the International legitimacy.
As an implication of these axioms, the program of reviving and
reforming the PLO must take into consideration and observe a series
of important issues:
1- All must be convinced that the principal reform must start from
the top, i.e. from the central institutions of the organization,
specifically the National Council, the Executive committee, and the
central council.
2-All must agree that reform is not an administrative decision and
its fate has nothing to do with any decision taken by any
organization howsoever big or important it is, but it is an outcome
of several political and objective conditions like the balance
inside the national movement. Reform has been difficult for the last
forty years because of the absence of the balances that promote
reform and regard it as an inevitable option and prevent domination
and dictatorship.
3- Now, notwithstanding Hamas ability to handle authority, and Fatah
ability to regain it, it is certain that neither Fatah can restore
its previous position that allowed domination and dictatorship, nor
can Hamas ignore the power of Fatah and its ability to constitute a
permanent censorship force that can prevent Hamas from repeating the
experiences Fatah had previously fallen in.
4-This balance, which constitutes an outcome of along historic
national work that stored various complicated and revolutionary
methods put the Liberation movement and the Palestinian National
Movement before two options: either being inflicted by an ever most
dangerous crisis that leads to the disintegration of the national
movement and then causes the Liberation Organization fall apart and
vanish away, or establishing a new Liberation Organization founded
on intellectual, political, and national bases which from those the
Organization had been founded upon during the last forty years.
Moreover, this organization could be an umbrella under which all
people are mobilized within a unifying national frame that is based
on the unity of all colors in the Palestinian National movement
spectrum.
5-Though the threat of disintegration is still existing, and there
are ample evidence that emphasize that, the occupation and the
severe oppression the Palestinian people suffer from and all the
transformations for the sake of the resistance in the region, could
lessen the impacts of this danger and urge the necessity of building
a front in the face of it.
6- No one can ignore all the transformations that Fatah witnessed
while looking at the future of the PLO, especially after the
eruption of Al-Aqsa uprising and the death of Yasir Arafat. These
transformations point at three basic facts closely related to the
future of the Palestinian National Movement and eventually to the
future of PLO:
-The first fact: The emergence of a trend that undertakes
resistance and military struggle and doesn't bet much on the
political process and the approach of negotiations .This trend, in
addition, represents the most effective and active force among the
bases and cadres of Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
-The second fact: The trend that rejects Intefada and despises the
military struggle is losing power and has become the weakest group
inside Fatah.This situation could help and facilitate the reform and
the reconstruction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization only
if the trends inside Fatah are maturely and reasonably addressed.
-The third fact: The birth inside Fatah of a moderate trend which
contributes to the weakening of the compromising and submissive one,
and is able to better understand the facts of the new stage, be it
on the Palestinian level or on the level of understanding the
internal situation in Fatah, and the requirements of rebuilding the
Palestinian Liberation Organization.
7-The problems of reforming and rebuilding the PLO in such
circumstances could be objectively solved if all parties in the
national movement adhere to these principles:
The first principle:
the necessity to agree on a new program that settles the differences
in the viewpoints .A program that takes into consideration
transition based on the commitment to the implementation of the two
resolutions of the UN 194 and 181, and the complete withdrawal to
the borders of June 4th 1967,and finally the recognition
of Israel constitutes the greatest common denominator that joins all
factions around joint points that maintain the whole rights of all
Palestinian factions.
-The second principle: the acceptance of the principle of
"proportional representation", which could be a reference for the
establishment of different offices of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization. The results of the elections and the distribution of
votes among the resistance factions and other groups of the national
work could be a standard by which the seats for each faction could
be determined in the new National Council and other institutions of
the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
- The third principle: Distributing the shares and the seats of PLO
institutions between those inside and outside the territories,
according to the numerical proportion, i.e. the share for the
diaspora is parallel to the Palestinians population abroad, as
compared to those who are still living in historical Palestine.
Any way, one can say that the Palestinian arena, after AL-Aqsa
uprising (2000) and until the victory of Hamas in (2006) elections,
witnessed a series of transformations that put the Palestinian
Liberation Organization on a crossroad .These transformations,
besides put the Palestinian arena for the first time, before options
of equal opportunities. These options range between disintegration,
deterioration, internal fighting, and reforming the Palestinian
Liberation Organization and make it capable of facing the challenges
that confront the Palestinian people, where opportunities become
equal for the first
time. |
