Ever since the announcement of the
establishment of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948, there have been
successive battles between the Arabs and the Israelis. And since in all
these wars the Jews have had the upper hand, the Arabs have not been
able to achieve their stated aim, namely, to preserve what remains of
the territory of Palestine and to recover what has been taken away from
them by the Israelis. In the course of these wars against the Arab
armies, the Jews have practiced the most heinous forms of terrorism,
including murder, terrorization of Palestinians or of the war captives
they had taken. Nor should we fail to mention that Israel is tantamount
to a military state which is unable to survive without an army and a
military apparatus, for which reason it devotes most of its efforts,
capacities and resources to its military establishment. Moreover, it is
an entity which is in constant search of power, having fallen prey to an
obsession with superiority, terrorization of enemies, and brooking no
potential challenge to its authority. As such, Israel may be seen as a
military outpost which attempts to express itself through the practice
of destruction, bloodshed, demolition of people's homes, forced
expatriation of the inhabitants of Palestine, and striking fear in the
hearts of young children. Its entire history, including even the period
prior to 1948, has been a bloody one.
If we attempt here to read the gory history of Zionism on the basis of
the Israeli-Arab wars, we are merely pausing at points of obvious
transition in the history of the struggle between us and the sons of
Zion. Therefore, a distinction may be made between these events and
others which have been marked by less violence and fury, yet without
losing sight of the fact that Zionist terrorism during all phases of our
struggle with the occupying enemy has been essentially a single
phenomenon with varying manifestations.
The War of 1948
Simultaneously with the Palestinians'
loss of control over affairs due to their lack of a leadership capable
of unifying their forces and organizing their efforts to oppose Zionist
aspirations, and as a result of Britain's insistence upon fulfilling the
Balfour Declaration of 1917 and its having adopted policies in support
of the Jews in their efforts to take control of the Palestinian lands
and to resist Palestinian revolts aimed at preventing this from
occurring, Britain undertook in 1937 to propose a division of Palestine
into two states, one of them Jewish and the other Arab, with Jerusalem
and Haifa to remain under the supervision of the mandate power. However,
this proposal met with rejection on the part of both Arabs and Jews (1).
In 1939, Britain issued a white paper in which it announced "that our
commitments toward the Jews and toward British national interests cannot
justify the government's continuing to develop the Jewish homeland
further than the point it has already reached. Hence, it is no longer
possible to develop said homeland without the use of unjustified force"
(2). With the outbreak of World War II (1939-1945) and British
preoccupation with said war, the Jews intensified their efforts to
establish their foothold in Palestine, and it became clear that the
Zionist project to establish a homeland for the Jews in the land of
Palestine was on its way to realization. The issue of Palestine appeared
on the agenda of the Arab states during preparation for the
establishment of the Arab League, and Arab leaders who met in Alexandria
toward the end of 1944 reached an agreement to the effect that Palestine
was a fundamental key to the survival and welfare of Arab nations as a
whole. In a special appendix attached to the Arab League Charter, stress
is laid on the importance of independence for Palestine as an Arab
country. Between September 16-19, 1947, a meeting was held in Sofar,
Lebanon to discuss the Palestinian issue. It was decided at this meeting
that a standing technical committee would be set up with its
headquarters in Cairo, to study the defense requirements of Palestine,
and that one million Egyptian pounds would be set aside to aid the Arabs
of Palestine. The Arab League Council met once again on October 7, 1947,
with the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon
and Iraq all in attendance. The Council issued a resolution to offer
necessary aid to the Arabs of Palestine for the purpose of enabling them
to defend themselves. The funds needed for this purpose were to be
allotted with the understanding that they would be dispersed by a
special committee. Moreover, the resolution stated that "Arab states
shall take military precautionary measures along the borders of
Palestine, with those countries adjacent to Palestine doing everything
necessary to facilitate cooperation in fulfilling this same duty on the
part of non-adjacent states" (4). It was likewise decided that a
military committee headed by Major General Isma'il Safwat would be
formed to recruit and arm Arab volunteers and to lay plans for rescuing
Palestine. The committee established its headquarters in Damascus and
set up a military training camp in Qutna, near the Syrian capital.
On November 26, 1947, the United Nations passed its resolution to
partition Palestine, with the General Assembly voting on the same day on
a resolution to end the British mandate over Palestine as of May 1,
1948. The political committee of the Arab League convened in Cairo
between December 12-18, 1947, during which time it issued the following
resolutions:
1. That the governments and peoples of
all Arab nations would stand by Palestine until it had achieved its
freedom.
2. That the partition resolution would be rejected.
3. That the parties to the resolution would go into battle in order to
prevent partition from taking place.
4. That the principles espoused by the UN and their ramifications for
the Holy Land, which is to be ruled by justice and equality among all
races, must be respected and acted upon.
In addition, the political committee of the Arab League held a meeting
on April 10, 1948 in Cairo; however, this meeting led to no appreciable
results (5).
As a result of the failure of some governments to deal effectively with
the Palestinian problem, numerous Arab capitals witnessed protest
demonstrations which quite alarmed the governments of the countries
concerned. A general strike was declared in Beirut on February 16, 1948
to force the Lebanese government to intervene militarily. A public
strike was likewise called in Damascus a week later, once the news of
the Zionist occupation had reached Haifa. And students in Baghdad went
on a hunger strike in hopes of obliging the Iraqi army to move toward
Palestine (6).
A meeting was held in the Jordanian capital on April 23, 1948, and which
was attended by a number of governmental ministers from both Jordan and
other Arab states. It was determined in this meeting to send Arab
standing armies to Palestine as soon as the British mandate had ended,
and those in attendance assigned Chiefs of Staff in the various Arab
states to carry this out (7).
The political committee of the Arab League, which held a meeting on
April 24, 1948, endorsed the resolutions issued from Amman.
Moreover, consistent with these resolutions, the Arab states decided on
May 15, 1948 to mobilize their armies to enter Palestine and to achieve
its independence. The mobilization then got under way, including the
"Holy War Army" which had been established by the Supreme Arab Council
with the assistance of the Arab states. In addition, the "Rescue Army",
composed of Arab volunteers, was mobilized under the leadership of Fawzi
al-Qawqaji, and all the armies thus mentioned were placed under the
command of King Abdullah bin al-Husain, the then king of Eastern Jordan.
In still another meeting, held in Baghdad on May 9, 1948, a decision was
made to establish a general command for the Arab standing armies, to be
placed under the leadership of Major General Nour al-Din Mahmoud. The
political committee of the Arab League confirmed this appointment at its
meeting held in Damascus on May 11, 1948 (8).
Top
The Military Situation Immediately
Preceding the War
The military situation preceding the war
was not an auspicious one for the Arabs and the Palestinians, who were
not in a state of readiness for a battle such as the one which awaited
them. In fact, preparing to expel the occupying Jews from the land of
Palestine was the furthest thing from their minds. They had not as of
yet developed a sense of national security, or of the need to defend
their collective or individual interests against foreign aggression. A
central cause for this was their having been under the influence and
control of certain Western states, whose aid they had come to depend on
in directing both their internal and external affairs. The Jews, by
contrast, had begun readying themselves to ward off a potential attack
by the Arabs and to build their own state in the land of Palestine from
the time they started migrating and settling in Palestine. Moreover,
they had found a ready helper in the British mandate forces, which
provided them with protection and support which further enabled them to
build up their defensive and military capabilities.
a) The Arab and Palestinian Military
Situation
1. The "Holy War" forces
After the partition resolution was issued by the UN, the Arab Council
brought together the Holy War forces, assigning their leadership to Abd
al-Qadir al-Husaini on December 22, 1947. In addition, Kamal Uraiqat, a
former officer in the Palestinian police force was appointed
Vice-Commander, while Qasim al-Rimawi was appointed Secretary and Dawud
al-Husaini was appointed General Inspector. The Arab Council undertook
responsibility for funding their forces, whose command headquarters were
to be located in Bir Zeit (9).
However, these forces lacked training, order and discipline due to the
inability of their command to organize and develop them into an
effective fighting force. Their weapons were a hodgepodge of
lightweight, out-of-date arms, which in some cases did not even have
sufficient ammunition (10).
These forces consisted of "recruits" who made up the mobile force, and
stationery fighters to be stationed in Palestinian villages and cities
(11).
2. Local Palestinian Garrisons
The local Palestinian fighters were organized into small fighting units,
with each unit being connected to a local commander who depended on aid
and support from inhabitants of neighboring villages for any military
operations in which he might engage. These units lacked organization and
military training, and in the cities there grew up local defensive
organizations whose function was to protect Arab neighborhoods.
Moreover, in the major cities a "national guard" was formed under the
supervision of the local national committees which, like the forces
mentioned above, lacked military organization and training. Yet despite
the condition of these poorly-prepared, poorly-armed local forces, it
was these forces which bore the lion's share of the burden in the war
against the Jews during this period.
3. The Rescue Army
As has been mentioned, a military committee was set up to recruit, train
and arm volunteers after the meeting held by the council of the Arab
League and its political committee. The first step undertaken by the
military committee was to call upon all able-bodied Arab youth to take
up arms and join the liberation army which it had called "The Rescue
Army". The army was to be led by the aforementioned Isma'il Safwat
(Iraq), with the administrative assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Mahmoud
al-Hindi (Syria), and with military operational assistance from Major
Shawkat Shuqair (Syria) and President Wasfi al-Tell (Jordan). Major Taha
al-Hashemi (Iraq) took on the position of General Inspector as well as
responsibility for training and organization (12).
Recruiting for the Rescue Army began on a large scale in the beginning
of 1948, and those who came forward as volunteers included people from
many different walks of life: former soldiers and officers, school boys,
junior employees, farmers, laborers, and others who were moved by a
sense of national loyalty. Detachments were formed from particular
regions or cities, such as the Aleppo Detachment, the Lebanese
Detachment, the Euphrates Detachment, the Arab Mountain Regiment, the
Hamawite Detachment, the Circassian Detachment, the Ildibite Detachment,
the Jordanian Detachment, the Bedouin Detachment, the Yugoslavian
Detachment, and so forth. (A group of Yugoslavian Muslims volunteered to
fight in Palestine.) (13)
This hodgepodge of volunteers received rudimentary training in the Qutna
camps near Damascus, training which was insufficient to prepare them to
take part in a true war, and they were armed with a motley array of
weapons, some of which were out-of-date and no longer even functional,
while others had no ammunition available for them (14). Hence, as a
consequence of this non-homogeneous array of irregular forces, chaos
reigned over the "Rescue Army". A soldier who was not satisfied with his
regiment or detachment might simply flee to another more to his liking
(15).
4. The Irregular Arab Volunteers
Detachments and regiments of volunteers were formed to come to the
defense of the Arab, Islamic identity of the land of Palestine. Some of
these joined the Rescue Army, while others cooperated with the "Holy
War" forces and still others worked independently. These detachments and
regiments were named according to the regions or cities from which their
members came (16). The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood took part in all
aspects of the struggle on behalf of Palestine, and they were assisted
by Muslim Brothers from Egypt. The leader and founder of the Muslim
Brotherhood, Sheikh Hasan al-Banna, sent a telegraph on October 9, 1947
to the Arab League Council telling them that he was prepared to send
10,000 fighters to Palestine, and more later on. However, the severe
restrictions placed on the Brotherhood by the Egyptian government caused
their participation to be limited. The Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan
likewise took part in the defense of the Islamic land of Palestine by
establishing a committee to gather contributions and aid, and by forming
a detachment of brothers from the Amman area and its environs composed
of approximately 120 fighters (17).
The Brothers of Iraq played a significant role in the struggle alongside
their compatriots from various other Arab countries by mobilizing the
masses for the struggle on behalf of Palestine. Two regiments, the
Husain regiment and the Qadisiya regiment, as well as the Commando
Detachment and others, were made up entirely of volunteers. Whenever a
group of them were trained, they would be sent to the military committee
in Damascus. In addition, many Iraqi brothers who fought as part of the
Rescue Army took part in the regiments who participated in the struggle.
These same fighters saw firsthand the weakness and mismanagement of the
leadership. Nevertheless, they did their best in the battles which they
entered, particularly in North Palestine (18).
Top
Arab and Zionist Strategy in the 1948 War
Arab Strategy:
The Arabs did not have a clearly defined strategy with respect to the
Palestinian cause and bringing a stop to Zionist expansion in Palestine.
Moreover, conflicts among various Arab states were at their height.
Former British foreign minister, Douglas Hume, described the Arab
strategy during that period, saying, "And since the Arabs were
continuously without a strategy, there was no clarity or sense regarding
what the Arabs needed to do in the land which they call 'Palestine'"
(19).
The Arab armies which participated in the war were not, in fact,
prepared to enter into a full-scale war with the Zionist forces. After
the Egyptian parliament voted to have Egypt take part in the Palestine
war, Ahmad Sidqi Pasha commented on the decision, asking, "And is the
army ready?" The pasha's question aroused a storm of ridicule, in
response to which the then-president of Egypt, al-Naqrashi, stated, "I
bear responsibility for the army's readiness to take part in the
fighting." However, one need look no further for evidence of the
Egyptian army's lack of readiness than the fact that the Egyptian
ground-force commander, Colonel Muhammad Naguib, raised his voice in
warning, announcing to his superiors that no more than four battalions
out of the two brigades which had been brought together in al-Arish were
actually ready to fight. As for Rear Admiral Ahmad Ali al-Nawawi's
response to Muhammad Naguib's warnings, it was for naught. For there
occurred no true fighting nor even resistance (20). Speaking of events
of the war of !948 in his capacity as the General Commander of the Arab
armies, King Abdullah, King of Jordan mentions that he was not even
given permission to visit the Egyptian sites. He states, "We traveled to
Egypt during that phase of the truce and presented what information we
had. But when we asked the late al-Naqrashi Pasha to visit the Egyptian
supreme command headquarters in Palestine, he replied that this wouldn't
be fitting given the fact that His Majesty (i.e., King Farouq) hadn't
visited the front himself" (21). His Majesty (King Abdullah) also points
out that the Arab intervention in the 1948 war was nothing but a
charade, saying, "Then there was the Arabs' military pretense in the
1948 war in Palestine; the rushed decision to send in forces which their
own leaders had determined not to be sufficient; a leadership with no
real unity to speak of; the refusal to allow the General Commander to
inspect the very forces he had been told were under his authority; then
the Arab armies' entry into Palestine only to stand by helpless, until
it was all followed by the truce in Rhodes and what everyone knows by
now about the way things were" (22).
As for the Iraqi army, it was in no better condition than was that of
Egypt, as it entered Palestine without maps (23). Glubb Pasha, who had
taken over command of the Arab army, did not intend to give his men
orders to head toward Tel Aviv or the Mediterranean Sea, having given
strict orders to his British officers to remain within the regions set
aside for the Arabs based on the 1947 partition line. His plan called
for leaving his soldiers along the length of the rugged mountain area
overlooking the coastal plain, and to move them from one location to
another whenever necessary in order to stop any Jewish advance which
might attempt to penetrate the mountain passes (24).
The Arabs were not fully prepared for such an encounter. After the
British mandate over Palestine came to an end, the then-Secretary
General of the Arab League declared that "the Arab nations hadn't been
expected to commit themselves to fighting" (25). If one needs evidence
of the Arab nations' misassessment of the situation, including the
assessments made by their political and military leaders, one need look
no further than the condition of the Arab armies which were pressed into
a battle that had been lost before it began, and for which they were not
prepared (26).
The Zionist Strategy
When the 1948 War began, Zionist terrorist elements had drastically
increased their criminal activities and Zionist military preparations
were moving ahead full swing, including the preparation of arms and
amassing needed man power. As for the Arab intervention in Palestine, it
came only after the Zionist terrorist forces had made full preparations
for this event, having laid a clearly defined strategy to meet this
critical phase (27).
More specifically, the Zionist strategy depended upon the following:
1. A policy of building colonies in outlying regions and holding onto
them at any price, since such colonies could serve as locations to which
some, at least, of the Arab population could be transferred if they
proved to be creating pressure upon Jewish centers. In this way, such
colonies could be made use of as operations bases for gang activity
behind enemy lines.
2. Avoidance of any clash with British forces lest such a clash hinder
or delay plans for evacuation of the latter. The aim behind war
operations was to destroy the center of the British forces and their
sense of safety, and to convince them that without agreement on the part
of the Jews, Britain would not be able to keep Palestine as a safe,
useful base of operations in this vital region.
3. Working toward creating ground communication within each region under
Jewish control so as to achieve security by means of internal
communication, and to provide the man power and the military situation
needed to counter Arab threats.
4. Focusing on the continuation of Jewish immigration to Palestine. This
was among the most important goals of the Israeli strategy during this
phase, since immigration used to take place by sea or land, as well as
by means of clandestine flights into the country. Between 1945 and 1948,
the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine came to 100,000 (28).
On the basis of such an overview of the Arab and Israeli strategies, one
may say that the Arab states and their armies were neither prepared for
nor capable of dealing effectively with the Palestinian problem. Not
only so, but they appear to have either been unaware of, or to have
ignored, the possible consequences of the situation as it was at that
time, as a result of which most of the territories of Palestine were
lost during this war. The Jewish side, by contrast, was fully aware of
and prepared for any sudden move which the Arabs might make, and hence
had laid plans and established mechanisms by means of which it could
take over Palestine.
Armament and the Size of the Arab Forces
Armament was one of the most pressing
problems which faced the Arab forces in Palestine. The British mandate
government had denied Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the region the
right to carry, use or acquire arms, and passed strict laws concerning
who could or could not carry or acquire weapons (29). The military
committee of the Arab League sought without success to purchase arms and
ammunition from Europe, after which it turned to Arab states, asking to
purchase the following amounts of arms and specifying that it needed
1,000 shots for each rifle.
- Iraq, 2,000 rifles
- Syria, 2,000 rifles
- Saudi Arabia, 2,000 rifles
- Egypt, 2,000 rifles
- Jordan, 1,000 rifles
- Lebanon, 1,000 rifles
Some of the Arab states were remiss in sending what had been asked of
them, as a consequence of which by February 8, 1948, the military
committee in Damascus had received no more than 4,110 rifles out of a
total of 10,000 ordered, and no more than 189,000 shots out of a total
of 1,000,000 requested. According to the clandestine reported submitted
by Lieutenant Colonel Isma'il Safwat to the Secretariat General of the
Arab League, the military committee had received 9,000 rifles and
3,860,000 shots [? - see p. 11, "D-1"}, as well as a number of machine
guns from the various Arab states (30). The Syrian government had
contracted with a Czechoslovakian arms manufacturing company to purchase
10,000 rifles, 2,000 machine guns and 12.5 million shots. However, the
shipment never arrived, since it was discovered by Zionist intelligence
and confiscated while it was still on the high seas (31).
As for the Arab forces which took part in the war of 1948, their
composition was as follows:
-the Egyptian army, approx. 10,000 soldiers
-the Iraqi army, approx. 3,000 soldiers
-the Jordanian army, approx. 4,500 soldiers
-the Syrian army, approx. 3,000 soldiers
-the Lebanese army, approx. 1,000 soldiers (32)
-the Palestinian Holy War forces, approx. 8,000 soldiers
-the Rescue Army forces, 3,000 soldiers
Top
Armament and the Size of the Zionist
Forces
After World War II, the Jewish Agency
sought to buy the equipment needed to establish arms industries from
America and Europe and smuggle it into Palestine. In January, 1946 a
delegation from the Jewish "Hagana" gang went to the United States to
purchase American-made equipment, while the Jewish Agency established
four ghost companies for the purpose of purchasing whatever arms and
other war machinery they might need. It managed to buy fifty devices for
measuring the caliber of fire arms, and approximately two thousand other
war-related machines which were shipped to Palestine in the fall of
1947, then smuggled to Jewish colonies. In addition, it established a
department devoted to the new war production enterprise, for which 3.2
million Palestinian pounds were earmarked for the manufacture of regular
and miniature machine guns, revolvers and shots of ammunition. A
parallel project was likewise set up by the name of "Chemical
Enterprises" in Kufr Viticin and in Pardis Ibrilia near the Ramat Ghan
colony for the purpose of producing explosives. At the same time, Hagana
agents set up clandestine storage depots for arms which had been
purchased in Marseilles, Toulouse and Ville de France in the south of
France and in Italy until they could be smuggled to Palestine. The first
shipment arrived in the winter of 1947 and contained 3,000 "Burne"
artillery pieces, 2,000 English and German rifles, 400 machine guns, 500
revolvers, and 1,500,000 shots of ammunition (33).
The Zionist leadership in Palestine began establishing military
industries secretly during the 1940's, and the Eilon Establishment for
war industries near the Rahoufoun colony began producing rounds of
ammunition in 1946. By the end of September, 1947, this factory had
produced nearly two million shots for the "Stevy" machine gun, while in
the years 1940 and 1946, the other war factories produced approximately
100 2-inch-caliber mortar artillery pieces and 44,500 shells of the same
caliber. In the period between 1946 and the fall of 1947, these same
factories produced 8,800 machine guns, while the Mills hand grenade
factory in the Tell Mound colony produced 53,000 grenades during the
same period (34).
Zionist war factories then began producing arms and ammunition in large
quantities, and as of the spring of 1948, the number of technical and
non-technical employees in these factories had reached approximately
500. These factories expanded to produce mines of all types; in
addition, they began producing the Barghouth cannon with a 100-meter
range, and the Davidka bomber which was used for the first time in the
attack on the Abu Kabir neighborhood of Jaffa on March 13, 1947 (35).
Hagana agents were able to ship 215 tons of arms by sea from Italy to
Palestine during the first two months of 1948, and a 320-ton shipment on
May 4, 1948 which contained 96 tons of TNT, 223 machine gun artillery
pieces, 1,535 rifles and 3.5 million bullets. These same agents managed
to ship 50 65-mm cannons and 250 "Sato" machine gun artillery pieces
from the Marseilles port to Tel Aviv, with the shipment arriving on May
13, 1948. The Jewish Agency purchased a number of Toursamin cargo
aircraft from among the war materiel left by the American in West
Germany. These were flown by pilots from places outside Palestine to
Holland, where they were repaired, renovated, then taken to Tel Aviv on
May 2, 1948, filled to capacity with arms and ammunition (36).
In the meantime, and despite the plentiful supply of arms in the hands
of the Zionists, the Hagana gang spared no effort to purchase arms from
the British forces stationed in Palestine as well as from local
merchants, their aim being to minimize the quantities of arms available
to the Arabs (37). As for the make-up of the Zionist forces which took
part in the 1948 war, it was as follows:
-20,000 fully trained, fully armed soldiers
-10,000 fully trained, partially armed soldiers
-30,000 partially trained, unarmed soldiers
-60,000 soldiers belonging to the Hagana gang
-70,000 soldiers belonging to the Irgun terrorist group, some of whom
were armed (38).
By means of such a comparison between the sizes of the Arab and Israeli
forces which took part in the war of 1948, it can be clearly seen that
the Israeli forces outnumbered the Arab forces by a ratio of 3 to 1, in
addition to the fact that the Jewish army was highly experienced, well
organized and well trained.
Top
Events of the War
The Arab armies entered Palestine at midnight on May 15, 1948 from
several different points with the intention of striking the Zionist
forces and thereby preserving the Arab, Islamic identity of Palestine
and securing its independence. The Rescue Army had by this time already
entered Palestine, while the Holy War army, Egyptian fedayeen, and
groups of local fighters also took part in confronting the Zionists. At
this point in the fighting, the Arab armies took the form of an
offensive force on several different fronts. The Arab semi-regular
forces played the role of assistant to the regular Arab armies, while
the Zionist forces resorted to a kind of offensive defense based on
centers of resistance made up of the inhabitants of Jewish colonies and
other population centers located near the areas of fighting. These were
prepared to contain and wear down Arab attacks, thereby creating
circumstances conducive to the success of counter-attacks against the
regular brigades (39).
The Arab offensive was divided into the following areas:
1. The Lebanese Front (The
Northern Front)
The plan set forth by the Supreme Arab Command called for the Lebanese
army to advance from the cape of Naqourah along the coastal road
extending from Naqourah to Akka. Following this, the Lebanese forces
advanced toward the villages of Malikiah and Qudus and took control of
them, opening the way toward the Jordan Valley in the direction of the
Hawla lake. They were aided by the Rescue Army forces led by Fawzi al-Qawqaji,
which penetrated into the Galilee region between Safad and Akka. Their
missions also included that of occupying the Oudid units scattered
throughout the Western part of the "Galilee Finger", supporting the
Syrian army and the Rescue Army as they attacked Jewish settlements, and
repelling attacks by the Yaftah brigade which had scattered throughout
the interior of the "Galilee Finger" as a reserve mobile offensive
force.
2. The Syrian Front (The Northern Front)
In view of the lack of a direct geographic link between Galilee and
Syrian territories, the General Command of the Arab forces decided to
send the Syrian army across the Lebanese-Palestinian borders to work
with the Lebanese army and the Rescue Army, and with groups of
Palestinian fighters scattered throughout Galilee. At the same time, a
number of Syrian formations remained inside Syrian territory, spreading
out along the Syrian-Palestinian borders. Meanwhile, the Syrian forces
advanced toward and took over the town of Simah located to the southeast
of Lake Tiberias, causing the Zionists to evacuate some of their
settlements nearby. The Syrian forces were repelled in attacks which
they launched on some other Jewish settlements. However, they were able
to occupy the colony of Mishmar Hiyardun, which in turn facilitated
contact with the Lebanese forces and the Rescue Army.
3. The Jordanian Front (The
Eastern Front)
Prior to the outbreak of the 1948 War, units of the "Jordanian Corps",
later known as the Jordanian Army, were already scattered throughout
Palestine. When the war commenced, other Jordanian forces also moved to
Palestine across bridges spanning the Jordan River. The Arab Command
assigned the Jordanian Army and the semi-regular forces operating in the
central part of Palestine to prevent the Zionists from expanding their
occupation of Jerusalem, to frustrate their efforts at opening a way
between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and to protect the villages and cities
located within the "Arab state" as per the 1947 partition lines.
Consequently, the Jordanian Army advanced into the regions set aside for
the Arabs and set up camp in the cities of Lid and Ramleh. With respect
to Jerusalem, the Jordanian Army overtook the Atarout settlement located
in the north of the city as well as the Misrara region, then blockaded
the Jewish quarter until it surrendered. The Jordanian forces likewise
attempted to blockade West (New) Jerusalem, but without success. Even
so, the way was opened for the Jordanian forces to meet the Egyptian
forces in Bethlehem after the Iraqi forces overtook the Nabi Ya'qoub
settlement.
4. Operations of the Iraqi Army
(The Eastern Front)
Before the war began, an Iraqi brigade of
infantrymen reinforced by artillery and armored cars had already arrived
in the eastern region of Jordan and had gathered in Mafraq to the south
of Irbid. On May 14, 1948, the units of this brigade spread out along
the Jordanian-Palestinian borders on the heights located to the south of
the point where the Syrian-Palestinian-Jordanian borders converge, and
which overlooks the southern portion of the Tiberias plain. The primary
mission of this force was to cross the Jordan river at the Majami'
Bridge and to advance westward along the left wing of the Syrian forces
assigned to attack Samakh. The Iraqi forces advanced first toward the
area south of Tiberias and occupied a Jewish colony by the name of
Ghaishar. However, unable to remain there, they withdrew and entered
Palestine, heading toward the city of Nablus while the Iraqi army
advanced toward the regions designated as "Arab" (according to the UN
partition resolution) until it was within fifteen kilometers of the
Natania colony on the Mediterranean coast opposite the city of Toulkarm.
In addition, the Iraqi forces were able to expel the Zionists from the
city of Janin after occupying it.
5. Fighting on the Egyptian
Front (The Southern Front)
The Egyptian ground forces were amassed and equipped in al-Arish. They
were then joined by a Saudi Arabian force composed of a reinforced
detachment and a battalion of Egyptian fighters from the Muslim
Brotherhood operating under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad
Abd al-Aziz..
According to the plan laid by the Arab Supreme Command, the Egyptian
forces were to attack in two locations. First, in an area where regular
forces were operating, they were to march parallel to the Palestinian
coast line extending from al-Arish toward Tel Aviv, then on to Rafh,
Gaza, Askalan, Majdal, and Usdouda, yet without going outside the
boundaries set for the Arab territories by the UN partition resolution.
As for the second location, one in which they would be attacking
semi-regular forces, it was within the borders of the Jewish State as
per the UN partition resolution, extending from Abu Ujaila to Jerusalem
via Beersheva and Hebron.
It is worth noting here that the Egyptian forces which took part in
these advances were not sufficient to achieve the superiority in numbers
needed for the attacks planned, since the Zionist forces which would
come against them were comprised of the Negev Brigade which was
scattered throughout the Negev region, and the Ghaf'ani brigade which
was prepared to disperse behind the former in the region extending from
the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road to the Majdal-Bait Jibrin road. Moreover,
behind these two brigades there was a back-up force prepared to support
the central or southern front as need arose.
The Egyptian forces advanced across the Sinai desert toward the Negev
and occupied the colonies of Nirim and Kufr Darum. They also entered the
city of Gaza, then headed northward toward Majdal. On their way, they
occupied the colony of Yadmordechai, after which a portion of the same
forces headed for Usdouda while another portion advanced to Beersheva,
entering it and then heading northward to meet the Jordanian forces in
Bethlehem. In this way, the Egyptian army was able to isolate the Jewish
settlements in the south of Palestine from the northern regions.
6. Operations of the Rescue Army
The units of the Rescue Army operating in the north of Palestine under
the leadership of Fawzi al-Qawqaji were dispersed throughout Upper
Galilee and part of Lower Galilee. The region in which they were
dispersed was shaped like a pocket which extended from the
Lebanese-Palestinian borders to the outermost edges of the Batouf plain
in the south, and from the hills of Galilee in the west to the outermost
edges of eastern Galilee in the east. Their supply bases were located
throughout south Lebanon.
The Rescue Army carried on its activities against the nearby colonies
from the area in which it was dispersed. In addition, it continued to
set up ambushes against Jewish transportation routes in cooperation with
groups of Palestinian fighters. As for its units located in central
Palestine, they were transformed once the war began into support forces
for operations undertaken by the Jordanian and Iraqi forces. Its forces
located in Galilee cooperated with the Syrian and Lebanese armies and
reinforced their war efforts. Yet despite some offensive operations
which were carried out by the Rescue Army, the general tenor of their
operations during the war remained defensive. One of the most important
battles which the army engaged in was the battle of Shajara. On June 11,
the Rescue Army along with groups of Palestinian fighters attacked
locations to the north and west of the township of Shajara, cutting off
the road to Kufr Tabour by fire. However, they failed to storm the city
and the colony adjacent to it, as a consequence of which they were
obliged to withdraw at nightfall.
7. Operations of the Egyptian Fighters
Once the Negev had been penetrated, battalions of Egyptian fighters
worked as light, mobile forces whose mission was to defend Beersheva and
the Arab locations to the east of the coastal road, as well as to launch
raids on Zionist colonies in the Negev and threaten transportation and
communications to and from there. The fighting forces committed by the
Muslim Brotherhood played an effective role in the battles of Taighaba,
Araq and Suaidan in particular. Battalions of fedayeen fighters were
active on the Jerusalem front from the time they arrived in Bethlehem on
May 19, at which point they raided Zionist colonies and means of
transport and communication to the south of the Jerusalem road. They
worked in cooperation with the Holy War Army in protecting Arab villages
on the outskirts of Hebron, and played a fundamental role in the battle
of Ramat Rahil to the south of Jerusalem. Their operations also had an
indirect effect upon the battles waged by the Jordanian forces in the
regions of Jerusalem and Sharif.
Top
The First Truce (June 11 - July 9, 1948)
The "superpowers" looked upon the entry
of Arab armies into Palestine for its liberation as a kind of external
interference which must be stopped, and a challenge to UN Security
Council resolutions. And despite the limit successes which the Arabs
scored in Palestine, the United States and Britain both viewed the
continuation of the war as a threat to the existence of the Zionist
Jewish entity, and to the Western project aiming at planting a "foreign
body" as it were in the heart of the Arab homeland and the Islamic world
in order to serve their own future interests in the region. In addition,
the Zionist movement worldwide played a major role in arousing the
Western world against the Arabs and the Arab states, which were
ostensibly seeking to wipe out the entire Jewish presence in Palestine.
The bias which existed in Israel's favor is obvious from the fact that
the same states which applied pressure for an end to the war and for the
imposition of sanctions on the Arab states [at war with the Jews] on the
pretext of their desire to adhere to the UN Security Council [partition]
resolution, remained silent when the Zionist forces occupied the
Palestinian coast from Akka (Acre) to Naqourah, a move which was in
violation of the same UN resolution.
Consequently, Western nations hastened to support Israel, turning to the
UN to put a stop to the war. In response, on May 20, 1948, the UN
Security Council appointed Count Bernadotte as an international mediator
to search for a solution to the crisis, and on May 22, 1948, the Council
passed Resolution No. 50 calling for a cease fire between the Arab
states and Israel.
In the beginning, the Arab states rejected the cease fire. However,
taking advantage of its special political and economic ties with Iraq,
Jordan and Egypt, states which possessed the largest fighting forces and
greatest military capabilities and which, moreover, were receiving arms
from Britain, the latter threatened each of these states with a
discontinuation of arms and ammunition supplies should the fighting in
Palestine continue. It was at this time that the divergence in opinion
between the Arab states with ties to Britain on one hand, and Syria on
the other, became apparent.
The situation being what it was, the leaders of member states of the
Arab League held a meeting in Amman to discuss proposals which had been
presented by the international mediator, and opinions were divided over
the matter. It became apparent that all of the Arab states except Syria
favored acceptance of a truce, and over the latter's objections, the
Arab League states agreed to a truce on May 29, 1948, the decision
taking effect as of June 11, 1948.
However, once the Zionist forces had managed to regroup and obtain more
arms from America and other Western states such that it was in a
position to go from a defensive to an offensive position, they violated
the UN Security Council resolution regarding a truce and on June 8,
1948, they took over a number of Arab villages and expelled their
inhabitants.
The fighting recommenced on June 9, 1948, with the balance swinging in
favor of Israel this time. The Zionist forces attempted to rout the Arab
forces on a number of different fronts, succeeding in some cases and
failing in others. They failed to defeat the Iraqi forces in the Janin
region, after which they scored a minor victory in Toulkarm. The Zionist
forces also succeeded in occupying the city of Lid along with its
airport and the city of Ramleh, a battle in which the Jordanian army was
forced to retreat. However, they failed to take over East Jerusalem. The
Security Council passed a cease fire resolution which took effect on
June 18, 1948. However, Israel did not adhere to the resolution, nor did
the Security Council states apply any pressure upon Israel to do so. And
not long after this, Zionist gangs murdered the international mediator
Count Bernadotte on September 17, 1948, apparently because he had been
intending to present a new partition resolution to the UN.
By October, 1948, the Zionist command had organized a series of
operations directed primarily against the Egyptian army. The most
significant of these were the "Ten Strikes" Operation and the "Eye"
Operation as well as the "Hieram" Operation in the Galilee region. After
carrying out these operations, the Zionist forces were able to reinforce
their military positions, impose a blockade on Jayb al-Falouja [sp?],
and advance toward the Gulf of Aqaba and occupy the Egyptian village of
Umm al-Rashshasha (Eilat). In addition, they were able to occupy Upper
Galilee, drive the Rescue Army out of Palestine, and rout the Syrian and
Lebanese forces. Then on October 22, 1948, the Arab commands issued
cease-fire orders to all their forces [!]. Thenceforth, cannons were
silent on numerous fronts, with Israel having gained control over 77% of
the land of Palestine and with the area under Arab control having shrunk
by half, from approximately 12,000 square kilometers to approximately
6,000 square kilometers.
At this time, the West Bank and the eastern part of Jerusalem, which had
now become part of the Jordanian Kingdom, became subject to
[administration by Jordan], whereas the Gaza Strip came under an
Egyptian military administration.
Following the defeat suffered by the Arab forces, talks were held on the
island of Rodos in 1949 between the Zionist entity and the Arab states
which had fought in the war in order to conclude a permanent truce. The
Zionist entity signed truce agreements with the following states: with
Egypt on February 2, 1949, with Lebanon on March 23, 1949, with Jordan
on April 3, 1949, and with Syria on October 20, 1949. And thus it
happened that the greater part of the land of Palestine was lost after a
fierce struggle on the part of the Zionist movement and the Western
powers to take possession of it. This had taken place at a time when the
Arab world was languishing at best, and at worst, in a conspiracy
against itself. As a result, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon became
separated from the new Zionist entity by extra-legal truce lines (40).
One of the most important results of this war was that hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians were rendered homeless, deprived of the right
to return to their houses and to the lands they had left behind. As for
the reasons behind the Arab failure in the war, they include the
following:
- failure on the part of Arab politicians to consult military leaders
with regard to matters related to the war.
- the superior forces and numbers enjoyed by the Zionist entity, and the
aid given to it by international powers.
- Weak military capabilities and lack of expertise on the part of the
Arab forces, some of which were still newly formed with no prior
experience in actual warfare, and some of which were under foreign
leadership.
- the nature of official Arab policies and trends at the time, in
accordance with which there was no intention on the part of Arab leaders
to engage in warfare against international powers.
- weak coordination and divergent points of view on the part of Arab
nations' political leaders.
- the Arabs' lack of a unified, serious military command capable of
planning, coordination and oversight of military operations.
The War of 1956
The Tripartite Aggression Against Egypt
The states of Britain, France and Israel took part together in the
attack on Egypt which took place in 1956. And although each party to the
aggression may have had its own reasons for participation, the result
was their agreement to launch a military strike against Egypt. Before
discussing the details of the attack, it is necessary to touch upon the
reasons for which each nation took part.
On June 26, 1956, four years after the Free Officers' revolt which
resulted in their taking over the government of Egypt and Gamal Abdel
Nasser's accession to power, the latter announced Egypt's response to
the decision of the USA and Britain to withdraw their offers of funding
for the High Dam in the south Aswan region. At around the same time,
Britain announced its intention to employ armed force to protect its
interests in the Suez Canal (41).
Meanwhile, Arab-French and in particular, Egyptian-French relations
began to deteriorate, the reason being that France had been heavily
arming Israel, and with the latest in modern military equipment. This is
what led the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to declare that, "the
true enemies of Egypt are Britain and France, which are sending arms to
Israel" (42). In addition, the support being provided by Egypt at that
time to the Algerian revolution against French colonialism was
considered by France to be interference in its internal affairs, since
France looked upon ?Algeria as a French province. Within this context,
Egypt's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal provided a convenient
justification for France's participation in the aggression against Egypt
on the pretext of preserving its vital interests with respect to the use
of the canal (43).
As for Israel, it had the following reasons to be interested in
launching an attack against Egypt (44):
1. the desire to launch a "preventive strike" which would do away with
the Egyptian military power, which represented the major Arab force at
that time, especially in view of Egypt's recent purchase of tanks,
cannons, war boats and aircraft which helped to make it into a
considerable fighting force.
2. the desire to open up the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli navigation, since
Egypt had gained control over the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba known as
the Strait of Tiran, as well as the two islands located along the strait
known as Tiran and Sanafir. These islands were thus closed to Israeli
navigation, and on more than one occasion Israel had thought of
launching a limited military operation in order to seize Sharm al-Shaikh
in Sinai, thereby gaining control over the strait.
3. to put a stop to the fedayeen operations which employed the Gaza
Strip as their base, since Gaza was under Egyptian control at that time.
Hence, one can see that each party to the aggression was acting on its
own motives, although they were in agreement that the nationalization of
the Suez Canal was to be considered a threat to the strategic interests
of each of them.
Top
The
Military Situation Prior to the Aggression
The condition of the forces which were to engage in repelling the
aggression against Egypt was as follows (44):
Nineteen (19) brigades, including one regular infantry brigade and four
reserve brigades; four armored companies, each having the power of
approximately one brigade; three independent tank battalions with a
combined force of more than one armored brigade. As for the Egyptian air
forces, they were comprised of fourteen air squadrons: seven fleets of
anti-aircraft fighter airplanes, one fleet of fighter-bombers; two
fleets of bombers, three fleets of transport aircraft and one supply and
communications fleet. In terms of sea power, the Egyptian fleet
comprised four destroyers, five frigates, four torpedo boats, several
disembarkment skiffs and coastal patrol boats, in addition to three
submarines whose crews were not yet complete.
As for the Israeli side, its force consisted of eighteen brigades
including three armored brigades, twelve infantry brigades, two
mechanical brigades and one paratrooper brigade, whereas its air force,
which was reinforced by French squadrons borrowed from France and parked
in Israeli airports since October 23, 1956, included twenty-eight
squadrons: nine suadrons of anti-aircraft fighters, seven squadrons of
fighter bombers, four squadrons of bombers, three reconnaissance
squadrons, three air transport squadrons, and two supply and
communications squadrons. As for the Israeli naval corps, it included
only two destroyers, five frigates, twenty-two torpedo boats, seventeen
disembarkment boats, three guard ships and six coastal patrol boats
(45).
Britain earmarked a large land, sea and air force for direct
participation in the attack and had the force amassed in Cyprus, Malta,
Libya and Aden. These forces included twelve brigades, ten squadrons of
anti-aircraft fighter aircraft, fifteen squadrons of fighter-bombers,
fifteen squadrons of bombers, three reconnaissance squadrons, seven air
transport squadrons, two squadrons of storm helicopters, and one supply
and communications squadron.
The British naval force consisted of five aircraft carriers, six cruiser
warships, fourteen destroyers, seven frigates, seven submarines, as well
as a number of sea landing devices and logistical support ships
(transport, repair, hospital, supply, water tanks, wireless
communications, etc.). These various naval pieces were distributed
between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (46).
As for the French forces which had been prepared to participate in the
attack, they included five brigades, twenty-four air squadrons (not
including those which had been lent to Israel), which in turn included
nine squadrons of anti-aircraft fighter planes, three squadrons of
fighter-bombers ready to take off from aircraft carriers, three
reconnaissance squadrons, five air transport squadrons, two aircraft
carriers, one barge, two cruiser warships, four destroyers, eight
frigates, two submarines, and a number of landing, disembarkment and
logistical support aids (47).
By means of such a comparison between the military forces on the
Egyptian side and those belonging to the aggressor states, it becomes
clear that the balance of military power was not weighted in favor of
the Egyptian side, and this despite the fact that not all of the British
and French brigades slated for battle actually entered the fighting
(48). This imbalance contributed further to Israel's readiness to
undertake such aggression against Egypt in hopes of achieving the
aforementioned aims.
On October 2, 1956, the final protocol for the invasion of Egypt was
signed in the suburb of Sivre (49) near Paris. The Israeli side was
represented by David Ben Gurion, the Israeli Minister of Defense, the
French side by Christian Peneau, and the British side by Patrick Dean
(50). The three states had agreed to begin the attack on October 29,
1956 according to the following progression (51):
1. Israel would attack the Sinai Peninsula by land, moving across the
cease-fire lines, then doing an air-drop into strategic Mamarr Mathala.
It was a condition of this operation that it endanger the Suez Canal in
order for France and Britain to be justified in intervening.
2. Britain and France would attack the Suez Canal via Port Said, then
move toward Suez and al-Isma'iliya from the Mediterranean Sea.
3. Requests would be presented to Egypt and Israel. The message sent to
Israel, which was to include two paragraphs, would deal with the demand
that it commit itself to a cease fire, and that it withdraw its forces
ten miles from the canal. As for the message to be sent to Egypt, it
would contain a third paragraph containing a demand that French and
British forces be placed in the canal area.
4. French aircraft would be allowed to use Israeli air bases in order to
provide air protection to Israeli cities.
5, Britain and France would offer Israel a guarantee of free navigation
privileges in the Gulf of Aqaba once the war was over, in response to
which Egypt would take preventive measures in view of a potential future
attack on the canal by Britain and France. These measures included the
following:
1 - Sending a part of the Egyptian army to meet the Israeli aggression
in Sinai.
2 - Employing another part of the army in the canal zone.
3 - Keeping still another part of the army at the disposal of the
[Egyptian] Command in the event that it might need to be transferred to
areas of unexpected military mobilization (53).
Top
The
Beginning of the Tripartite Aggression
On October 27, 1956, the Israeli forces were moving quickly, and on
October 28, the Israeli Ministry of War issued a statement concerning
the Israeli movements in order to prevent Egypt from learning of the
attack. According to the statement, the military mobilization was aimed
against Jordan for the purpose of bringing an end to fedayeen activities
commencing from Jordanian territory. And to further obfuscate the facts,
Israel leaked news about how soon the attack on Jordanian targets was
due to take place.
On the afternoon of October 29, sixteen Israeli aircraft took off and
land-dropped forces into Mamarr Mathala, crossing the truce lines into
Sinai. The Egyptian forces gathered in the area began repelling the
Israeli forces in Mamarr Mathala and in Sinai, the result being that the
Israelis were obliged to clash with the Egyptian forces despite the fact
that they had been trying to avoid entering into battle until after the
British and French forces had arrived.
At 7:00 p.m., October 31, the British and French attack on Egyptian
airports in the areas of Cairo and Suez began. The raids, which
continued for two days. forced the Egyptian air force to drop out of the
fighting and thereby demobilized the major Egyptian air defenses. On
October 31, an order was issued to withdraw the Egyptian forces from
Sinai and concentrate them in the canal area lest they be exposed to air
strikes which the air-land defenses would be unable to repel or
sufficiently neutralize. Moreover, as the Egyptian forces were preparing
to carry out the withdrawal order, the Israeli forces were preparing to
make the most of the new situation and keep moving full speed toward the
Suez Canal. Meanwhile, several battles took place between the Egyptians
and the Israelis in Rafah, Gaza, Khan Younis, Abu Ujaila and Sharm al-Shaikh.
The Israeli forces entered Rafah on November 2 without resistance, while
Gaza fell on November 2 as well. As for Khan Younis, it fell on November
3, after which the Israeli forces proceeded toward the Suez Canal
without difficulty.
As the attack progressed the battle grew fierce, particularly in the
areas of the canal and in Sinai, with aircraft sending forth their bombs
and both military and civilian locations being pounded full force. The
Egyptian forces received a beating by land, air and sea, in which
circumstances the Israeli forces advanced still further until they had
occupied Sharm al-Shaikh on November 6. With the fall of Sharm al-Shaikh,
the Israeli operations in Sinai came to an end. At this point, Israel
had achieved three of its aims:
1 - to reach the Suez Canal.
2 - to occupy the locations overlooking the entrance to the Gulf of
Aqaba.
3 - to gain control over the Gaza Strip.
As for the French and British forces, they encountered stubborn, heroic
Egyptian resistance despite the forcefulness of the air attack against
the city. Consequently, the aggressor was able to do no more than gain
control over Port Said, Port Fuad and the entrance to the canal.
The End of the Aggression
Following the fierce battles on the
Egyptian front, the USA and the Soviet Union issued separate warnings to
each of the parties to the aggression, calling upon them to cease the
attack and to withdraw from the locations over which they had gained
control. The British and French governments both agreed to stop fighting
on the night of November 6-7, announcing that they would remain in Egypt
only until the arrival of the international forces. Then on December 22,
1956, both British and French forces withdrew from Egypt. Following
this, international emergency forces entered the city of Port Said,
after which the Egyptian forces entered it as well. As for Israel, it
claimed that withdrawing from Sinai and the Gaza Strip would create a
situation which threatened its future security, refusing to withdraw
from the locations which it had occupied until after Egypt had agreed to
the placement of international emergency forces in Sharm al-Shaikh. The
USA offered a verbal commitment to refrain from any aggression against
Israel, including fedayeen operations from the Gaza Strip. At the same
time, the major naval powers offered Israel a guarantee of freedom to
navigate in the Tiran Straits, and on March 6, 1957, the last Zionist
soldier withdrew from the Gaza Strip.
Top
The
1967 War
The 1967 War represented one more link in
a series of Zionist terrorist acts: the killing of civilians, striking
fear in their hearts, expropriating their lands after driving their
inhabitants out, and so forth. As for the aggression against Egypt in
the War of 1956, it had represented a political defeat for the Zionist
forces. Except for having opened up the Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli
navigation, Israel had achieved none of its aims through participation
in the aggression against Egypt. Not only so, but the aggression of 1956
had created strategic problems for Israel in that it made it more
difficult for the newborn Zionist entity to gain additional areas of
land which would enable it to expand its borders in the interest of
protecting itself. For this reason, the leaders of the enemy considered
that it would be necessary to set off a new war, and as early as 1957,
began making preparations for such an eventuality. For a ten full years
Israel continued to build up its forces for a further war against the
Arabs, the primary reasons for which may be summarized as follows:
1 - Leaders of the Zionist state were in agreement that the lands which
they had wrested from the Arabs in 1948 were not sufficient to achieve
their strategic aspirations of establishing a safe, strong entity, and
of encouraging the wave of Jewish immigration to "Israel", especially
with further Arab lands having been occupied such as to be new territory
for colonization and settlement. Consequently, they arrived at the
conviction that these aspirations could only be fulfilled by acquiring
more Arab lands. This is confirmed by the statement by Moshe Dayan, the
Israeli Minister of War at that time, who stated, "Israel faces an
unusually complex security problem, since the area covered by its land
is no more than 8,100 square miles, the length of its borders being 400
miles. Three-fourths of the population of Israel live on the coastal
plain which extends from north of Haifa to south of Tel Aviv, and the
average width of this densely populated area is no more than twelve
miles, between the Mediterranean Sea and the borders of Jordan. From the
hills along the Jordanian borders one can see the headquarters of the
Israeli Military Chief of Staff, and the main roads and rail lines are
vulnerable to swift, easy attack. There is hardly a single place in
Israel which is not within reach of enemy fire with the exception of the
Negev desert" (55).
2 - Despite all the summit conferences which had been held among Arab
states by this time, Arab-Arab relations had reached a state of
unprecedented disunity and disarray.
3 - The Israeli armed forces had completed their preparations for war,
having formed striking forces which would give them the ability to
launch a decisive, swift, simultaneous attack against three different
Arab fronts.
4 - Israel had also gained control over Arab water sources, having
worked on establishing a variety of water projects for the purpose of
making maximum use of whatever water was available to it. One of these
was the Hawla Lake Project, completed in the 1950's. Israel had also
begun thinking of seeking control over the headwaters of the Jordan
River so as to render its water resources safe from Arab threats.
5 - By the end of 1966, the Zionist entity was beginning to suffer from
worsening economic problems, and war had come to be seen as the ideal
solution to such problems, since entering a war would help to bring in
economic, financial and military aid from friendly states, as well as
from international Zionist organizations and the Jewish community
throughout the world.
Events Leading up to the War
When the Israeli Military Chief of Staff, Ishaq Rabin stated that "the
Israeli armed forces may attack Damascus, since Syrian terrorist
operations have not ceased", adding that, "this would mean the overthrow
of the present regime [in Syria]" (56), it was a certainty that the
third Israeli-Arab war was about to begin. And in fact, in 1966 the
Zionist forces began amassing their troops along the Syrian borders. A
joint defense pact was then signed between Egypt and Syria on November
2, 1966, while an Egyptian-Jordanian defense pact was signed on May 30,
1966. Prior to these events, the international emergency forces had
withdrawn from Egyptian territory at Egypt's request. In May, 1967 the
Zionists began amassing their forces along the Syrian borders, while the
Syrian command amassed its forces along Syria's southern borders. Not
long after this, Egypt issued orders to its forces to head toward Sinai,
and on May 23, 1967, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli
navigation. At the same time, Iraqi, Syrian, Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian
forces arrived to stand by the Arab states having borders with Israel.
Top
Events of
the War (57):
The Zionist entity began its war against the
Arab nations with a full-blown air attack which it launched against
Egyptian air bases at 8:05 a.m., Monday, May 5, 1967. The Zionist entity
had called its terrorist attack plan, "The Dove Movement". As for the
beginning of the air attack, it was referred to by the acronym KOLP.
According to the Israeli plan, all of Israel's aircraft (approximately
164 fighter airplanes) were to be launched against Egyptian air bases,
leaving no more than twelve aircraft (eight as an umbrella to protect
the air space over the Zionist entity, and four on the ground to meet
emergencies). The attack included nine major airports: four in the Sinai
peninsula and five to the west of the Suez Canal. The raiding aircraft
hovered at an extremely low altitude, sometimes not exceeding ten meters
above sea level, in order not to be detected by Egyptian radar.
The Zionist aircraft struck the runways first in order to prevent
Egyptian airplanes from taking off, then attacked them swiftly to
destroy them. The Zionists excepted only the Arish airport in hopes of
using it later on as a supply base and as an airport for its own
airplanes. In this way, the Egyptian air force was effectively knocked
out of the battle from the early hours of the war.
In accordance with the Zionist plan, the air strike against Sinai
coincided with the massive movement of Israeli forces toward the coast
of Gaza and Sinai, where the Israeli forces clashed with the Palestine
Liberation Army forces on the Gaza coast, and with the Egyptian army in
Sinai. Despite the resistance put up by the Egyptian army, it was unable
to stand up long against the Israeli forces, since it was fighting
against the Israeli air force without sufficient defenses. For this
reason, one may say that the battle on the Egyptian front had been
decided during the early hours of the Zionist aggression against Egypt.
As for the Jordanian front, it fared no better than did the Egyptian
front. Virtually all the aircraft in the Jordanian air force (32
airplanes) were destroyed in the Amman and Mafraq airports on the
afternoon of June 5 after a number of them had launched raids on Israeli
airports (Natania, Batah, Takfa and Sakrin. At approximately 11:00 a.m.
of the same day, four transport airplanes were destroyed on the ground,
as a result of which the Jordanian forces on the West Bank remained
without air cover to help them repel the Zionist aggression. In a land
battle most of which was concentrated in the areas of Jerusalem and
Janin due to these two locations' strategic importance, the Jordanian
Army collapsed at noon on the second day of the war. It then retreated
eastward toward the second defense line, namely, to the Jordan River. As
for the forces which had been sent by other Arab states to Jordanian
territory, they did not take part in the fighting.
On the Syrian front, there was a repeat of what had occurred on the
Egyptian and Jordanian fronts: destruction of Syrian aircraft and Syrian
airports resulting in massive losses. As for the land battles, they were
limited due to the fact that Zionist forces were scattered over the
Egyptian and Jordanian fronts, and after the Zionist forces had finished
with the two previous fronts, some of the forces subject to Zionist
gangs advanced toward the Syrian front to support their forces located
there. Zionist pressure on the Golan Heights then heightened, allowing
the Israeli forces to scale the heights and occupy them by the sixth day
of the war.
As a consequence, the cease-fire lines came to extend from the Suez
Canal in the west to the Jordan River in the east, and from Sharm al-Shaikh
in the south to the mountains of Syria and Lebanon in the north. The
number of Arab inhabitants who came under Israeli occupation at this
time came to 922,000, including 597,000 on the West Bank, 356,000 on the
Gaza strip, 33,000 in Sinai and 6,500 on the Golan Heights. Other
inhabitants of these areas migrated in large numbers, this being the
second forced migration in twenty years resulting from Zionist terrorism
(58).
Top
The 1973 War (59)
In the aftermath of the Zionist invasion
of Arab lands in 1967, Zionist society experienced the euphoria of
victory, proud as it was of what had been achieved by the "Defense Army"
or "the invincible army" as it came to be called by its chief military
leaders. At the same time, the Israeli army's reputation was enhanced
all over the world. As for the Arab side, the defeat of 1967 represented
the end of a dream of liberating the Palestinian land, which in turn
caused a sense of great frustration on the part of ordinary Arab
citizens. As a result, one could now hear accusations of weakness and
failure being leveled at Arab regimes, with an insistence on the
necessity of liberating the Arab lands which had been forcibly wrested
away by the Zionists. Meanwhile, Syria, Iraq and Jordan agreed to
establish a unified military command for the Eastern Front which would
cooperate with the Southern Front (Egypt) in order to achieve their plan
to liberate the land of Palestine and to preserve the legitimate rights
of the Palestinian people. This plan was in accordance with resolutions
passed at the Fourth Summit Conference in Khartoum, which had issued a
statement to the effect that removing the effects of Zionist aggression
against Arab lands was the responsibility of all Arab nations, that
mobilizing all Arab forces was now an absolute necessity, and that the
defeat of 1967 must be a powerful motivation to unify the Arab ranks and
support common Arab efforts (60).
Aims
of the War
The aim behind the decision to launch the war of 1973 was not to
liberate all of the occupied Arab lands and to destroy the Israeli
entity by military force. Rather, it was to create a new reality which
would make possible the liberation of the Palestinian, Syrian and
Egyptian territories lost to Israel in 1967 by diplomatic means, rather
than by military means. This would be possible on the basis of changes
which would inevitably accompany the outbreak of a fourth Arab-Zionist
war. Such changes would have the potential of transforming the
diplomatic situation in the region from a state of silence and
anticipation to one of effective, concerted action. This may be seen
clearly in the statement made by former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat,
who said, "We are fully aware of the dimension of the international
balance [of power], the sensitivity of the Middle East region, and its
importance both to the West and to the East. For this reason, the
October 1973 War was a limited war, the aim of which was to strike at
the heart of the theory of Israeli security. For we know that this will
be followed by significant changes capable of leading us toward full
liberation of the land" (61).
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The Outbreak of the War
The 1973 War began as a surprise to the Zionists. At 2:05 p.m. on
October 6, 1973, preparatory bombing began with artillery, mortar,
bomber and tank fire which continued for a period of 53 minutes. At the
same time, two-hundred Egyptian and Syrian airplanes took off, heading
toward Israeli military outposts at the other end of the 1967 cease-fire
lines. The fighting took place only on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts,
the Jordanian front remaining calm throughout the war. And this despite
the fact that forces from the Jordanian army took part in the fighting
on the Syrian front. Moreover, in accordance with a resolution passed by
the Khartoum Summit, forces from Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya,
Morocco, Algeria, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates would fight
alongside the states sharing borders with Israel. Within 45 minutes, and
with the help of the Arab forces which had come to offer support, the
Egyptian forces were pouring onto the eastern side, destroying
barricades and mines and surrounding Israeli fortifications along the
Barlev line. As Arab soldiers stormed Zionist fortifications, enemy
soldiers surrendered to them with their weapons and tanks. With the help
of its Arab brethren, the Egyptian army was able to liberate areas along
the entire length of the Suez Canal line.
On the Syrian front, and with the help of the other Arab armies which
had come to offer assistance, the Syrian soldiers were able to ascend
the peak of Jabal al-Shaikh, as well as to occupy the most
well-fortified Zionist strongholds. Arab tanks began liberating one
outpost after another, and before long the Syrian forces were
overlooking Lake Tiberias and the "Finger of Galilee". The Zionists
attempted to make use of their air force in this battle; however, the
Arab ground defenses came against them, shooting down a number of
Israeli aircraft. Soon Israeli soldiers began fleeing a battleground
filled with soldiers crying, "God is greatest!" But when the Zionist
army was on the verge of collapse, the United States began supplying the
Zionist entity with modern arms and equipment in unprecedented
quantities. This took place via the American air bridge, which began its
work in a public, concentrated manner on October 13, 1973, thereby
modifying the balance of power in military operations in favor of the
Zionist army.
As a result of American support for Israel in the war, the Zionist
forces were able on October 16, 1973 to cross over to the western bank
of the Suez Canal by means of a bridge which they had set up at the
Dafarsiwar point. In this way the Israeli forces began reinforcing their
presence at the canal, causing major confusion in the ranks of the
Egyptian forces. The Zionists likewise tried without success to occupy
the city of Suez. However, they were able to bring the Egyptian third
army under siege, cutting off its lines of food and communication. On
the Syrian front, the Zionists were able to recover all the lands they
had lost and to advance into Syrian territory until the vanguard of the
enemy forces was within 25 kilometers of Damascus. This was a major
reason for the Egyptians' and Syrians' decision to accept Security
Council Resolution 338.
Meanwhile, the oil-producing states did not hesitate to take part in the
battle by using petroleum as an effective weapon for the first time. The
Arab ministers of oil convened a meeting in Kuwait on October 17 in
which they decided to make an immediate cut in oil production to
continue on a monthly basis, banning all oil exports to the United
States and Holland until such time as the Israeli forces had evacuated
all Arab lands which had been occupied in the 1967 War. However, the ban
resolution was rescinded by the Arab ministers in a later meeting held
in Cairo on July 10, 1974.
In order to prevent the fighting from spreading further and for fear
that the Zionist Army might be destroyed, on October 22 the Security
Council issued Resolution 338 calling for a cease fire on the part of
all warring parties, and to go into effect within a maximum of 12 hours
after the issuance of the resolution. In addition, this resolution
called upon all warring parties to put into effect Resolution 242 passed
on November 22, 1967 and to enter into negotiations under supervision by
mutually agreed upon mediators for the purpose of reaching a just,
lasting peace in the Middle East. Now that the enemy had managed to
achieve the aforementioned advance into Egyptian territory, Egypt
acquiesced to the resolution. The Egyptian acceptance of a cease fire
came as a surprise to Syria which, not believing itself capable of
carrying on the war alone, likewise agreed to the resolution.
Results of the War
The War of 1973 opened the door wide for the Palestinian cause to
reappear on the agendas of international forums after being kept out of
view for so long by powers supportive of Israel. Militarily speaking,
although the Arab forces had not been able to remove the effects of the
Zionist aggression of 1967, one may say that one of the most important
military outcomes achieved by the Arabs in 1973 was that Arab armies had
been able to take an offensive strategic initiative for the first time
since the war of 1948, this in addition to a number of practical,
tactical successes scored by the Arab forces in the early stages of the
attack. The war also had a positive effect on Arabs' state of mind,
since by showing Arabs to be courageous fighters it served to correct
distortions in the image of Arabs which had been prevalent earlier. And
within the Arab territories, the war gave Arab citizens a psychological
boost capable of helping them to cope more effectively with their
occupying enemy.
By contrast, the war had a demoralizing effect on citizens of the
Zionist entity due to the massive human and material losses suffered by
the Israelis. Confidence in Israel's military capabilities was shaken
both within Israel and elsewhere, and the myth of the "invincible
Israeli army" was effectively demolished.
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The War of 1982
The War of 1982 was distinguished by the
fact that it was clearly and unequivocally an Israeli-Palestinian war.
For the first time in the history of Israeli-Palestinian confrontations,
the arena of conflict was one which clearly involved the forces of the
Palestinian revolution on one hand, and those of the occupying Zionist
army on the other. Here also one may see the difference between the
primary aims behind the war of 1982 and those behind the wars which
preceded it. In the war of 1956, for example, the aim entertained by the
Zionist entity was not to do away with Egypt as a political entity so
much as to destroy its military capabilities in Sinai. In the War of
1967, the Zionist entity sought to expand geographically and to destroy
Arab military power, whereas the War of 1973 initiated by Syria and
Egypt had limited political ends, in particular, the effacement of the
effects left by the War of 1967. In this war, by contrast, the Zionists
planned to achieve a decisive, comprehensive military and political
victory over the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its
infrastructure in Lebanon.
Events Leading up to the War
After a period during which there was an increase in military operations
against the Zionist entity being launched by Palestinian resistance
forces from bases within south Lebanon, the Zionist entity thought it
advisable to engage in an invasion of south Lebanon in order to create a
buffer zone to provide security for inhabitants of the northern regions
of the occupied territories. Two operations in particular launched by
the Zionist occupation powers against the Palestinian resistance in
Lebanon, one in 1978 and the other in 1981, served as harbingers of the
War of 1982. The first of these, known as the "Litani Operation", lasted
from March 15-21, 1978. By means of this operation, the Zionist entity
was able to gain control over south Lebanon, and to delegate
responsibility for administering this region to a person by the name of
Sa'ad Haddad, who announced the establishment of "The Free State of
Lebanon" (62). In the second of these two operations, which took place
in July, 1981, Israeli forces bombed bases belonging to the Palestinian
resistance as well as villages in south Lebanon. The Palestinian
resistance forces responded with artillery fire and missiles launched
against Jewish settlements in Upper and Western Galilee. The conflict
ended fourteen days later with a cease fire which went into effect as of
July 24, 1981. Moreover, in view of Israel's failure to achieve the aims
for which it had engaged in these two operations, namely, to destroy the
infrastructure of the PLO, Zionist leaders, both political and military,
decided to launch an invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 in an
operation which they called "Well-being for Galilee".
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The
Beginning of the War and Subsequent Events
(63):
On the night of June 5-6, 1982, the Zionist air force strafed the
western neighborhoods of Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiya. On June 6,
the invading forces entered Lebanese territory, bringing with them onto
the battlefield 90,000 soldiers, 1,300 tanks, 12,000 soldier- and
ration-transport trucks, 1,300 armored personnel carriers, an air force
composed of 634 fighter aircraft, and a navy force the size and power of
which rendered it virtually invincible. This force attacked the Syrian
army and air force on Lebanese soil and in Lebanese air space. However,
the attack was directed primarily against approximately 10,000-15,000
Palestinian and Lebanese fighters without air power, naval power or
tanks (64). The invasion had barely been in progress for 24 hours when
the city of Tyre fell, allowing the Zionist forces to take it over and
continue their advance through south Lebanon. Palestinian and Lebanese
centers of resistance fell like dominoes before the Zionist invaders.
However, the invaders also met stubborn resistance on the part of the
Palestinian fighters, on account of which they sought refuge in the
Lebanese capital, Beirut.
The Zionist invasion took place so swiftly that reporters and cameramen
could see the ruins of villages and cities with the smoke still rising
from them, and the corpses of the slain as they were being pulled out
from beneath the debris. The Zionist enemy forces clashed with the
Syrian forces located in Lebanon, and fierce battles took place between
the two sides for several days. The Syrians showed considerable skill in
tank warfare. However, in the course of these battles the Zionists were
able to destroy the Syrian anti-aircraft missile network. These missiles
were never even launched, in fact, due to an advanced technology
developed by the Israelis which enabled them to "blind" the Syrian
missiles (65), then destroy them on the ground. For this reason Syria
launched its airplanes to counter the attacking aircraft, but the Syrian
air force received a powerful blow which virtually paralyzed it, with
the result that Syrian land forces were left exposed before enemy
aircraft, which inflicted heavy losses on the Syrian side in tanks,
artillery and human life. Syrian forces then withdrew to posts
relatively distant from the primary centers of fighting.
The fall of south Lebanon into the hands of the Zionist occupation army
opened the way for the siege of Beirut, which was where the leaders of
the PLO were based along with the PLO's main institutions. The Lebanese
kata'ib forces cooperated with the invading forces in closing in on the
Palestinians (66), the result of which was that Beirut suffered a
continuous siege at the hands of the Zionist forces for more than two
months. During this period, the Zionist air force engaged in heavy
strafing of Beirut and a number of other Lebanese cities, the aim being
to destroy the military posts, both known and suspected, of the PLO, as
well as civilian centers associated with the Palestinians. After all,
Israel considers any and all institutions associated with the PLO to be
"terrorist", including even those dedicated to medical and social work.
Consequently, all such locations became military targets. Israel engaged
in two types of operations which led to heavy casualties among
civilians: the first, random bombing to incite people against the PLO,
and the second, bombing concentrated in particular locations to kill the
PLO leaders (67).
The fighters on behalf of the Palestinian revolution succeeded in
holding out against the Zionist war machine despite their sparse numbers
and their lack of equipment and ammunition. However, the political
leadership then chose the quickest, easiest, but most costly way out of
the blockaded city. On the basis of an agreement sponsored by the United
States eighty days after the beginning of the siege, the Palestinian
forces would be allowed to leave the city on condition that they
relocate to Arab countries far from the Israeli borders. The exit of the
PLO forces in this manner was seen as a cruel, devastating blow to the
Palestinian military structure.
Outcomes of the War
1 - The Zionist forces were able to deliver a blow to the infrastructure
of the Palestinian armed forces, and to minimize their presence on
Lebanese soil.
2 - The Zionist entity embroiled itself in a Lebanese military quagmire,
exposing itself to military resistance of a new sort led by Lebanese
organizations (68).
3 - The Arabs' popular armed struggle entered a new phase which gave
rise to projects, some Arab-initiated and others initiated by others,
involving the search for a political settlement, a change which signaled
a turning point in the course to be followed by the Zionist-Arab
struggle and the Palestinian cause.
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References
1. The Center for Cultural Studies,
International Issues (special issue), No. 261, 2-8, Jan. 2-8, 1995, p.
47.
2. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
3. Mamdouh al-Rousan, Iraq and Middle East Issues, 1941-1958, Beirut,
The Arab Institution for Study and Publication, 1979, p. 243.
4. A Group of Researchers, The Palestinian Cause and the Zionist-Arab
Conflict, Vol. II, Part I, The Association of Arab Universities
(Secretariat General), p. 26.
5. Barry Rubin, The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, Syracuse,
Syracuse University Press, 1981, p. 196.
6. Ibid., p. 199.
7. Arif al-Arif, The Setback: The Setback Suffered by Jerusalem and
Paradise Lost, 1947-1952, Beirut, Sidon: Manshourat al-Maktabat al-Asriyah
lil-Tiba'ah wal-Nashr [the Modern Library for Printing and Publication],
1956, p. 282.
8. Al-Rousan, op. cit., p. 262.
9. A Group of Researchers, The Palestinian Cause, op. cit., p. 30.
10. Nabil Khalid al-Agha, The Cause of Palestine in the Biography of a
Hero: The Living Martyr, Abd al-Qadir al-Husaini, The Arab Institution
for Study and Publication, Beirut 1980, pp. 62-63.
11. Ibid., paraphrased, pp. 61-65.
12. A Group of Researchers, op. cit., p. 31.
13. Rubin, op. cit., p. 198.
14. Ibid., p. 199.]
15. A Group of Researchers, op. cit., p. 33.
16. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
17. Muhsin Muhammad Salih, The Islamic Current in Palestine and its
Effect on the "Jihad" Movement, 1917-1948, Maktabat al-Falah, Kuwait
1988, pp. 464-476, paraphrased.
18. Ibid., pp. 477-478, paraphrased.
19. Dr. Ghazi Rababi'a, The Palestinian Cause and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, Amman 1987, First Printing, p. 65.
20. Ibid., p. 66.
21. The Memoirs of King Abdullah, presented by Umar al-Madani: A Reality
out of the History of Jordan, p. 241.
22. Charles Douglas-Hume, The Arab and
Israel, The Bodley Head, London-Sydney-Toronto, p. 23.
23. Ghazi Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 68.
24. Ibid., p. 67.
25. Retired Major General Ali Ghalib Aziz, The Liberation of Palestine,
The Iraqi Army Press, Baghdad 1969, p. 65.
26. Palestine: the Role of Morals and Intellect in the Battle for
Liberation, Dar al-Abhath wal-Nashr [Research and Publication House),
Beirut 1967, p. 77.
27. Muhammed Haikal, The Road to Ramadan, London-Collis-Tame Place,
1975, p. 153.
28. Igal Alon, The Establishment and Formation of the Israel Army,
trans. into Arabic by Uthman Sa'id, Dar al-Awdah, Beirut 1971, pp.
66-68.
29. A Group of Researchers, op. cit., p. 35.
30. Arif al-Arif, op. cit., pp. 54-61.
31. Hani al-Hindi, The Rescue Army, Dar al-Quds: Beirut 1974, pp. 52-53.
32. Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 70.
33. The War of Palestine 1947-1948: The Official Israeli Account, trans.
into Arabic by Ahmad Khalifa, Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniah [The
Foundation for Palestinian Studies]: Nicosia 1984, pp. 60-74.
34. Ibid., pp. 54-56.
35. Ibid., pp. 408-409.
36. The Wars over Palestine 1947-1948, op. cit. pp. 427-429.
37. A Group of Researchers, op. cit., p. 42.
38. Rababi'a, op. cit., 71.
39. A Group of Researchers, op. cit., 84.
40. For further information on events of the war, see: The Palestinian
Encyclopedia, "Al-Dirasat al-Kharijiyah [Foreign Studies]", pp. 478-489;
A Group of Researchers, op. cit., pp. 153-231; and Chaim Herzog, The
Arab-Israel War, pp. 1-104.
41. Rababi'a, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
42. Dr. Ahmad Sa'id Nawfal, French-Arab Relations Vis-a-vis the French
Position on the Basic Elements of the Palestinian Cause, The Kazimah
Company for Publication, Translation and Distribution, Kuwait 1984, p
55.
42. For further details, see Ibid., pp. 54-57.
43. Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 101, paraphrased.
44. A Group of Researchers, op. cit., p. 252.
45. Ibid., pp. 251-252.
46. Ibid., p. 253.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Nawfal, op. cit., p. 57.
50. Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 103.
51. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
52. Introduction to the Palestinian Cause, Center for Middle Eastern
Studies, forthcoming.
53. Al-Haytham al-Ayyoubi, in The Palestinian Cause and the Zionist-Arab
Conflict, op. cit., pp. 258-284; and Rababi'ah, op. cit., pp. 104-109.
54. For further details, see Dr. Haytham al-Kilani, "The Arab-Israeli
Wars over Palestine" in The Palestinian Encyclopedia, Section 2, Vol. 5,
Damascus 1984, p. 46; Drs. Abd al-Sattar Qasim and Ghazi Rababi'ah,
Arab-Israeli Wars, and Jawad al-Hamd (ed), Introduction to the
Palestinian Cause, Amman, 1997, pp. 288-290.
55. Dr. Salman Rashid Salman, The Nuclear Weapon and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, Amman 1978, p. 27.
56. Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 122.
57. For further details, see The Military Encyclopedia, Part I, The Arab
Institution for Study and Publication, Beirut 1977, pp. 670-694; and
Haytham al-Kilani, op. cit., pp. 542-582.
58. Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 125.
59. For further details, see The Military Encyclopedia, op. cit., pp.
694-723; and Lieutenant Colonel Haytham al-Ayyoubi, "The Ramadan War,
1973", in Abdul Aziz al-Dawri, ed., The Palestinian Cause and the
Arab-Zionist Conflict, Part II, Section 2, pp. 579-635.
60. Tal'at Ahmad Muslim, "Participation of Arab Armies in the 1973 War,"
in Palestinian Affairs, No. 193, April 1989, Beirut, p. 62.
61. Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 234.
62. Qasim and Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 309.
63. For further details, see: Haytham al-Kilani, op. cit., pp. 664-719;
Nizam Sharabi, America and the Arabs: American Policy in the Arab World
in the Twentieth Century, Riyad al-Rayyis Books and Publishing, London
1990, pp. 596-612.
64. Clifford A. Wright, The Israeli War Machine in London (trans. from
Eng. to Arabic), The Foundation for Palestinian Studies; and The 1982
Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Political and Military Studies, Beirut
1984, p. 60.
65. For further details concerning Zionist weapons and technological
progress related thereto, see: Ibid., pp. 57-86.
66. Qasim and Rababi'a, op. cit., pp. 310-311.
67. Wright, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
68. Qasim and Rababi'a, op. cit., p. 312.
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